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NEW YORK TIMES
19 Feb. 1976

Text of Ford Plan on Intelligence Units and Excerpts From His Executive Order

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Feb. 18—Following are the text of President Ford's message to Congress outlining proposed changes in the structure and authority of the intelligence community and excerpts from his executive order, effectively immediately, placing new restrictions of intelligence activities and establishing a new oversight aspect.

Ford Message

To the Congress of the United States:

By virtue of the authority vested in me by Article II, Sections 2 and 3 of the Constitution, and other provisions of law, I have today issued an executive order pertaining to the organization and control of the United States foreign intelligence community. This order establishes clear lines of accountability for the nation's foreign intelligence agencies. It sets forth strict guidelines to control the activities of these agencies and specifies as well as those activities in which they shall not engage.

In carrying out my constitutional responsibilities to manage and conduct foreign policy and provide for the nation's defense, I believe it essential to have the best possible intelligence about the capabilities, intentions and activities of governments and other entities and individuals abroad. To this end, the foreign intelligence agencies of the United States play a vital role in collecting and analyzing information related to the national defense and foreign policy.

It is equally as important that the methods these agencies employ to collect such information for the legitimate needs of the Government conform to the standards set out in the Constitution to preserve and respect the privacy and civil liberties of American citizens.

The executive order I have issued today will insure a proper balancing of these interests. It establishes Government-wide direction for the foreign intelligence agencies and places responsibility and accountability on individuals not institutions.

I believe it will eliminate abuses and questionable activities on the part of the foreign intelligence agencies while at the same time permitting them to get on with their vital work of gathering and assessing information. It is also my hope that these steps will help to restore public confidence in these agencies and encourage our citizens to appreciate the valuable contribution they make to our national security.

Beyond the steps I have taken in the executive order, I also believe there is a clear need for some specific legislative actions. I am today submitting to the Congress of the United States proposals which will go far toward enhancing the protection of true intelligence secrets as well as regularizing procedures for intelligence collection in the United States.

Protecting Sources

My first proposal deals with the protection of intelligence sources and methods. The Director of Central Intelligence is charged, under the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, with protecting intelligence sources and methods. The act, however, gives the director no authorities commensurate with this responsibility.

Therefore, I am proposing legislation to impose criminal and civil sanctions on those who are authorized access to intelligence secrets and who willfully and wrongfully reveal this information. This legislation is not an "official secrets act," since it would affect only those who improperly disclose secrets, not those to whom secrets are disclosed. Moreover, this legislation could not be used to cover up abuses and improprieties. It would in no way prevent people from reporting questionable activities to appropriate authorities in the executive and legislative branches of the government.

It is essential, however, that the irresponsible and dangerous exposure of our nation's intelligence secrets be stopped. The American people have long accepted the principles of confidentiality and secrecy in many dealings—such as with doctors, lawyers and the clergy. It makes absolutely no sense to deny this same protection to our intelligence secrets. Openness is a hallmark of our democratic society, but the American people have never believed that it was necessary to reveal the secret war plans of the Department of Defense, and I do not think they wish to have true intelligence secrets revealed either.

I urge the adoption of this legislation with all possible speed.

Second, I support proposals that would clarify and set statutory limits, where necessary, on the activities of the foreign intelligence agencies. In particular, I will support legislation making it a crime to assassinate or attempt to conspire to assassinate a foreign official in peacetime. Since it defines a crime, legislation is necessary.

Third, I will meet with the appropriate leaders of Congress to try to develop sound legislation to deal with a critical problem involving personal privacy—electronic surveillance. Working with Congressional leaders and the Justice Department and other executive agencies, we will seek to develop a procedure for undertaking electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes. It should create a special procedure for seeking a judicial warrant authorizing the use of electronic surveillance in the United States for foreign intelligence purposes.

Supervised Mail Openings

I will also seek Congressional support for sound legislation to expand judicial supervision of mail openings. The law now permits the opening of United States mail, under proper judicial safeguards, in the conduct of criminal investigations. We need authority to open mail under the limitations and safeguards that now apply in order to obtain vitally needed foreign intelligence information.

This would require a showing that there is probable cause to believe that the sende or recipient is an agent of a foreign power who is engaged in spying, sabotage or terrorism. As is now the case in criminal investigations, those seeking authority to examine mail for foreign intelligence purposes will have to convince a Federal judge of the necessity to do so and accept the limitations upon their authorization to examine the mail provided in the order of the court.

Fourth, I would like to share my views regarding appropriate Congressional oversight of the foreign intelligence agencies. It is clearly the business of the Congress to organize itself to deal with these matters. Certain principles, however, should be recognized by both the executive and legislative branches if this oversight is to be effective. I believe good Congressional oversight is essential so that the Congress and the American people whom you represent can be assured that the foreign intelligence agencies are adhering to the law in all of their activities.

Congress should seek to centralize the responsibility for oversight of the foreign intelligence community. The more committees and subcommittees dealing with highly sensitive secrets, the greater the risks of disclosure. I recommend that Congress establish a joint foreign intelligence oversight committee. Consolidation of Congressional oversight in one committee will facilitate the efforts of the Administration to keep the Congress fully informed of foreign intelligence activities.

It is essential that both the House and the Senate establish firm rules to insure that foreign intelligence secrets will not be improperly disclosed. There must be established a clear process to safeguard these secrets and effective measures to deal with unauthorized disclosures.

Secrecy Emphasized

Any foreign intelligence information transmitted by the executive branch to the oversight committee, under an injunction of secrecy, should not be unilaterally disclosed without my agreement. Respect for the integrity of the Constitution requires adherence to the principle that no individual member, nor committee, nor single house of Congress can overrule an act of the executive. Unilateral publication of classified information over the objection of the President, one committee or one house of Congress, not only violates the doctrine of separation of powers, but also effectively overrules the actions of the other house of Congress, and perhaps even the majority of both houses.

Finally, successful and effective Congressional oversight of the foreign intelligence agencies depends on mutual trust between the Congress and executive. Each branch must recognize and respect the rights and prerogatives of the other if anything is to be achieved.

In this context, a Congressional requirement to keep the oversight committee "fully" informed is more desirable and workable as a practical matter than formal requirements for notification

of specific activities to a large number of committees. Specifically, Section 662 of the Foreign Assistance Act, which has resulted in over six separate committee briefings, should be modified as recommended by the Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy, and reporting should be limited to the new oversight committee.

Both the Congress and the executive branch recognize the importance to this nation of a strong intelligence service. I believe it urgent that we take the steps I have outlined above to insure sure that America not only has the best foreign intelligence service in the world, but also the most unique—one which operates in a manner fully consistent with the constitutional rights of our citizens.

Executive Order

Foreign intelligence agencies shall not engage in any of the following activities:

(1) Physical surveillance directed against a United States person, unless it is a lawful surveillance conducted pursuant to procedures approved by the head of the foreign intelligence agency and directed against any or the following:

(I) A present or former employee of such agency, its present or former contractors or their present or former employees, for the purpose of protecting foreign intelligence or counterintelligence sources or methods or national security information from unauthorized disclosure; or

(II) A United States person, who is in contact with either such a present or former contractor or employee of a foreign intelligence or person who is the subject of a foeign intelligence or counterintelligence inquiry, but only to the extent necessary to identify such United States person; or

(III) A United States person outside the United States who is reasonably believed to be acting on behalf of a foreign power or engaging in international terrorist or narcotics activities or activities threatening the national security.

(2) Electronic surveillance to intercept communication which is made from, or is intended by the sender to be received in, the United States, or directed against United States persons abroad, except lawful electronic surveillance under procedures approved by the Attorney General; provided, that the Central Intelligence Agency shall not perform electronic surveillance within the United States, except for the purpose of testing equipment under procedures approved by the Attorney General consisten with law.

(3) Unconsented physical searches within the United States; or unconsented physical searches directed against United States persons abroad, except lawful searches under procedures aproved by the Attorney eGneral,

(4) Opening of mail or examination of envelopes of mail in United States postal channels except in accordance with applicable statutes and regulations.

(5) Examination of Federal tax returns or tax information except in accordance with applicable statutes and regulations.

(6) Infiltration or undisclosed participation within the United States in any organization for the purpose of reporting on or influencing its activities or members; except such infiltration or participation with respect to an organization composed primarily of non-United States persons which is reasonably believed to be acting on behalf of a foreign power.

(7) Collection of information, however acquired, concerning the domestic activities of United States persons except:

(I) Information concerning corporations or other commercial organizations which constitutes foreign intelligence or counterintelligence.

(II) Information concerning present or former employers, present or former emloyees, or their present or former employees, or applicants for any such employment or contracting, necessary to protect foreign intelligence or counter-intelligence sources or methods or national security information from unauthorized disclosure; and the identity of persons in contact with the foregoing or with a non-United States person who is the subject of a foreign intelligence or counter-intelligence inquiry.

(III) Information concerning persons who are reasonably believed to be potential sources or contacts, but only for the purpose of determining the suitability or credibility of such persons.

(IV) Foreign intelligence or counterintelligence gathered abroad or from electronic surveillance conducted in compliance with section 5(b)(2); or foreign intelligence acquired from cooperating sources in the United States.

(V) Information about a United States person who is reasonably believed to be acting on behalf of a foreign power or engaging in international terrorist or narcotics activities.

(VI) Information concerning persons or activities that pose a clear threat to foreign intelligence agency facilities or personnel, provided, that such information is retained only by the foreign intelligence agency threatened and that proper coordination with the Federal Bureau of Investigation is accomplished.

[C] Dissemination and Storage. Nothing in this section of this order shall prohibit:

(1) Lawful dissemination to the appropriate law enforcement agencies of incidentally gathered information indicating involvement in activities which may be in violation of law.

(2) Storage of information required by law to be retained.

(3) Dissemination to foreign intelligence agencies of information of the subject matter types listed in section 5 (b) (7).

Restrictions on Experimentation. Foreign intelligence agencies shall not engage in experimentation with drugs on human subjects, except with the informed consent, in writing and witnessed by a disinterested third party, of each such human subject and in accordance with the guidelines issued by the national commission for the protection of human subjects for biomedical and behavioral research.

Assistance to Law Enforcement Authorities.

(1) No foreign intelligence agency shall, except as expressly authorized by law (I) provide services, equipment, personnel or facilities to the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration or to state or local police organizations of the United States or (II) participate in or fund any law enforcement activity within the United States.

(2) These prohibitions shall not, however, preclude: (I) cooperation between a foreign intelligence agency and appropriate law enforcement agencies for the purpose of protecting the personnel and facilities of the foreign intelligence agency or preventing espionage or other criminal activity related to foreign intelligence or counterintelligence or (II) provision of specialized equipment or technical knowledge for use by any other Federal department or agency.

(F) Assignment of Personnel. An employee of a foreign intelligence agency details elsewhere within the Federal Government shall be responsible to the host agency and shall not report to such employee's parent agency on the affairs of the host agency, except as may be directed by the latter. The head of the host agency, and any successor, shall be informed of the detailee's association with the parent agency.

(G) Prohibition of Assassination. No employee of the United States Government shall engage in, or conspire to engage in, political assassination.

(H) Implementation.

(1) This section of this order shall be effective on March 1, 1976. Each department and agency affected by this section of this order shall promptly issue internal directives to implement this section with respect to its foreign intelligence and counter-intelligence operations.

(2) The Attorney General shall, within ninety days of the effective date of this section of this order, issue guidelines relating to activities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in the areas of foreign intelligence and counterintelligence.

Oversight of Intelligence Organizations.

Oversight of Intelligence Organizations.

(A) There is hereby established an Intelligence Oversight Board, hereinafter referred to as the oversight board.

(1) The oversight board shall have three members who shall be appointed by the President and who shall be from outside the Government and be qualified on the basis of ability, knowledge, diversity of background and experience. The members of the oversight board may also serve on the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory oBard (Executive Order No. 11460 of March 20, 1969.) No member of the oversight board shall have any personal contractual relationship with any agency or department of the intelligence community.

(2) One member of the oversight board shall be designated by the President as its chairman.

(3) The oversight board shall:

(I) Receive and consider reports by inspectors general and general counsels of the intelligence community concerning activities that raise questions of legality or propriety.

(II) Review periodically the practices and procedures of the inspectors general and general counsels of the intelligence community designed to discover and report to the oversight board activities that raise questions of legality or propriety.

(III) Review periodically with each member of the intelligence community their internal guidelines to ensure their adequacy.

(IV) Report periodically, at least quarterly, to the Attorney General and the President on its findings.

(V) Report in a timely manner to the Attorney General and to the President any actlvities that raise serious questions about legality.

(VI) Report in a timely manner to the President any activities that raise serious questions about propriety.

(B) Inspectors general and general counsels within the intelligence community shall:

(1) Transmit to the oversight board reports of any activities that come to their attention that raise questions of legality or propriety.

(2) Report periodically, at least quarterly, to the oversight board on its findings

concerning questionable activities, if any.

(3) Provide to the oversight board all information requested about activities within their respective department or agencies.

(4) Report to the oversight board any occasion on which they were directed not to report any activity to the oversight board by their agency or department heads.

(5) Formulate practices and procedures designed to discover and report to the oversight board activities that raise questions of legality or propriety.

(C) Heads of intelligence agencies or departments shall:

(1) Report periodically to the oversight board of any activities of their organizations that raise questions of legality or propriety.

(2) Instruct their employees to cooperate fully with the oversight board.

(3) Ensure that inspectors general and general counsels of their agency have access to any information necessary to perform their duties assigned by [a later paragraph] of this section.

(D) The Attorney General shall:

(1) Receive and consider reports from the oversight board.

(2) Report periodically, at least quarterly, to the President with respect to activities of the intelligence community, if any, which raise questions of legality.

(E) The oversight board shall receive staff support. No person who serves the staff of the oversight board shall have any contractual or employment relationship with any department or agency in the intelligence community.

(F) The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board established by executive order No. 11460 of March 20, 1969, remains in effect.

Secrecy Protection

(A) IN order to improve the protection of sources and methods of intelligence, all members of the executive branch and its contractors given access to information containing sources of methods of intelligence shall, as a condition of obtaining access, sign an agreement that they will not disclose that information to persons not authorized to receive it.

(B) IN the event of any unauthorized disclosure of information concerning sources or methods of intelligence, the names of any persons found to have made unauthorized disclosure shall be forwarded (1) to the head of applicable departments or agencies for appropriate disciplinary action; and (2) to the Attorney General for appropriate legal action.

(C) In the event of any threatened unauthorized disclosure of information concerning sources or methods of intelligence by a person who has agreed not to make such disclosure, the details of the threatened disclosure shall be transmitted to the Attorney General for appropriate legal action, including the seeking of a judicial order to prevent such disclosure.

(3) In further pursuit of the need to provide protection for other significant areas of intelligence, the Director of Central Intelligence is authorized to promulgate rules and regulations to expand the scope of agreements secured from those persons who, as an aspect of their relationship with the United States Government, have access to classified intelligence material.

THE NEW YORK TIMES, THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 19, 1976

In Sheep's Clothing

By Anthony Lewis

WASHINGTON, Feb. 18—What was advertised as a sweeping reform of the intelligence community turns out, on examination, to be a blueprint for more secrecy, greater executive power and less Congressional oversight. That is the gist, the amazing gist, of the orders and proposed legislation unveiled today by President Ford.

The Ford package is so massive, and so full of obscurities, that thorough analysis would require a lawyer's brief. Mr. Ford's own legal, political and intelligence aides had difficulty giving clear answers to questions at a briefing. But some of the more remarkable provisions can be quickly sketched.

On secrecy, a proposed statute would introduce into American law, for the first time, criminal punishment of past or present Government employees for disclosing "information relating to intelligence sources and methods." Everything in that vague category would be swept under the ban, regardless of whether disclosure did any actual harm to U.S. security, or was intended to.

The effect of such a law could be to legitimize some of the legally dubious actions of the Nixon Administration. Consider, for example, the case of the Pentagon Papers. Today, no one would seriously argue that their publication harmed the national security. But in 1971 John Mitchell and Robert Mardian argued vehemently that it would damage security—and disclose intelligence methods.

After the Nixon lawyers failed to prevent publication of the Pentagon Papers, they brought reporters and others before grand juries and demanded their sources; one professor went to jail for contempt. Then Daniel Ellsberg was prosecuted under flimsy legal theories that were never tested because the case failed on other grounds.

The Ford secrecy act would provide a solid statutory basis for a future Nixon or Mitchell or Mardian to do all those things. The Ford draft does exclude those who receive leaks from criminal punishment or injunctions; it is said to be aimed at the leakers. But if anyone published information arguably related to "intelligence sources and methods," the reporter or editor could be taken before a grand jury and asked for his source. Grand juries have power to ask anyone about possible crimes—and here would be a whole new category of crime.

Or consider Watergate. Mr. Nixon tried to keep the investigation away from a key money transaction in Mexico, arguing that this might compromise C.I.A. sources. A law like Mr. Ford's proposal might have given him greater leverage with the bureaucracy to declare that whole area out of bound.

Mr. Ford's secrecy bill is actually more restrictive than a draft submitted last April by William E. Colby, then Director of Central Intelligence. That is among the more astonishing facts of the day.

The Colby draft, for example, required that anyone prosecuted must have *known* that what he disclosed was legally restricted. This requirement of *scienter*, as the lawyers call call it, is dropped from the Ford bill. The bill also raises more difficult obstacles than the Colby draft to private hearings by judges on the lawfulness of classifications.

On the executive power, the basic thrust of the Ford plan is to lay out in published rules who must approve what in the intelligence business. Getting those procedures out in the open is a step forward, as Mr. Ford's aides said because bureaucrats do tend to worry about what is on the books.

But Mr. Ford has neither imposed nor proposed any substantive limitations on the kinds of dirty tricks our intelligence agencies may play abroad —with the sole exception of prohibiting assassinations in peacetime. A future Nixon could order the C.I.A. to bring about a military coup in Chile, or pay vast sums to Italian rightists, or intervene in an African civil war.

In the past, it has been regarded as doubtful whether there was any legal authority for covert operations abroad. Under the Ford approach, that authority would be assumed—and would have almost no statutory restraints. According to the new C.I.A. chief, George Bush, the legal basis would be the President's "inherent powers"—an imperial doctrine that the Supreme Court condemned a generation ago.

As for Congress, it would have one oversight committee instead of six; and it would hear about covert operations only after the President approved them. In short, the hope of preventing executive abuses would be left largely to the executive. For example, there would be a new monitoring board of three private citizens. But the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board has existed and has not prevented abuses.

The basic thrust of the Ford "reform" is made clear by one passage in the President's message to Congress. The right way to deal with "questionable activities," it suggests, is to report them to "appropriate authorities." That is what Gerald Ford and his men have learned from Vietnam. and Watergate.

The Washington Star

Thursday, February 19, 1976

No Helms Charges

Associated Press

The Justice Department has decided not to bring charges against former CIA director Richard Helms and other intelligence officials for their alleged roles in approving a 1971 break-in at a Fairfax County photo studio, informed sources said today.

NEW YORK TIMES
18 FEB 1976

Transcript of President Ford's News Conference on Foreign and Domestic Affairs

Following is the transcript of President Ford's news conference in Washington last night, as recorded by The New York Times through the facilities of ABC news:

OPENING STATEMENT

For over a year, the nation has engaged in exhaustive investigations into the activity of the C.I.A. and other intelligence units of our Government. Facts, hearsay and closely held secrets —all have been spread out on the public record.

We have learned many lessons from this experience, but we must not become obsessed with the deeds of the past. We must act for the future. Tonight, I am announcing plans for the first major reorganization of the intelligence community since 1947:

¶First: I am establishing by executive order a new command structure for foreign intelligence. Henceforth, overall policy directions for intelligence will rest in only one place: the National Security Council, consisting of the President, the Vice President, the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense. Management of intelligence will be conducted by a single new committee. That committee will be chaired by the Director of Central Intelligence, George Bush.

To monitor the performance of our intelligence operations I am creating a new independent oversight board to be made up of private citizens. Former Ambassador Robert D. Murphy will chair the board and two other distinguished citizens—Stephen Ailes and Leo Cherne—will serve as members. All three of these units—the National Security Council, the committee on foreign intelligence and the oversight board—will be responsible to me, so that the President will continue to be ultimately accountable for our intelligence activities.

¶Second, to improve the performance of the intelligence agencies and to restore public confidence in them, I am issuing a comprehensive set of public guidelines which will serve as legally binding charters for our intelligence agencies. The charters will provide stringent protections for the rights of American citizens. I will soon meet with Congressional leaders to map out legislation to provide judicial safeguards against electronic surveillance and mail openings. I will also support legislation that would prohibit attempts on the lives of foreign leaders.

¶Third, tomorrow I will send to the Congress special legislation to safeguard critical intelligence secrets. This legislation would make it a crime for a Government employee who has access to certain highly classified information to reveal that information improperly.

In taking these actions, I have been guided by two imperatives.

As Americans, we must not and will not tolerate actions by our Government which abridge the rights of our citizens. At the same time, we must maintain a strong and effective intelligence capability in the United States. I will not be a party to the dismantling of the C.I.A. and the other intelligence agencies.

To be effective, our foreign policy must be based upon a clear understanding of the international environment. To operate without adequate and timely intelligence information will cripple our security in a world that is still hostile to our freedoms.

Nor can be confine our intelligence to the question of whether there will be an imminent military attack. We also need information about the world's economy, about political and social trends, about food supply and population growth, and certainly about terrorism.

To protect our security diplomatically, militarily and economically, we must have a comprehensive intelligence capability.

The United States is a peace-loving nation, and our foreign policy is designed to lessen the threat of war and of aggression. In recent years, we have made substantial progress toward that goal—in the Middle East, in Europe, in Asia and elsewhere around the world. Yet we also recognize that the best way to secure the peace is to be fully prepared to defend our interests. I believe in peace through strength.

A central pillar of our strength is, of course, our armed forces. But another great pillar must be our intelligence community—the dedicated men and women who gather vital information around the world and carry our missions that advance our interests in the world.

The overriding task now is to rebuild the confidence and capability of our intelligence services so that we can live securily in peace and freedom. That is my goal.

QUESTIONS

Intelligence Director

Q. Mr. President. You have talked often lately including tonight about the need for a strong intelligence capability. You have appointed a Director of Central Intelligence who has little or no intelligence expertise that I'm aware of, and I wondered what do you see as the advantages of having a relative novice directing the intelligence community?

A. I respectfully disagree with your assessment of George Bush's capabilities and background. George Bush was our U.N. ambassador and did a superb job at the United Nations. George Bush was our representative in the People's Republic of China and in that capacity did extremely well. I've known George Bush for a number of years; I served with him in the House of Representatives where he did a very fine job. I'm absolutely convinced he will perform superbly as the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Q. Are you arguing that he has an intelligence background? A. I think he has the intelligence to do the job and the experience in foreign policy, and Ithink these are major ingredients that make him an outstanding person for this responsibility.

Q. Mr. President, Robert Strauss has suggested that it might behoove you to ask former President Nixon to postpone or cancel his trip to China. There are also reports that you're unhappy because it coincides with the New Hampshire primary. Do you have any plans to ask him to put off the trip?

A. I have no such plans. Mr. Nixon is going to the People's Republic of China as a private citizen at the invitafor any alleged political purposes that tion of that Government. I don't believe vate American citizen visit that country. I should intervene with the invitation of a foreign government to have a pri-

Q. Well, do you think if the Chinese Government sends a special plane which lands at a military airport, asks for the top media in this country to cover him—some 20 representatives—and you send your special briefing books on the change in leadership and it still is a private trip in their eyes?

A. Well, let me answer several of those questions; you've asked a good many of them.

First, there has been no special briefing given to Mr. Nixon. He has received periodic briefings, or information concerning world affairs from the national or Federal Government. There was no special briefing given to him in relationship to this trip.

Whether or not he will land at a civilian or a military airport has not been detrmined. It's a decision on the part of the Chinese Government as to where they would like to land, and they have to ask us which of several airports. If and when we get a specific request, we'll act on it.

Control of C.I.A.

Q. Mr. President at first reading on your reform of the Central Intelligence Agency you seem to be putting the agency more on under the dominance and more under the control of the office of the Presidency, and we know that office has abused the C.I.A. in the past and I'm wondering what you've done to make sure that does not occur again, since you are not apparently making an outside agent outside of the White House responsible for the C.I.A.

A. I think a President ought to be accountable. And what we have sought to do in this case is to make the process and the decision-making fall on the shoulders of the President and he will be held accountable by the American people. In each of the cases of the Director of Central Intelligence or any of the other intelligence agencies, the directives or the guidelines will hold special individuals accountable for what happens in their particular area of responsibility.

But the final and the ultimate responsibility falls on the shoulders of the President, and in my case I'm willing to assume that responsibility and I can assure you it will be handled in the most appropriate way.

Q. If you are setting a precedent, though, for future Presidents by giving them more authority over the C.I.A., would you agree it also invites the prospect of a temptation for abuse of the C.I.A.? A. It shouldn't happen and I would hope that the American people will elect a President who will not abuse that responsibility. I certainly don't intend to.

Q. Mr. President. Last weekend in

Florida you suggested that anyone to the right of you politically could not be elected as President. Newsmen assumed you were referring to Ronald Reagan, but you weren't entirely specific, and I'd like to pin you down now. Do you believe that Reagan is so far to the right that he cannot win a national election, and if you do believe that, I'd like to know what you base your opinion on, especially in light of the fact that he was twice elected Governor of the most populous state in the country by large margins.

A. I was referring to anybody in either political party who is to the right of me, and there are some in the Democratic party and some . . . I think Governor Reagan is to the right of me philosophically. It seems to me that there are some differences, for example, between Governor Reagan and myself. Let's take the issue of Social Security. He has suggested from time to time that it ought to be voluntary, not mandatory as it is under the existing law. He has suggested that maybe the funds from the Social Security program ought to be invested in the stock market—I disagree with both of those proposals. I believe in the firm integrity of the Social Security program and the way I suggested, it seems to me, is the better approach.

Governor Reagan has suggested $90 billion cuts in Federal expenditures, transferring the responsibilities in the programs to the local and state officials where they either have to abandon the programs or raise taxes to support them. I disagree with that approach. I tehink that the better way to do it is to take he Federal funds and transfer them to the state and local units of government so that those services can be provided at the state and local level much more effectively. These are some of the differences that exist betwen Mr. Reagan and myself. It is a somewhat different philosophy.

Q. Specifically, do you believe that he cannot win a national election? A. I believe that anybody to the right of me —Democratic or Republican—can't win a national election.

Going to New Hampshire

Q. Mr. President, are you ready to say now flatly that you're confident of winning the New Hampshire and/or the Florida primary?

A. I think we'll do well in both. I certainly was greatly encouraged by the two days we were in Florida last weekend. The crowds were very large, the enthusiasm of not only my party workers but the public generally was extremely encouraging. We're going to New Hampshire on Thursday and Friday of this week and I am led to believe I am encouraged in both cases.
that we'll be warmly received there. So

Q. Do you expect to win?

Q. Do you expect to win? A. When I say I'm encouraged, I think that is quite indicative that I think I'll do very well.

Q. Mr. President, your opening remarks concerning the Central Intelligence Agency, it sounded considerably like an Official Secrets Act, which applies in Great Britain. Now, this act has been criticized as being beyond the constitutional realm that we apply here in the United States. First of all, do you agree with that assessment, and secondly, wouldn't, if you received this kind of legislation, wouldn't this in the future prevent the kind of disclosures which have brought out the abuses in the Central Intelligence Agency?

A. I categorically disagree with your assessment. It's a great deal different from the Official Secrets Act that prevails in Great Britain.

As a matter of fact, this is much more restrictive on the foreign intelligence community in the United States than anything has been in existence in the past. There are a number of specific limitations as to what foreign intelligence agencies in the United States can do. They are spelled out. And there is an official charter for each one of the intelligence agenciees, and I am recommending to the Congress several very specific pieces of legislation which are I think constructive and quite contrary to the impression you left with your question.

For exampie, I am recommending that the Attorney General proceed to work with the Congress to establish legislation for electronic surveillance so that he, representing the administration, would have to go to the court to get the authoriy, even in national security matters.

Under the present setup the Attorney General can simply do it without going to the court if it involves national security. This is quite contrary to the impression that you raised with the question that you asked.

So I think we're going down the middle, trying to make certain and positive that the intelligence capability of this country is first class and at the same time that the rights of individuals are adequately protected.

Q. The second part of my question, Mr. President, was whether the legislation to prevent leaks in the third point of your opening remarks would not mean that the United States would once again be subjected, perhaps, in the future, to abuses that have been exposed to the fact that people were not put in jail by leaking information.

A. Well under the organization that I've established or will establish tomorrow and under the legislation that I have recommended there won't be any abuses and the people, if there are any abuses, will be held accountable. So I don't feel at all apprehensive that what happened in the past will be repeated in the future.

Q. Mr. President your statement that was early in the week showed that despite some very heavy tax bites from Federal and state taxes, you ended up with about $135,000 in spendable income last year. It also showed that you made no investments and that you weren't able to save any of that. Can you tell us how you can spend $2,600 a week when you don't have to pay rent or any mortage payments.

A. I'm glad that you were scrutinizing my complete and full disclosure of my financial activities. Let me say this, during that period of time I had at least three of my four children in college and most of you know that that's not a cheap operation. I paid for it, they didnt borrow 'any money, they didn't get any scholarships, etc. That accounts for part of it.

And, quite frankly, um . . . I have sought to help my children so that at the time when I'm no longer in a position to help them financially, I have made some investments for them, which is perfectly permitted under our laws of this country. So between supporting them in college and trying to help them get a start when they get through college, I think we can account for every penny.

Q. Mr. President, you haven't said anything about members of Congress who reveal classified information. Does that concern you?

A. It does. And we had some experiences—and I'm not pointing a finger at anybody but certain information which we supplied to the Congress, to the House of Representatives, to a committee of the House, somehow, either through a member or through a past member, highly classified material has been made public.

This is something that the Congress, I think, has to address it self to. The Constitution protects a member of the Congress, but it doesn't protect the illegal making of such information public for a staff member. And I think the Congress has to clean up its own house, and I have urged them to do so. And I hope they will.

Q. Assuming they take some steps in that direction, will this affect your providing classified information to Capitol Hill?

A. In the case of most committees we've had no trouble whatsoever. There's been good cooperation. The arrangements have been lived up to.

On the other hand, even after the House of Representatives by almost a 2-to-1 margin said a report that had highly classified information in it should not be released, it was leaked to certain individuals and to certain publications.

I think the House of Representatives ought to take some action. We've agreed to cooperate with them in whatever legal way they would ask us to do so. But I think it's a very serious matter what happened in this one case.

Function of Oversight Panel

Q. Mr. President, will your new oversight board supersede the 40 Committee?

A. No, we have an Oversight Committee composed of three members, Ambassador Murphy, Stephen Ailes and Leo Cherne. That is the group that looks to make certain that there are no violations of the new restrictions and has an oversight responsibility working with the inspector generals in each of the intelligence agencies. The 40 Committee is having a name change and some change in personnel. It will now be given a new name but it will have on it the following people:

It will have the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; it will have the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Director of Intelligence, George Bush; the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; it will have two observers, one the Attorney General and, two, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget. So there are two separate organizations—one, the one I just described, to handle covert operations recommended to the National Security Council and to me as President, and the Oversight Board, which will check up on any abuses.

Law on Assassination Attempts

Q. Mr. President, in your opening statement on intelligence, you said that you would support legislation that would prohibit attempts on the lives of foreign leaders. Was it your intention to leave open the possibility of attempts on the lives of people in other places —that is, people who are not leaders, and if so will your specific guidelines to the intelligence community address itself to this problem?

A. I have said previously, that I would not condone or authorize assassination period. Certainly not in peacetime. So, the legislation I trust will follow those guidelines.

Q. Mr. President, to return to another subject, unemployment. In your state of Michigan that covers around 13 percent, which is above the 8.5 national average, and you are vetoing the public works bill. As a compromise, you smile upon Senator Griffin's bill as a compromise.

A. I think it's a far better piece of

legislation than the legislation that the Congress passed and I have vetoed. The bill that came down to the White House really is a hoax, it's a campaign year document. It allegedly says it will provide 800,000 jobs. The truth is it'll provide no more than 100 to 120,000 jobs at a cost. And this is the unbelievable part of $25,000 per job. Now we can do a better job using that money elsewhere, so I vetoed it. I hope that we can get it sustained and if the Congress comes back with a proposal, recommended by Senator Griffin and Congressman Gary Brown which provide for the channeling of Federal funds of significantly less amounts into programs that are ready to go at local levels in areas where the unemployment is over 8 percent and as long as the national unemployment is over 7 percent.

It would provide for about $750 million. It could be done quickly. It could be done much more cheaply. And it'll be far more effective. Now it seems to me that the bill that I vetoed cannot be defended in any way whatsoever. The cost is high per job, it will be late in being implemented. Actually the jobs won't be available for almost nine months to 18 months.

We hope and expect to be out of the problems we're in significantly by that time. So the alaternative suggested by Senator Griffin and Congressman Brown are far, far better.

Abuses by the F.B.I.

Q. Mr. President, you made no reference in your opening statement to abuses by the F.B.I., and some of the greatest abuses in the intelligence gathering were conducted by that agency. What do you have in mind for putting more severe controls on the F.B.I. in intelligence gathering?

A. The Attorney General is in the process right now of writing very strict guidelines involving the activities of the F.B.I. And he expects to have those guidelines available and in place and effective within a relatively short period of time. And those guidelines will take care of the problems that you have raised.

Q. Mr. President, as I understand, then, those guidelines would be the result of executive action and as I underproposed here this evening will be the result of executive action, some of which you have already taken. Do you see foresee no role for the Congress in oversight of intelligence gathering activity at the time that it is going on, either foreign or domestic?

A. I will issue executive orders involving foreign intelligence agencies. The Attorney General will do it as it affects the F.B.I. The Congress, I hope, will establish a joint committee along the format of the Joint Atomic Energy Committee and this committee, called, if this is the proper title—it's up to the Congress, of course—the Joint Intelligence Committee, would have an oversight responsibility as to the program and the performance of the intelligence communities in the Federal Government.

Q. Mr. President, following up on about the Nixon trip last weekend and you said i part that it was "wholesome and healthy for private citizens to make these sorts of trips to China. You've mentioned again tonight that former President Nixon is going as a private citizen. With all due respect, Richard Nixon isn't exactly your run of the mill private citizen. I'd like to ask if you really think it's wholesome and healthy for the conduct of American foreign policy for Mr. Nixon to be making this trip.

A. He's not going there involving any foreign policy matters. He's going as the guest of the Chinese Government, and he's going as a private citizen. He hasn't had any special briefing. He's going under the guidelines that I've suggested.

Q. You see no complications at all to foreign poluicy? A. None whatsoever.

Q. Mr. President, . . . considerably over leaks of classified information—national security information and so on—but I'd like to ask what steps you're taking to assure the public that no one in your Administration misuses the classification system or the secrecy label to cover up his own policy mistakes.

A. The recommendations that I will make include that every employee of the Executive Branch of the Government sign a statement to the effect that he will not divulge classified information and that he expects punishment for such release of that information.

In addition, I will ask for specific legislation making it a criminal offense for the release of such information. And that, I think, protests the Government against any unauthorized leaks of classified secret information.

Now, the oversight board, and the N.S.C., will take care of any failure to act properly in a noncriminal matter.

Q. I'd like to ask a question again, because I think that perhaps we're talking about two different things. Suppose, for example, a member of your Administration misused the label "official secrecy" to cover a policy error or mistake that he made and clamps a secret label on it so that this mistake would not get out. What steps are you taking to assure that—to assure the public that this does not happen?

A. We have made the head of the Central Intelligence Agency, the head of the Defense Intelligence Agency, the head of the other agencies, responsible for the conduct of people working for them. And we have an inspector general system that I think will make sure that the other people do their jobs properly.

Q. It's my recollection, Mr. President, that a couple of weeks ago in an interview with Walter Cronkite, you said there were no real philosophical differences between yourself and Ronald Reagan. I just wonder, when did you decide that there were some differences?

A. Fundamentally, I don't think there are any philosophical differences—there are some pragmatic differences and these I tried to explain earlier today. I have to make hard decisions as to what legislation I will sign, or what legislation I will recommend. That's quite different from being able to propose a plan or a program in words. One is the very hard decision the other is very easy to say. And I tried to illustrate those pragmatic differences in the carrying out of a basic moderate conservative philosophy.

Q. You're saying he's much to the right of you and so forth—that that's not a philosophical difference, then? A. Well I think he's to the right of me in a pragmatic and practical way.

Q. Mr. President, during the Nixon Administration, guidance was issued to Federal executive that their activities should never support or appear to lend support to private organization which practice exclusionary discrimination. Does your Administration follow that same rule? A. Was that an executive order?

Q. It was a guidance order that Federal executives' activities should never lend support or appear to lend support to private organizations which practice exclusionary discrimination. A. I would assume that we carry out that same policy.

Q. Then, can I ask you, Mr. President, why then you lend the prestige of your high office to discrimination by golfing at Burning Tree Country Club which excludes women? A. Well, there are no Federal funds go to Burning Tree.

Inflationary Food Prices

Q. Mr. President. On food prices. It is reality that each year, not monthly but each year, food prices go up as part of inflation. Now, addressing yourself to the housewife—rising food prices—can you say to her that's something she should accept as a normal way of life or can you project one year, two years, or what, that inflation will end on food and come back to what is called normal?

A. We've made substantial progress in combating inflation. When I became President the cost of living was over 12 percent per year; it's down in the range of about 6 percent at the present time. We had some very good results announced last Friday in the Wholesale Price Index. As a matter of fact, as I recall, the food factor in the Wholesale Price Index as reported last Friday was a minus not an increase, and I think we're getting a good effective handle on the question of inflation—not as good as we want—but we've cut it over 50 percent since I've been President and we're making increased progress in this regard. I think that we're achieving, particularly in the area of food, a better balance than we've had for a long, long time.

Q. Well, that's why in my original question I ruled out seasonal or monthly. The reality is that over the years food prices continued to go up. The price may remain the same, Mr. President, on an item, but the quantity has been diminished.

A. Now when I became President, as I recall the food prices that year had gone up something like 20 percent. It's now estimated that food prices in this calendar year will increase somewhere between 4 and 5 percent. That's a significant improvement—I think ought to get a little praise rather than condemnation. From 20 percent down to 4 or 5 percent is a lot of progress.

The Washington Star Thursday, February 19, 1976

Quality Intelligence Analysis: The Key Factor That Ford Ignored

By Henry S. Bradsher
Washington Star Staff Writer

In President Ford's statement on intelligence reorganization, he defined the U.S. intelligence community as "the dedicated men and women who gather vital information around the world and carry our missions that advance our interests in the world."

Gathering information and performing missions is part of intelligence, but in the opinion of some experienced producers and users of intelligence at top government levels, this leaves out what might be the most important part.

That is analysis.

By ignoring it, Ford neglected a critical part of intelligence, which informed observers think needs closer examination because it has not been as good as it should have been in the past decade.

WITHOUT GOOD analysis, all the information gathered by spies, reconnaissance satellites and computer filing of published data is of doubtful value. Some observers think a failure to understand properly the information that is gathered presents the greatest danger from intelligence work.

The nation has been embarrassed in recent years by some revelations of intelligence missions, such as plans to assassinate foreign leaders. But such embarrassment is of little consequence compared with the potential results of failing to analyze correctly what a possible enemy is doing or might do, one knowledgeable observer commented yesterday.

Ford's neglect of the analysis side of intelligence was typical of the general public attitude.

Spying is glamorous, analysis dull. Some of the successes and failures of spying have become public, some of the covert missions are notorious, but the analysis that produces National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) is kept secret.

Those estimates are the product of the U.S. Intelligence Board, an interagency committee whose members include officials from the armed services, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the State Department, the FBI and the National Security Agency, as well as the CIA. The CIA director is chairman of the board, and the analysis of his agency tends to dominate the final estimates.

IN FACT, according to several well qualified sources, the quality of CIA analysis often has been bad. The most recent case to come to light involved long underestimating of the Soviet military spending effort.

In that case, as in a number of others, the analytical side of the CIA developed a bias over the years that increasingly blinded it to the realities. Only a strong jog from outside — in this case primarily from the Pentagon's refusal to allow new information to be ignored or delayed for years in affecting estimates — brought analysis into line with current facts.

During the Vietnam war years, the CIA acquired the reputation of being a repository of realism while the Pentagon analysts flew off like intoxicated moths chasing lights at the ends of tunnels.

This reputation survived criticism, recently repeated by the House Intelligence Committee, of the agency's failure to give adequate warning of the 1968 Tet Communist offensive and several other failures to use available information to draw the right conclusions.

THAT REPUTATION is only partly deserved, according to persons in positions to judge.

Like any big bureaucracy, the CIA has shown a tendency to develop vested interests. Its analysts on some subjects have reflected preconceptions in the academic community; on others they displayed ingrown agency attitudes that did not keep up with changes in the real world.

One publicized failure was in predicting the size of the Soviet strategic weapons buildup.

Influenced by American thinking under then-Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara in the early 1960s that "enough is enough" in nuclear destructive capability, the CIA long assumed that the Soviet Union would limit its intercontinental missiles to a thousand or so. NIEs continued to make such predictions, even after satellite reconnaissance had begun to show the construction of well over 1,000 missile silos.

The academic and intellectual world, which provides much of the climate influencing CIA analysis, had decided that the Soviet Union and the United States were pushing each other into a continuing arms race, and that the topping out of American missile production would mean an end to the Soviet buildup. Hence the prediction.

But the Soviets never slowed down.

THIS WAS PART of what one observer says is the general CIA tendency to indulge in "mirror-image" analysis — believing that the Soviets reason the same way we do on arms matters. When the United States withdraws obsolete weapons from its inventory, for instance, the agency assumes that Moscow will do the same, and therefore projects armaments strengths which prove too low because it does not.

In 1968 CIA analysts could not believe that the Soviet Union would invade Czechoslovakia. Such a suggestion simply was not consistent with the widespread interpretation in this country of a Soviet desire to settle problems quietly and politely.

But CIA "operatives," the people who had dealt with real Russians, never doubted that they were capable of running over little Czechoslovakia to enforce Soviet national interests. Often viewed by outsiders, and even by some professorial types within the CIA, as a bunch of Cold War hawks, the "operatives" proved to have a better feel for the situation, while the analysts had created an artificial world of their own.

CIA ANALYSIS of the domestic priority which the Soviet Union has given to military power, and therefore the percentage of gross national product devoted to armed forces, similarly drifted into unreality.

In recent years the agency has estimated by its basic method that the Kremlin was devoting only 6 percent of GNP to the military, or 8 percent by an alternative method of calculation that it gave less importance.

Yet available data showed that 12 to 15 percent of the nation's manpower was tied up in the armed forces and military production, and other indicators pointed to a far higher priority for the Soviet military machine than 6 percent of GNP.

When new information became available last May showing that the highly computerized estimates had been wrong by a factor of two or three, the agency's initial reaction was to think this over for a while — perhaps for as long as four years — to restudy of where its computations had gone wrong, according to one source.

IT WAS ONLY the insistence of the Defense Intelligence Agency, with top-level Pentagon support, that forced the CIA into revising its estimate more quickly, according to some sources. Last autumn, the CIA circulated a tentative new conclusion that 15 to 20 percent of Soviet GNP has been going into the military, although this estimate might be reduced a bit when secret discussions of it end in the next month or two.

Other sources downgrade the Defense Department's role in this revision, but all agree that defense analysts had long been pointing out the illogic of the CIA position. This situation contrasts with the common conception of CIA realists keeping Pentagon big-budget promoters from exaggerating Soviet military capabilities.

The analytical failure on Soviet military spending was not confined to the CIA. A number of academic institutions doing supposedly independent work made the same mistake that the agency has now admitted within the intelligence com-

munity.

BUT ACCORDING to informed sources, the agency has shown considerable reluctance to tap outside expertise when it might be useful. In a few fields, such as meteorology, it has gone to world experts on the outside, but in areas such as Soviet affairs it has assumed that it was the world expert and scorned what might have been fresh, useful inputs that lacked built-in CIA bias.

The agency now is trying to rectify the mistake on Soviet military priorities, but Ford's lack of attention to analysis left some informed observers concerned that major weaknesses might remain in other areas.

The administration has resisted the release of old NIEs to outside examination, which might test the validity of CIA analysis.

But a number of voices around Washington, including those of persons who have been close enough to intelligence to know many of the analytical failures, have called for just such a re-examination. That, they say, is as the only way to force the administration to strengthen the vital third leg of the gathering-missions-analysis intelligence tripod.

THE NEW YORK TIMES, THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 19, 1976

Ford Asks Intelligence Disclosure Curb

By JOHN M. CREWDSON
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Feb. 18—President Ford proposed legislation today that would make it a serious crime for Government employees to disclose the ways in which the Central Intelligence Agency and other Federal agencies collect and evaluate their information.

While Mr. Ford's draft bill would extend criminal sanctions for such revelations to a far larger number of individuals than is now the case, it is considerably narrower than the prohibitions against disclosures of all classified information that are contained in the proposed reforms of the Federal Criminal Code now before Congress.

Nor does the Ford proposal approach in scope the Official Secrets Act on the books in Britain, which makes it illegal for a government employee to disclose virtually any official information to anyone outside the government, or for a journalist to report such information.

One presidential aide said Mr. Ford had considered "the option" of submitting to Congress broader provisions like those contained in the proposed criminal code reforms, but had decided on the narrower version "to avoid charges that we were going to an official secrets act" along the lines of the British model.

While the Ford proposal specifically exempts from criminal prosecution journalists or others who receive such secrets, it would, by elevating such disclosures to the level of a felony offense, enable government prosecutors to call reporters to testify before grand juries about the identities of their sources for articles containing such classified information.

Administration officials involved in the drafting of the so-called "secrecy protection" proposal, a part of Presiden Ford's overall reform of the Federal intelligence community made public today, said that the provision, in the form of an amendment to the National Security Act of 1947, was sent to both houses of Congress this morning.

One official said that the proposed legislation, designed to back up portions of an executive order signed by Mr. Ford today, was intended to "put some teeth into" the secrecy agreements that have long entered into by employees of the C.I.A. and other Federal intelligence agencies, and by those to whom such agencies have made classified information available.

The executive order states that any government official or outside contract employee who is given access to such information must sign a pledge not to disclose it to an unanthorized recipient. Nevertheless an aide to Mr. Ford said that such had always been the case except for high Administration officials, Cabinet members and the like, who would now also be asked to sign as "an example."

Penalties For Breach

The secrecy agreement heretofore entered into by employees of the intelligence community and those who receive its findings contains a recognition that any breach of security could lead to termination of employment or to prosecution under existing espionage statutes.

But Justice Department lawyers said those statutes had been narrowly drawn to protect certain classes of information, such as atomic or cryptographic secrets, and thus had made prosecutions impossible for violations of the secrecy agreement that did not embrace such national defense information.

One lawyer recalled that the C.I.A. had been forced to bring a civil action against Victor Marchetti, a former agency official, to win a restraining order preventing the publication of portions in 1974 of his book, "The C.I.A. and the Cult of Inteligence," that it said violated his secrecy agreement.

Under the law offered today by President Ford, Mr. Marchetti, Philip B. F. Agee and other former agency officials who have made similar disclosures could instead have been threatened by the Government with prosecution, or prosecuted if they were not dissuaded by the threat.

The Ford proposal would exempt disclosure of classified intelligence information from prosecution if the individual who made the disclosure had been unable to obtain a review within the Government of the "continuing necessity" for the classification.

Prosecution would also be barred if a court decided that the information in question had not been lawfully classified in the first place, or if it were communicated to Congress "pursuant to a lawful demand" of that body.

The draft bill would make it possible for the Director of Central Intelligence, in his capacity as chief of the intelligence community, to ask the Justice Department to seek a court order to prevent an imminet disclosure of classified information by a signatory to the secrecy agreement.

However, since newspaprs and other recipients of such information would not be held liable under the law, the Government would not be empowered to seek an order to prevent publication of such information once it had been disclosed to a news organization.

Not to Congress

The legislation would apply only to officials or "contract" employees of the executive branch and not to members of Congress or staffs of Congressional committees that were furnished such information in connection with investigations.

A White House official said, however, that Mr. Ford hoped his initiative would impel Congress to adopt similar legislation enforcing the secrecy of such information provided to it, and that would prevent unauthorized disclosures like those in recent weeks concerning the final report of the House Select Committee on Intelligence.

Charles Morgan Jr., who heads the national office of the American Civil Liberties Union here, said he was most distressed by Mr. Ford's proposal. He said it meant that, if enacted, under recent Supreme Court decisions any newspaper reporter could be put in jail if he refused to tell a Federal grand jury the name of a source who had provided him classified intelligence information.

DAILY TELEGRAPH, London
5 February 1976

PRESS SILENT ON GERMAN 'CIA LIST'

By Our Staff Correspondent in Bonn

West German newspapers and news agencies yesterday ignored a list of 15 alleged Central Intelligence Agency agents in the Federal Republic, published by an obscure Socialist newsletter in Franfurt. "I don't want to play any part in undercutting the CIA," said one diplomatic correspondent in Bonn.

Mr William Marsh, an American Embassy spokesman, called the Frankfurt report irresponsible and contemptible. However it was no great surprise. A 98-page booklet containing the names, addresses and functions of all the Embassy staff is freely available, and while not describing any official as "CIA" it gives initials which identify intelligence specialists.

Possibly the Frankfurt newsletter, *Information Service for the Distribution of Ignored News* timed publication to coincide with a West German television programme indentifying several Russian diplomats in Bonn as agents of the KGB secret service.

WASHINGTON STAR
10 FEB 1976

CIA Agent Reportedly Escaped Ambush

Republican Whip Robert H. Michel told the House yesterday that there has been at least one assassination attempt against an American identified as a CIA agent besides the murder of CIA Station Chief Richard Welch in Athens.

The Illinois Republican said he could give no names or places but that terrorists tried to ambush a U.S. Embassy employe who had been identified by a local journalist as a CIA agent.

Thursday, Feb. 12, 1976 THE WASHINGTON POST

Part of Intelligence Report Published in N.Y. Tabloid

Security Question

By Stephen Isaacs
Washington Post Staff Writer

Large segments of the secret report of the House intelligence committee were printed yesterday in a 24-page supplement to The Village Voice, a weekly tabloid newspaper published in New York.

Publication of the 338-page report was blocked Jan. 29 by a vote of the House after Ford administration officials claimed that its disclosure would damage the national security.

Many members of the House, as well as critics of America's intelligence-gathering apparatus, have expressed doubt about some contents of the report and the quality of the investigation that produced it.

The report snipes again and again at Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger, contending he placed one obstacle after another in the way of the committee's getting material and, when he appeared before it, lied.

The report at one point says that "Dr. Kissinger's comments . . . are at variance with the facts."

It describes Kissinger as having a "passion for secrecy" and as trying "to control dissemination and analysis of data."

In sum, the excerpts of the House panel's report describe the American intelligence community as often inept, not out of control (as has often been charged), and as frequently considering itself beyond the laws of the land.

For instance, then-President Johnson in 1967 blocked the CIA from offering further covert assistance to educational or other private voluntary institutions, after disclosures that the CIA had been sneaking money to the National Students Association.

The Village Voice excerpts quote CIA deputy director Carl Duckett as testifying that the CIA still maintains covert contracts with "a small number of universities."

The report talks of most of the CIA's covert activities as haphazard and in effect lacking any master plan, saying that "the overall picture . . . does not support the contention that covert action has been used in furtherance of any particular principle, form of government, or identifiable national interest."

"Instead," the report continues, "the record indicates a general lack of a long-term direction in U.S. foreign policy. Covert actions, as the means for implementing a policy, reflected this Band-aid approach, substituting short-term remedies for problems which required long-term cures."

Yet at another point the report claims that "all evidence in hand suggests that the CIA, far from being out of control, has been highly responsive to the instructions of the President and the assistant to the President for national security affairs."

What is absent, the report suggests, is any kind of controls on the CIA and its fellow intelligence-gathering agencies.

The report makes much of the fact that the intelligence community has never been frank about how much it spends, which the committee claims is "at least three to four times the amount reported to Congress."

That means it all costs about $10 billion a year, says the report, with almost no controls, no checks, no balances.

As a result, says the committee, the CIA has been able to do some unusual things with the taxpayers' money, including developing "a huge arsenal of weapons and access to ammunition . . . giving it a capability that exceeds most armies of the world," having put at least $75 million into Italian politics, and serving in effect as a discount shopper for some foreign officials.

The CIA's budget, it says, "appears as only a single line item" in the budget, giving the agency "an unusual advantage" in its ability to transfer money from area to area unimpeded.

The committee points out that the General Accounting Office, because of the CIA's penchant for secrecy, cannot even balance the CIA's books, "let alone analyze its efficiency," and that last year the CIA, National Security Agency and Defense Intelligence Agency all refused information the GAO was seeking.

At the Office of Management and Budget, only six employees work full-time on foreign intelligence, three of those are former CIA employees, and the CIA's budget head recently transferred there from the OMB, the report said.

"This," it added, ". . . does not bode well for a vigorous review of the merits of intelligence programs."

"All this adds up," says the intelligence committee, "to more than $10 billion being spent by a handful of people, with little independent supervision, with inadequate controls, even less auditing, and an overabundance of secrecy."

The report recounts the committee's inquiry into six events as illustrative of the intelligence community's performance.

The Vietcong Tet offensive in early 1968 is cited as an instance where enemy force levels were generated for "political purposes" and other intelligence collected was subjected to "biased misinterpretations."

In the Soviet Union's invasion of Czechoslovakia on Aug. 20, 1968, the report says, U.S. intelligence "failed to provide a warning that the Soviets 'decided to intervene with force.'" The report states that U.S. technical intelligence "learned of the Soviet invasion several hours before" Czech radio announced it, but that word did not reach Washington before President Johnson received his first word — from Soviet Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin.

Technical intelligence (apparently electronic intercepts) did not reach Washington "until days later," the report says.

In the 1973 Middle East war, the report says, U.S. intelligence again "failed."

The community, according to the report, "argued that the political climate in the Arab nations was not conducive to a major war" just a week before it broke out.

The report charges that the worldwide U.S. alert ordered by President Nixon on Oct. 24, 1973, was the result of "poor intelligence." Three DIA officials were "removed from their positions" as a result, the report states.

In the case of the overthrow of Portugal's government in April, 1975, the report says, U.S. intelligence "gave no real warning of the timing, and probable ideological consequences of the coup despite clear and public indications that a political upheaval was at hand." Special criticism is directed at the military attaches in Lisbon.

The report says the United States was "caught off guard" by India's test of a nuclear device on May 18, 1974.

The report documents U.S. intelligence failures at the time of the overthrow of Archbishop Makarios, President of Cyprus, and terms them "the most damaging intelligence performance in recent years."

Despite early warnings that a coup might be in the making, the CIA, "for reasons still unclear," the report says, "embraced and heeded" for 12 days prior to the coup a report from an "untested source" that "despite new aggressiveness on Makarios' part, (Greek strongman) Ioannides had changed his mind (against removing Makarios); there would be no coup at all."

In discussing Cyprus, the report raises some unanswered questions including the contents of a message it could not get that Kissinger sent Ioannides "through the CIA the day after the coup."

One revelation in the Voice excerpts describes restrictions on distribution within the American government of information about possible Soviet violations of the first SALT treaty.

It is in this section that the report accuses Kissinger of lying.

The committee said Kissinger had ordered the CIA "to avoid any written judgments that the Soviets are in violation of SALT agreements." Instead, the agency was to communicate such information privately to the National Security Council, "which, coincidentally," the report says, "was headed by Dr. Kissinger."

The report mentions, but implicitly discounts, Kissinger's rationale for limiting the distribution of SALT-related intelligence — that distribution risked leaks of sensitive material, and that the specialists had to carefully consider complicated technical material before distributing it to people who might draw hasty and unwarranted conclusions from it.

Instead, it says: "At times, the Secretary of State (before Kissinger held that post), the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and key U.S. officials in SALT compliance meetings with the Soviets have not been aware of the existence of sensitive data suggesting Soviet cheating . . ."

The report's accusation that Kissinger lied stems from a comparison of his public statements and other facts the committee staff says it uncovered. For example, one technique for controlling SALT intelligence, the report said, was to put it "on hold," thus restricting its normal distribution in the intelligence community.

The report quotes Kissinger as saying no item was ever held "on hold" for more than two months, but says the committee found items held for three months to more than a year.

The report also challenged Kissinger's assertion that all decisions of the verification panel were "unanimous," by quoting a memorandum of one panel member written after a meeting was held, expressing the view that one subject "was not sufficiently assessed" at the panel meeting. The report cited no evidence of a less-than-unanimous panel decision, however.

The report cites cases in which important officials involved in SALT matters were kept ignorant of information they should have known. In one case, the report says, Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson, head of the U.S. delegation to the SALT talks,

queried Washington for details of a secret interpretation of one matter that was mentioned to him by a Soviet negotiator, but about which he knew nothing.

The report does not say Kissinger or anyone else actually hid or distorted hard information of Soviet violations of a SALT agreement.

The report includes the transcripts of cables between the CIA's chief of station in Rome and headquarters in Langley, Va., revealing a raging battle between the agency and then-Ambassador Graham Martin over U.S. aid to Italian political figures in 1972.

The Italian newspaper La Stampa previously has published some of this material.

The exchanges reveal that Martin wanted to give generous sums of money to a number of individuals and organizations, while the CIA's chief of station was dubious about the usefulness of such contributions. (It is in this context that the committee revealed the giving of at least $75 million to various Italian politicians and parties since 1948.)

Martin particularly wanted to give $800,000 to Gen. Vito Miceli, a right-wing intelligence officer who has since been formally accused of plotting a military coup in 1970. When the gift was proposed in 1972, Miceli was head of the Italian defense information service.

In one cable to CIA headquarters, the chief of station recounted this exchange with Martin:

"Do you really care if (Miceli's) propaganda efforts are successful or not?" the chief of station asked the ambassador.

"Yes, I do," he is quoted as replying, "but not a helluva lot. Important thing is to demonstrate solidarity for the long pull."

With special authority from Washington, Martin did give the general the $800,000, with no strings attached.

At one point, the cables reveal, Martin got so angry with the chief of station that he threatened to order the embassy's Marine guards "not to let you in this building and put you on the airplane."

In the area of domestic intelligence, the committee cited two examples it found disturbing.

The report described details of a five-year FBI investigation of the Washington-based Institute for Policy Studies. Because the institute had a "connection" with the Students for a Democratic Society, the FBI in 1968 began to investigate the institute and continued its inquiry despite interim findings that, according to the report, results were "negative." Continuing an investigation after a negative finding, the report says, violates the FBI's own procedural manual.

The report noted that in August, 1972, the FBI went through the institute's garbage and found eight typewriter ribbons.

From the ribbons, the bureau reconstructed the documents written with the ribbons. "Part of the yield was intimate sexual gossip," according to the report, which "was incorporated into a number of (FBI) reports." This was done, the committee report says, despite sworn testimony from FBI officials "that personal information such as sexual activities is discarded if it does not bear on a crime."

The report also reviewed the 34-year "intensive" FBI investigation of the Socialist Workers Party, which failed at any time to find evidence to support any prosecutions.

Nevertheless, according to the report, the FBI over the years "committed a massive manpower allocation to interviewing landlords, employers, fellow employees and family relations" of party members.

Many of the topics the Voice excerpts cover have been the subjects of public hearings by the committee and earlier disclosures.

The report outlines basic criticism of the Defense Intelligence Agency as "duplicative, expensive, unattractive and its production capabilities are handicapped by the consistent weaknesses of its own organization"

The committee recommended that the DIA be abolished.

The committee said that the supposed checks on the intelligence community were in effect shams and pointed to the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board and the National Security Council Intelligence Committee with particular scorn.

The quasi-public Intelligence Advisory Board, says the report, is not set up for "responsible analysis and review" and that to rely on it for "oversight responsibility is totally without merit."

The Intelligence Committee, the so-called "Forty Committee" that is supposed to be the main brake on America's intelligence machinery, is supposed to approve in advance "any politically sensitive" projects.

The House committee said that the Forty Committee "has often been little more than a rubber stamp" wielded by the President's national security adviser and the CIA director.

The report said that, from 1965 through 1975, 32 per cent of covert actions approved by the Forty Committee were to direct financial aid to foreign political parties or candidates; 29 per cent were for media and propaganda projects, and 23 per cent were to give arms or money to military or paramilitary operations.

The report said most of the financial election support went to "incumbent moderate party leaders and heads of state." It further noted that some projects went on for years. "One Third World leader received some $$$9,000 over a 14-year period," the report said.

Also contributing to this article were Washington Post Staff Writers Robert G. Kaiser and Walter Pincus.

WASHINGTON POST
12 FEB 1976

'Voice' Melodrama

By William Claiborne
and Laurence Stern
Washington Post Staff Writers

After a week of clandestine melodrama complete with secret code names (Operation Swordfish and covert working headquarters, Village Voice publisher Clay Felker went to press with a 24-page supplement under the titillating headline:

"THE CIA REPORT THE PRESIDENT DOESN'T WANT YOU TO READ."

By the time the circumstances of the Voice exclusive seeped to the surface there appeared to be some question whether it was more important as a substantive scoop or a journalistic morality play.

Felker, reflecting the secretive mood in the offices of New York magazine, which was the operations center for the Voice leak, said laughing "as far as I know, it landed on the back doorstep in a basket." Both publications are directed by Felker.

But other sources familiar with the hush-hush developments of the story say that CBS correspondent Daniel Schorr, who covered the intelligence committee for his network, was instrumental in transmitting the report to Felker.

It was also learned that a Washington-based organization of journalists, The Reporters Committee for Freedom of The Press, had agreed to accept "passively" any cash proceeds from publication of the report by arrangement with Schorr.

Schorr, who recently displayed the title page of the still-secret House committee report on television as he described some of its contents, said yesterday that he was obliged "to deny on the record that I have a copy of the report."

The CBS correspondent also denied that he had discussed the report with Felker. "I have no knowledge of how The Village Voice acquired its copy. I had no connection with it and I do not mean by that to state that I have a copy."

He added that whatever conclusions viewers might gather from having seen the report's title page on the screen "is something that they are inferring."

Schorr told a fellow CBS reporter on a CBS radio broadcast that he had a copy.

Schorr also acknowledged that in a conversation he had recently with a Washington Post editor he said he possessed the House report.

He added, however, that he regarded it as a "business conversation" and off the record. Both Schorr and Post Assistant Managing Editor Harry M. Rosenfeld agreed that nothing was said about the conversations being off the record.

Schorr denied, on the record, having made any approach to the reporters committee under which he would assign it the proceeds from the report's distribution. The reporters committee agreed, after a telephone poll of its trustees, not to say anything publicly because of the "confidentiality" of its conversations with Schorr.

"God, I'm never going to get involved again with a bunch of reporters," said one trustee of the organization which is decdicated to promoting freedom of the press. "Off the record, it's a——mess."

Schorr, it was learned, first talked with a CBS colleague and member of the reporters group, Fred Graham, about the financial arrangement within the past two weeks. The commentator began considering offering his exclusive copy of the report for paperback publication after it came into his possession two weekends ago.

"Dan proposed that the reporters committee receive whatever profits were generated by the sale," acknowledged one trustee. "...Some of the group didn't want to be associated in print or any way with release of that document (but) we had no objection to a passive role" in accepting funds.

Efforts by the trustees of the reporters committee yesterday to agree on a statement ended in a collective decision to have "no comment."

"We had no objection, however, to passive role," the trustee added. We've accepted proceeds from a variety of sources."

During the discussions with the reporters committee, Schorr consulted a lawyer in New York on his legal position in making the report public. He was advised that there was no immediate criminal liability against him although he might be subject to contempt of Congress proceedings should he refuse to tell a congressional committee the source of his copy.

Schorr conceded that he may have made a mistake in showing the title page of the report to his viewers. "I guess I was boasting," he said.

Schorr obtained access to the report, according to one authoritative account, after the House intelligence committee voted to refer the document to the House for a publication decision. The New York Times obtained its ac-

cess earlier. Schorr spent his limited time with the document, Xeroxing rather than reading, according to the account.

He thought he and the Times both had copies until Times columnist William Safire called for help on details in the report concerning CIA involvement with the Kurds. At that point, Schorr confided to an acquaintance, the realization began to dawn upon him that he alone was the possessor of a copy of the House document.

At one point in an on-and-off-the-record conversation, Schorr volunteered, when asked what he intended to do with the proceeds of publication of his copy of the report:

"On the record, I would not have been willing to benefit personally from the sale of the report but would have been willing to sign the proceeds over to a First Amendment-oriented group."

For Felker the first installment of Operation Swordfish, as the report was code-named, began last Thursday when he learned it was available to him and he dispatched a staff worker to Washington to get a copy. Asked yesterday if he was specifically denying or refusing to comment that Schorr made it available to him, Felker chuckled.

"I stand on what I said," he repeated. "It was left on the doorstep."

There was never any debate, Felker said, against running the report. "There was a big split in Congress on what to do . . . We feel, in an election year, this is the time to contribute to that debate."

By coincidence, the 24-page section of excerpts was included in the Voice's first experimental national edition. It was also the third 160-page issue in the weekly newspaper's history.

When he learned of the publication of the excerpts in the Voice, House intelligence committee chairman Otis Pike (D-N.Y.) said he suspected the material was leaked by the executive department to incriminate Congress.

WASHINGTON POST
7 FEB 1976

— A British magazine called Private Eye has published the London address and phone number of Philip Agee, onetime CIA agent turned anti-spy.

THE WASHINGTON POST Friday, Feb. 20, 1976

Charles B. Seib

The Secret Report Caper

If the CIA's dirty tricks department had been assigned to cast a shadow over the press, it couldn't have done a better job than did a covey of journalists earnestly committed to the integrity and high purpose of their calling.

I'm talking about the Secret Report Caper, featuring Daniel Schorr, a star reporter for CBS News, and the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press.

Here's the plot:

Schorr, who has a way with government secrets, obtained a copy of the House intelligence committee's unreleased report on the CIA and other intelligence operations. It was a pretty good coup, and Schorr did a series of radio and television reports on it. Then it became even more of a coup when the House decided on grounds of national security that the report should not be issued. Schorr had not just beaten his colleagues to a soon-to-be-released document; he had a permanent exclusive.

What to do? First, he decided that the report should be published—not just the guts of it, which he and others had reported, but all of it, or at least large sections, word for word and in print. Schorr says he made that decision as a matter of "journalistic conscience" because, as the only person outside of official circles with a copy of the report, "I could not be the one responsible for suppressing (it)."

Second, he decided that the report, now officially bottled up by the House, was worth money. Since he had no wish to profit from it himself, how about helping some worthy cause? And what more appropriate cause than the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press?

He approached the committee's leaders and proposed that it accept the proceeds of the sale. They agreed and gave him the name of a lawyer who could help him in his negotiations with publishers.

And so it came to pass that on February 11, the Village Voice, a New York liberal weekly, printed 24 pages of excerpts. The content was less than sensational. The hardest news was a charge that Secretary of State Kissinger made statements "at variance with the facts."

Nevertheless, the publication set off a storm. President Ford angrily offered to help the House find the leak. Kissinger declared that "a new version of McCarthyism" was rampant. House committee sources hinted that maybe the CIA had leaked the report to make Congress look bad.

Then, with fine irony, there was a leak within the leak. The Washington Post reported, in effect, that Schorr was the source of the Voice's text even though he was denying it on the record. It also reported the deal with the Reporters Committee.

Schorr is angry at The Post and the Reporters Committee. He says The Post story, which he called "unconscionable," used off-the-record material. He also says that his discussions with the Reporters Committee were confidential and should not have been disclosed.

The Post denies that it broke any agreements with Schorr, and the Reporters Committee says it never felt that its arrangement with Schorr could or should be kept secret.

The day after the Post story appeared, Schorr confirmed that he did indeed provide the Village Voice text and that he had made the arrangement with the Reporters Committee.

To bring the story up to date as of this writing, CBS has said that Schorr has been taken off the intelligence story, but that "as always we will back our guy."

Rep. Samuel Stratton (D-N.Y.) wants the House to find Schorr in contempt for releasing a secret House report. So before it's over, CBS may get the opportunity to back its guy.

It's a pretty funny story, if you like black comedy: news people arguing bitterly over what was on the record and what wasn't, and a group with the loftiest journalistic mission—defense of the First Amendment—agreeing to accept proceeds from the sale of a secret government document.

The News Business

But before the laughter dies and the press' notoriously short attention span wanes, journalists concerned about the good name of their trade would do well to try to clean up the mess.

There is, for example, that money. At this writing it apparently is hovering between the Village Voice and the Reporters Committee. Schorr has said it is a "substantial" amount, but he won't say how much.

Think how the press—Schorr included—would move in on a situation like this if someone else had been doing the dealing.

Retroactive judgments are easy and often unfair. Nevertheless, I'll offer a couple:

Schorr should have recognized that the dollar sign is a danger sign in journalism. The buying or selling of news inevitably taints the product. His own network has had experience with that truism. (It should be noted that CBS was not involved in Schorr's marketing of the text; he says he acted entirely on his own after the report's use to the network was over.)

As for the Reporters Committee, no matter how much it needed funds, it should have recognized the untenable position it was getting itself into. Its argument that the deal was acceptable because the committee was to be just a "passive" recipient of the money is naive—and doesn't quite jibe with the suggestion of a negotiator to Schorr.

The story is not over. Schorr may have further problems with the House and with his bosses.

But whatever happens, the cause of free journalism has been damaged. News people should be laughing with tears in their eyes.

As for those dirty trick boys at CIA, their laughter should be tempered by envy. Even the most devious of them couldn't have dreamed up a "poisoned well" scheme like the Secret Report Caper.

NEW YORK TIMES, FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 20, 1976

Editors Fearful of Ford's Proposals

By MARTIN ARNOLD

Some news executives reacted to President Ford's new "secrecy protection" proposal with the concern that it would, if approved by Congress, put newsmen in jeopardy of having to disclose news sources to grand juries and would stop the flow of precisely the kind of information that led to Mr. Ford's current program for reforming intelligence activities.

The asic worry of news executives is that if reporters are forced to reveal their sources of information in particular cases then government officials generally — fearful of losing their jobs or even of facing prosecution—will refuse to disclose confidential information that might be controversial or potentially embarrassing to the Government.

Warren H. Phillips, president of The Wall Street Journal and president of the American Society of Newspaper Editors, asserted that in the risk of forcing news reporters to divulge confidential sources "there is contravention of the First Amendment" guaranteeing freedom of the press.

Charles Morgan, Washington director of the American Civil Liberties Union, said that Mr. Ford's proposals for protecting Government intelligence secrets would put a public official on notice that "the newsman he's talkign to may end up as the prime witness against him" in a court case growing out of the leaked information.

This in turn, news executives said, would have the "chilling" effect of silencing officials and keeping much information from the public, the sort of information published by the New York Times and other publications that led to the Government's own investigation of Central Intelligence Agency activities in this country and abroad.

Larry Jinks, executive editor of The Miami Herald and president of the Associated Press managing editors, commented, "my immediate reaction is that these proposals would have emanated from the Nixon Administration, which was anti-press."

President Ford announced Wednesday that he would seek both through executive orders and new legislative sanctions, civil and criminal, against Government employees who make unauthorized disclosure of "sources and methods of intelligence" to "persons not authorized to receive" such information.

This provision would appear to cover newsmen or members of the general public, whereas current law—the Espionage Act—authorizes the Government to prosecute officals criminally only if they disclose certain classified information to a foreign agent with the intent of harming the United States, or if they divilge atomic energy secrets.

In disclosing his new proposals, President Ford said that he was not imposing restrictions on the press.

But the President's proposal would apparently allow the recipents of government secrets, including reporters, to be called before grand juries investigating leaks and forced to disclose their sources of information or be held in contempts.

Need To Protect Sources

This goes to the heart of the belief of many in the press that it has a constitutional right under the First Amendent to protect the confidentiality of its news sources.

Mr. Phillips said that although a first reading of the President's proposals did not for the most part make him believe that they were too restrictive, "we in the A.S.N.E. and at the Journal feel that this part is a contravention of our First Amendment rights."

Basically, it is the position of the press that if it is forced to disclose its sources of information, then those sources—fearful of losing their jobs or of facing prosecution—will refuse to supply information.

Washington Post
20 Feb. 1976

Schorr Taken Off His Assigned Beat

By John Carmody
Washington Post Staff Writer

CBS correspondent Daniel Schorr, who passed a copy of the House intelligence committee report to the weekly newspaper Village Voice for publication, has been removed from the intelligence beat by his network.

Schorr was transferred to general assignment late Wednesday by CBS Washington bureau chief Sanford Socolow.

Schorr covered the intelligence beat, considered a key assignment, for 13 months.

Last week, at the height of the furor over the still officially secret report's publication, he was barred by CBS from covering the House intelligence committee itself, but continued other intelligence beat coverage.

CBS action was learned yesterday shortly before the House, by 265 to 115, directed its ethics committee to inquire if Schorr is in contempt of the House for his role in the publication of portions of the report. The intelligence committee has expired.

The resolution was introduced by Rep. Samuel Stratton (D-N.Y.).

Schorr has publicly stated that he passed the report to The Village Voice, which published excerpts in its Feb. 16 and Feb. 23 issues. Schorr had revealed some of the report's contents on television and radio broadcasts before Congress voted Jan. 29 to keep the report secret.

Yesterday's resolution asked the ethics committee to probe the circumstances surrounding its publication in the newspaper.

CBS news president Richard Salant said yesterday that the reassignment does not represent disciplinary action against Schorr.

However, it is known that CBS officials held several discussions in New York this week regarding Schorr's status.

While CBS officials have told Schorr they will back him to the fullest against any government action that might seek to force him to reveal how he got the report, it is known that some CBS executives believe the report's subsequent publication in The Village Voice has raised serious questions.

One senior network executive, who asked that his name not be used, said yesterday that "the Voice is what I'd call at least an 'anti-establishment' paper.

"Publication of the report there," he said, "made Dan's actions very political. It could reinforce the conviction some of our conservative affiliates have that while CBS news management is not politically oriented, underneath them are some reporters who wear their hearts on their left sleeves."

Washington Post
20 Feb. 1976

Prosecution Of Helms Ruled Out

By Bob Woodward
Washington Post Staff Writer

The Justice Department announced yesterday that former Central Intelligence Agency Director Richard M. Helms and others will not be prosecuted for their roles in a 1971 break-in at a Fairfax photo studio.

Helms' attorney, Edward Bennett Williams, said afterward that the Justice Department decision means the current CIA director, George Bush, has the right to approve break-ins if he deems them necessary to protect national security.

Williams applauded the move not to prosecute Helms as "an unusually smart decision" and noted that the 1947 National Security Act imposed an obligation on the CIA director to protect security.

"If the government has a right to conduct electronic surveillance," Williams said, "then it has a right to make surreptitious entry."

He said that Helms believes the law should be changed so that the CIA director does not have such power.

Informed sources in the Justice Department reported last month that they expected Helms to be prosecuted on a misdemeanor charge after he acknowledged that he personally approved the break-in to gather information about a former CIA employee suspected of a security violation.

The Justice Department investigation involved the Feb. 19, 1971, break-in at the now-defunct Roland Studio on the second floor of 10419 Main St. in Fairfax City. Three Fairfax City policemen apparently cooperated by ensuring that no one interrupted the CIA break-in team.

The Justice Department was prepared to take the matter to the grand jury for prosecution last month before department attorneys began a series of three meetings with Williams, according to government sources.

In an unusual press release—the Justice Department rarely announces a decision not to prosecute—Attorney General Edward H. Levi said the department concluded that the case did not meet a Supreme Court standard set in a 1945 deci-

sion.

The standard, according to the press release, would require the Justice Department to show that Helms "willfully deprived an individual of a specific and well-defined constitutional right" by approving the break-in.

Justice Department sources said that Helms clearly thought he had the authority to approve a break-in and did so to complete a security investigation of Deborah Fitzgerald, who ran the photo studio.

"It was imposible to prove he (Helms) had intent to violate anyone's civil rights," one Justice Department source said yesterday. "It is regretable that this puts him out of reach of the law and many seem to be an endorsement of breaking and entering," the source added.

The 1947 law setting up the CIA says, "The director of central intelligence shall be responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure."

Under this law Justice Department attorneys said they felt Helms could reasonably argue the protection required extraordinary means.

On the other hand, the attorneys said, there was evidence indicating the break-in was approved to close out the security violation investigation and the CIA had no evidence that the national security was in immediate danger.

The photo studio was run by Fitzgerald and Orlando Nuncz, a former middle-level official in the Castro government in Cuba.

Sources said that both were under CIA surveillance after Fitzgerald, while working in the records division of the CIA, tried to find out what CIA files existed on Nunez. Fitzgerald and Nunez have since married and separated.

Levi said that the decision not to prosecute Helms, now ambassador to Iran, was based on recommendations of Deputy Attorney General Harold R. Tyler Jr. and Assistant Attorney General J. Stanley Pottinger, head of the Civil Rights Division and in charge of the investigation.

The break-in, but not Helms' role in it, was first publicly revealed last year by a presidential commission headed by Vice President Rockefeller in a report on CIA abuses.

The Justice Department did not specify others who would not be prosecuted in the Fairfax break-in, but reliable sources said that Richard Ober, a CIA official now assigned to the National Security Council, was one of those under investigation in the case.

A separate Justice Department investigation into possible perjury by Helms is continuing. This investigation focuses on Helms' sworn testimony denying a CIA role in domestic surveillance and in providing covert support to certain political factions in Chile.

Group Led by C.I.A. Board Nominee Reportedly Got $15,000 From Agency

By JOHN M. CREWDSON
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Feb. 19 — A private humanitarian organization headed by Leo Cherne, one of President Ford's appointees to a new committee that will investigate possible abuses of authority by the Central Intelligence Agency, reportedly received some $15,000 of C.I.A. funds in the mid-1960's that were channeled through a New York City philanthropic organization.

Frank Weil, President of the Manhattan-based Norman Foundation, said in a telephone interview today that he was approached by "a mysterious gentleman" from the C.I.A. in 1963 or 1964 and asked to pass about $15,000 in Government funds to the International Rescue Committee, of which Mr. Cherne was then chairman of the board.

Mr. Weil recalled that the funds had been earmarked for a medical services project in what was then the Belgian Congo that was being supported by the rescue committee. But he said he was uncertain whether Mr. Cherne or anyone else there had been told that the money was from the C.I.A. and not from the foundation's endowment.

Mr. Cherne, reached at his New York City office, said that neither he "nor any official of the I.R.C. had the slightest knowledge that any of those funds were C.I.A. funds."

He said that the committee, which he has headed since 1951, had "never sought C.I.A. funds" and would not have "welcomed" them if they had been offered overtly.

On Previous Board

President Ford announced on Tuesday that he was naming Mr. Cherne to the newly established intelligence oversight board, set up as part of Mr. Ford's reforms of intelligence community operations to monitor the C.I.A.'s activities for possible illegalities or improprieties.

Mr. Cherne had previously been a member of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, which Mr. Ford abolished yesterday.

The Norman Foundation, formerly known as the Aaron E. Norman Fund, was among the institutions identified publicly in 1967 as those that had served as "conduits" for C.I.A. financing of a number of domestic organizations, principally the National Student Association.

Those disclosures prompted President Johnson to establish an investigating committee to look into the agency's relationships with domestic groups, and Mr. Johnson subsequently ordered all Federal agencies to halt their covert funding of such organizations.

Keeping Independence

Mr. Cherne, who described the committee as one of his hobbies, said that he had tried diligently over the years "to maintain the independent status" of the organization, saying that he believed that its freedom from government associations was crucial to its work abroad.

Asked why, in the wake of the 1967 disclosures, he had not asked the I.R.C. to recheck its sources of financing to make certain that the committee had not unwittingly taken any C.I.A. money, Mr. Cherne replied that that was the "silliest question I've ever heard."

It would have been next to impossible, he said, to cull the contribution records of an organization that raised in the neighborhood f $3 million each year to examine them for donations that might have initiated with the C.I.A. but reached the committee "two or three times removed."

Mr. Cherne, who sounded distressed at the disclosure by Mr. Weil, later spoke with Gil Jones, whom he identified as the I.R.C. fund-raise through whom the Norman money was received, and reported that Mr. Jones had not "the foggiest" idea that the Norman Foundatiaon had not been the initial source of the money.

Mr. Cherne is an economist by profession and executive director of the Research Institune of America, which publishes newsletters and advisory pamphlets for businessmen.

He was vice chairman in 1972 of Democrats for Nixon and has been associated wth such organizations as the Citizens' Committee for a Free Cuba, the Council Against Communist Aggression and the Citizens' Committee for Peace with Freedom in Vietnam, according to the records of Group Research.

One of the foundations identified in 1967 as having cooperated with the C.I.A. in covert financing efforts was the J. M. Kaplan Fund, also of New York, and which over the years has contributed not only to the rescue group but also to Freedom House, an organization that monitors and reports on the degree of freedom that exists in other countries of the world.

Mr. Cherne is chairman of Freedom House's executive committee, and has been associated with the organization since 1945.

An executive of the Kaplan Fund said today, however, that his foundation's cooperation with the intelligence agency had been limited to the underwriting of a single program in the 1960's, and that none of the $21,500 given by it to the rescue committee or the $3,500 given to Freedom House had been supplied by the intelligence agency.

The Kaplan Fund, according to tax records compiled by Group Research, an organization here that monitors the activities of private foundations, gave the I.R.C. $10,000 in 1968 for assistance to refugees fleeing Czechoslovakia after the Soviet invasion that August.

The committee received another $10,000 from the fund in 1971 for assistance to Bengali refugees displaced by the Pakistani ar, and $1,000 in 1963 to aid refugees in South Vietnam.

Weil Is Disputed

Mr. Weil's recollection that the C.I.A. money given to the committee had been used to support the Belgian Congo medical program, which offered its services to Angolan refugees and others in the area, was disputed by Andrew Norman, also an officer of the Norman Foundation.

Mr. Norman said he recalled that the agency money passed through his foundation to the I.R.C. had gone to support some effort in Latin America, the details of which he said he could not remember, and that the amount involved had been a "maximum of $15,000."

WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)
17 FEBRUARY 1976

Didn't Everyone Get a Copy?

Sen. Robert A. Taft Jr., R-Ohio, has urged a Justice Department investigation to find out who leaked a secret House Intelligence Committee report to Daniel Schorr of CBS News. "There are already indications," said Taft, "that Schorr, who has admitted to being a party in the transaction, will be cited for contempt of Congress. But such a move does not go far enough. We must find the original source of the document and see to it that those responsible are punished to the fullest extent of the law." Taft added, "too much of perilous leaks" has been seen, not only from the "likes of Schorr" but from public officials as well. Did everybody get a copy but Taft?

WASHINGTON POST
19 FEB 1976

The Ford Intelligence Plan

MR. FORD'S INTELLIGENCE reform measures are notably serious and comprehensive. By an executive order issued yesterday, he has moved to centralize policy direction of the foreign intelligence community in the National Security Council, to set up a new board headed by the director of the CIA with the mandate and critical budget powers to "manage" intelligence activities, and to top this structure with an appointed citizen "Oversight Board." These steps, if put into effect conscientiously, would almost certainly give the President more assurance of control over the sprawling intelligence bureaucracy and could also give him better intelligence—surely desirable goals.

Mr. Ford describes his plan as one making the President "ultimately accountable for our intelligence activities." If this in fact turns out to be so, then it marks a major advance over the past, when the studied use of the doctrine of "plausible deniability" often made it impossible for others to know if the President had been consulted, let alone if he would accept responsibility, for a particular operation. This kind of accountability should also make more feasible the establishment of a responsible oversight system by the Congress, for in leading cases where Executive accountability must be established, it will often be, we think, to the Congress—under certain agreed terms of discretion — and not necessarily to the public at large—that it will have to be established.

Mr. Ford is proceeding with Executive branch self-reform, we note, before the Congress is fully ready to move. Clearly, he is taking advantage of the disarray particularly evident in the House, and of the confusion spread among the public by recent leaks and other events, to impose his own design. Whether this is good politics, however, is questionable. Mr. Ford has reserved to himself, for instance, the public definition of the charters of the various intelligence agencies. He seems prepared to submit to Congress only odd pieces of those charters, such as the writing of judicial safeguards against illegal electronic surveillance and mail openings, and the prohibition of peacetime attempts on the lives of foreign leaders. We are not at all sure that issuance of executive orders is the best way to build the Executive-congressional consensus needed for well-considered and lasting reform. It will be important just how receptive to the Senate's own reform proposals, now in committee, the administration will be.

It is characteristic of the Ford plan that his strongest bid for congressional cooperation lies in his proposal for a new law making it a crime for government employees with access to certain secret information to reveal it improperly. The matter demands extreme caution. Not for the first time, a President is professing outrage over leaks. Mr. Ford is no doubt right in figuring that he cannot expect Congress to tighten up on its leaks, as he has asked it to do, if he does not manifest worry over his own. But the designation of material as a national security secret, along with the holding, official release and unofficial leaking of it, are related parts of an immensely complicated process that ought to be treated as a whole. It is essential, for example, to think of creating a policy consensus which itself would tend to limit leaks; to define what secrets are and how they should be graded, reviewed and released over time; and to provide a reasonable procedure for honest dissent and whistle-blowing inside one or another branch of the government. We wish to study further whether the Ford bill adequately addresses their problem in its broad sweep.

In any event, the Ford administration has now spoken its piece—or at least offered its initial bargaining position—on intelligence reform. The Senate is working on its own proposals; the House, unfortunately, is still out to lunch. Legislators have a strong card in the Hughes-Ryan amendment, already law, requiring the administration to give "timely" notice of covert operations to six congressional committees; Mr. Ford wants it "modified." The President also needs an agreed procedure for treating secret information once it is given to Congress; he is demanding the last word on disclosure and Congress is plainly reluctant to give it to him. The challenge before both branches, then, is to demonstrate by cooperation on reform that it *is* possible for a democratic society to care properly both for its security and its citizens' rights.

BALTIMORE SUN
19 Feb. 1976

Voice publishes more of spying report

New York (AP)—The House intelligence committee concluded that United States intelligence agencies are, today, beyond the scrutiny of Congress, according to a document which the *Village Voice* published yesterday and identified as part of the committee's still-secret report.

The committee, which reviewed covert intelligence operations since 1965, also said "paramilitary operations of the worst type seemed to come from outside" the Central Intelligence Agency, and were ordered by former President Nixon and Henry A. Kissinger, the Secretary of State, the *Voice* report said.

The statement was made in reference to U.S. activities in Chile during the presidency of Salvador Allende and U.S. support for the now-ended Kurdish rebellion in Iraq.

The *Voice*, a New York city weekly newspaper, last week published what it said was the investigative section of the committee's report. Daniel Schorr, a CBS newsman, has said he supplied the *Voice* with a copy of the report.

The Justice Department said Tuesday it may investigate the leak, which led to initial publication of the report by the *Voice* last week. Representative Samuel S. Stratton (D., N.Y.) said yesterday that he plans to ask for a formal House investigation.

The *Voice* said it was publishing the material printed yesterday because it provides perspective for understanding the reaction of administration officials to the section it published last week.

The material published by the *Voice* yesterday detailed the difficulties the committee had in securing secret information from the White House, the intelligence agencies and FBI, the State Department, and other agencies of the executive branch.

Other than specifics of these problems, and statements of the committee's reaction, there was little, if anything, in the 10 pages that had not previously been made public by other newspapers and news organizations.

NEW YORK TIMES
20 Feb. 1976

Reforming the C.I.A.

President Ford's reform and reorganization of the country's foreign intelligence agencies is an important first step toward the elimination of abuses and the improvement in functioning that months of Congressional and press investigation have shown to be needed.

It marks the beginning of a process that the Congress now must continue: to write parts of the new Executive Order into law, but not before revising it in certain important respects; to expand and fortify the legal protection of civil rights; and to examine with meticulous care the fine print in Mr. Ford's proposal for a "secrets law" to safeguard the nation's intelligence "sources and methods" from disclosure by Government officials. It is this last point that arouses special concern lest it conceal retrogressive steps to curb freedom of information and freedom of the press.

There will be little argument about the new "charters" the President has issued setting forth the functions of the various intelligence agencies and barring most operations of a domestic character to the Central Intelligence Agency; but legislation is needed carefully to define such operations as remain and subject them, where necessary, to judicial supervision.

The increased powers given to the Director of Central Intelligence and the new three-man committee he will chair to coordinate the various agencies and allocate budgets are essential to improved operations. Efforts in the past to give coordinating authority to the C.I.A. Director have been largely meaningless without the power of the purse and in the face of the Pentagon's determination to maintain full control over the huge Defense Intelligence Agency.

By delegating these powers to a three-man committee, including a Deputy Secretary of Defense and a representative of the National Security Council — with right of appeal to the President in cases of disagreement — it should be possible to achieve this objective without the appointment of an intelligence "czar."

* * *

The chief omissions in the Executive Order—restriction of covert operations and improvement of Congressional oversight—reflect the Administration's recognition that the Congress will want to make these decisions itself, as it certainly should.

The President's general suggestion that Congress create a joint committee to be "fully informed" of all intelligence activities is a proposal of 20 years' vintage that should have been enacted long ago. It is the best way to achieve Congressional oversight as well as to avoid unreasonable covert operations.

Where the Presidential reform is weakest is in the Administration's new "independent oversight board," which is supposed to receive reports from the inspectors general of the various intelligence agencies and investigate other complaints of abuses. A more potent, full-time body is required, with considerably stronger top-personnel that the President evidently envisages. But no oversight board could be of much help in protecting a Director of Central Intelligence, serving at the pleasure of the President, from the kind of White House pressures that came from Richard Nixon and his aides. Fixed, statutory tenure for the Director as well as for the oversight board would be of more use—as the history of the Federal Reserve Board shows.

* * *

Most controversial—and most in need of Congressional study—is the single piece of legislation submitted to the Congress by Mr. Ford: his proposal for a new "secrets act." Legislation to prevent disclosure of vital intelligence secrets by Government employees undoubtedly is needed, particularly secrets concerning "sources and methods." Criminal penalties certainly are in order for such sorry disclosures by Government officials as the fact that the United States was eavesdropping on Leonid Brezhnev's radio-telephone conversations from his car to the Kremlin.

The President rightly has rejected proposals to restrict reporters or the press, limiting criminal prosecution to officials and Government contractors who sign agreements to protect the classified data they receive. But the bill submitted by Mr. Ford does not define "sources and methods"; it has a loophole that could lead to the imprisonment of reporters who refuse to reveal their sources of classified data; it raises unnecessary obstacles to private hearings by judges on the lawfulness of classifications; it does not require proof that anyone prosecuted knew that the data he revealed was classified. Each of these defects needs specific correction.

The Senate Intelligence Committee's intention to hold early hearings on the President's proposals is admirable, But the committee will terminate its activities March 15, after making its much-awaited final report. Pending creation of a joint Congressional intelligence committee, the Senate should create a new committee to prepare the comprehensive legislation now needed. As an Executive Order can always be revised by a later President, the more permanent legislative framework is essential, including the indicated revisions, extensions and clarifications of the Administration's proposal.

WASHINGTON POST
19 FEB 1976

'No Contact With the CIA'

On the basis of information to which they had access in 1970 a group of officers and past presidents of the Inter American Press Association issued a statement to the press warning of harassment of the Chilean news media by the Allende faction in Chile. Such harassment, especially as far as El Mercurio is concerned, did indeed occur following Allende's accession to the presidency.

On January 16 a story by Walter Pincus in The Washington Post included the following paragraph: "The (IAPA) release, according to the Senate report, was a CIA product 'through its covert action resources'."

In the first place this statement did not form part of the Senate report.

In the second place, the information on which the officers and past presidents of the IAPA based their statement came from Agustin Edwards, publisher of El Mercurio.

We have had no contact with the CIA or any other government agency, either North American or from any other country.

The IAPA has scrupulously kept clear of all association with any government in the conduct of its affairs.

RAYMOND E. DIX,
President, Inter American Press Association.
Washington.

Editor's Note: The Senate report said: "In response to criticisms of El Mercurio by candidate Allende, the CIA, through its covert action resources, orchestrated cables of support and protest from foreign newspapers, a protest statement from an international press association and world coverage of the association's protest." Mr. Pincus, learned from other, reliable sources that the press association referred to was IAPA.

WASHINGTON POST
19 FEB 1976

Joseph Kraft

CIA Shuffle: Can George Do It?

President Ford has finally come up with a passable program for reorganizing the intelligence community. But the effectiveness of the program depends heavily on detailed application in practice. In particular it is a question whether George Bush, the director of Central Intelligence, has it in him to establish an evaluative agency of high quality that is distant from both the CIA, with its spy mania, and the White House with its overwhelming pressure for applause instead of analysis.

To be sure, the President's program includes many different proposals. But most of the new ideas are paper improvements that can only be effective if the basic day-to-day operation works.

That principle includes the Intelligence Oversight Board made up of three distinguished outsiders; the proposal for a joint congressional oversight committee; the call for a semi-annual review; and the development of a full cabinet committee to replace what used to be the 40 Committee.

Similarly with the provision whereby officials who undertake to receive classified material can be made subject to civil and criminal penalties for divulging that information. Such a statute, applying only to those who have accepted government work, is clearly preferable to a broad Official Secrets Act which could be used against all citizens. Even so, the application of the rule will be discretionary and will again depend heavily on day-to-day operations.

In these circumstances, the centerpiece of the new structure is the three-man Committee for Foreign Intelligence, chaired by Mr. Bush as director of Central Intelligence. The committee will have control over all the many different agencies in the intelligence community. That includes the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency. This control is to be exercised primarily through careful scrutiny of budgets and programs. In addition, Mr. Bush and his committee are to evaluate the work of the different agencies stimulating competition and eliminating duplication. Finally, Mr. Bush is to make sure that the White House puts the right questions to the intelligence community—not as so often in the past the kind of questions that cause the intelligence community to support whatever the President takes it into his head to do.

The recommendation to give such power to the director of Central Intelligence is not new. It was advanced by former Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger back in 1971 when he was serving in the Bureau of the Budget. At that time President Nixon approved the notion.

But the idea failed in practice. Richard Helms, then director of Central Intelligence, never divorced himself from the CIA, which he continued to head and where he continued to work. He was regarded as an interloper by the other intelligence agencies who never let him dominate their budgets or programs. The White House also continued to regard him as a kind of spy master, who could be used for the dirtiest of Watergate tricks.

Mr. Bush, accordingly, has an exceedingly difficult task ahead of him. He will need to recruit a new staff with an outlook and a home apart from both the CIA and the White House. He himself will have to put the CIA under a deputy so that he can act impartially in judging its conflict with the other intelligence agencies. He will also have to put behind him his partiality to President Ford, so the White House can be rapped when it asks the wrong questions or demands a mere imprimatur.

I hope—though I have some doubts that were fortified by the President's bumbling discussion of the matter at his press conference—that Mr. Bush is up to the job, for other parts of the general package are quite disconcerting. The Federal Bureau of Investigation gets carte blanche for domestic counter-intelligence activity. And there is no provision for a net assessment—an absolutely essential intelligence function whereby the capabilities and intentions of the other side are measured against our own.

Moreover, the program has been an unconscionably long time coming. Its need has been pre-visible since the revelations by The New York Times in late 1974 of CIA interference in domestic affairs. In the interim, Mr. Ford has wasted time with the Rockefeller Commission and started a hare with the assassination issue. A Senate committee and a House committee and at least a portion of the press have allowed themselves to look like fools. The whole world has been scratching its head in bewilderment about what the United States is up to in the intelligence field.

If Mr. Bush can deliver the goods, it may all have been worthwhile. If not, the country has paid a terribly heavy price while waiting for the mountain to deliver what is only a mouse.

Friday, Feb. 20, 1976 THE WASHINGTON POST

Panel Rejects Joint Hill Unit On Intelligence

By Walter Pincus
Washington Post Staff Writer

President Ford's proposal that a joint congressional committee on intelligence be established was rejected yesterday as the Senate Government Operations Committee quickly moved to draft a resolution that would set up a Senate Committee on Intelligence Activities.

The joint committee proposal, offered by Sen. William Brock (R-Tenn.), was withdrawn after tough criticism of House handling of its intelligence investigation.

Brock said, "I have been disgusted with the House," and added that "they can go ahead and make idiots out of Congress and the intelligence agencies" if they establish their own House committee.

The Senate and House last year set up select committees to investigate alleged abuses by U.S. intelligence agencies. The House committee has already gone out of business, and the Senate committee's mandate expires at the end of this month.

Sen. Charles Percy (R-Ill.) said he initially favored a new joint committee but changed his mind. The House, he said, "is essentially on a Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday schedule" which would make serious joint work on intelligence oversight difficult.

Committee Chairman Sen. Abraham A Ribicoff (D-Conn.) said a joint committee would make the Senate captive to the House, which he said "had different policies on secrecy" from the Senate.

Public reaction to leaks of the House intelligence committee report was the focus of debate among committee members over how a new Senate committee should protect its secrets.

The committee's draft bill bars any member from disclosing intelligence agency information publicly without committee authorization.

Sen. William Roth (R-Del.) and Sen. Walter Huddleston (D-Ky.) offered an amendment establishing procedures by which a member who disclosed information could be investigated by the Senate Select Committee on Standards and Conduct.

Sen. Jacob K. Javits (R-N.Y.) cautioned that such a proposal limited the "speech and debate clause," a section of the Constitution that gives total immunity to a member speaking on the floor of Congress.

Percy said the Roth-Huddleston language would "place such a restriction on a member that he might not want to serve" on the new committee.

Sen. Lawton Chiles (D-Fla.), in supporting Huddleston, said, "People back home are appalled by the House . . . There has got to be some kind of self-restraint."

A final vote is set for today on the Roth-Huddleston secrecy amendment and on language that would give the Senate, rather than the President, final say over what classified material is publicly disclosed. Mr. Ford, in his message to Congress Wednesday, said that the President should decide what material is released.

WASHINGTON STAR
18 FEB 1976

Won't you keep my secret?

To the principal players, the drama known as "The Perils of the Pike Report" may seem sober fare. But for the rest of us there has been a persistent note of farce.

You would have to follow the plot summary pretty carefully, for instance, to understand Chairman Pike's beef about the suppression of his committee's report by the full House, at President Ford's insistence. And even then it might not be entirely clear.

It is probably true that some merely embarrassing matter is being concealed, as usual, under the rubric of national security. One almost takes that for granted.

It must nonetheless be recalled that Mr. Pike's committee, after failing to get the classified materials it wanted and needed, turned from threats of subpoena and struck a bargain with Mr. Ford. It gained access to the material, but only on condition that Mr. Ford reserve a veto of its publication. The Pike committee made that bed then, but doesn't want to lie in it now. After incorporating much sensitive material in the draft report, the committee encountered stern reminders of the contract it had made and came to the end of the road — or almost so.

Enter now, Mr. Daniel Schorr of CBS, to whom someone considerately leaked a copy of the report. By his own account Mr. Schorr realized that he alone, among possible leakees, stood to bring the suppressed report to light and therefore, as he explained to the Associated Press, "I could not be the one responsible for the suppression of the report." It was possible to see in this explanation more than a trace of vainglory, since 246 members of the House had voted January 29 to share with Daniel Schorr the awful burden of suppression.

But there was more to follow. When Mr. Schorr, in this act of journalistic conscience, decided to share his copy with the public, by transmitting it in some as yet undisclosed fashion to the *Village Voice* newspaper, his identity was not immediately known — although he had displayed the title page of the report during a network broadcast.

The Reporter's Committee on Freedom of the Press, an organization he had associated in the disclosure, promptly blew Mr. Schorr's cover; the discloser was disclosed. This breach of confidence shocked Mr. Schorr, whose response would have had to be composed by the brooding spirit of farce that has been writing key lines in the drama from the outset. "I deeply regret," said he, "that the reporter's committee has not been able to maintain the confidentiality of the arrangement because there are delicate matters involved that journalists should want to protect in their common interest."

Without waxing pompous about it, you could say that those are precisely the sentiments of those in the executive branch who are concerned over the promiscuous and unevaluated spillage of every weather-bleached skeleton in every closet of every intelligence agency. But Mr. Pike did not want to keep Mr. Ford's secret; Mr. Schorr thought it his duty as a journalist to disclose Mr. Pike's secret; and someone at the Reporter's Committee saw no reason to keep Mr. Schorr's secret. There may be honor among thieves; but there is no confidentiality among the violators of confidences. That seems the modest lesson of the case as of the end of the latest act.

NEW YORK TIMES
7 FEB 1976

Rule of Law

There is no longer any question that the Central Intelligence Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, in their pursuit of the national interest—as they and a succession of Presidents were left to define it—broke a number of the laws of the United States.

Senator Frank Church, whose post as chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence has afforded him a close and panoramic view of the whole range of violations committed by both agencies, has called for appointment of a special prosecutor to take the investigations and prosecutions out of the Justice Department. Attorney General Edward H. Levi has vigorously opposed the Church proposal, terming it "an attack on the integrity" of his department. In our view, Mr. Levi has much the better of the argument.

The task now before the Department of Justice, simply stated, is to vindicate the rule of law. Over and beyond the normal duty it bears to enforce the law vigorously and fairly, its recent history imposes a special obligation on the department to re-establish the sense that it will do so, wherever warranted, even against people who have acted under color of the highest Federal authority. By the same token, it must resist being stampeded by skeptics into bringing unwise and unsupportable indictments simply to prove that the John Mitchell era is over.

Appointment of a special prosecutor for these investigations, even if a number of important and successful prosecutions were accomplished, would serve only half the purpose of vindicating the rule of law. A clear demonstration that the ordinary law-enforcement machinery is again operative and reliable is also urgently required. Indeed, an effective Justice Department would stand as a far more credible deterrent to officials who might be tempted to commit crimes than would yet one more special prosecutorial effort destined to fold its tent when this particular job is done.

Even Senator Church's argument that a special prosecutor is needed because of the Justice Department's long-standing immunity agreement with the C.I.A. and its dependence on the F.B.I. for investigations cuts against him. Nothing would more clearly signal to the C.I.A. and F.B.I. bureaucracies that the immunity honeymoon is over than successful prosecutions by the Attorney General against officials of both agencies for crimes committed in the name of national security.

The national addiction to special prosecutorial offices —however well-founded in Watergate—is unwise, for it undercuts the drive for excellence and integrity without which the nation's established prosecutors' offices are bound to grow flabby, ineffectual and even corrupt. Mr. Levi's current task is to prod his department into moving on the F.B.I. and C.I.A. cases as skillfully, fairly and expeditiously as possible; successful completion of that task would be a major contribution to the Republic and to the rule of law.

WASHINGTON POST
31 JAN 1976

Panel Requests Names Of CIA News Covers

By Walter Pincus
Washington Post Staff Writer

The Senate intelligence committee has asked the Central Intelligence Agency for the names of American news organizations that provided cover for clandestine agents abroad, according to Senate sources.

The committee staff also has studied examples of past CIA covert operations and has requested the names of American reporters who worked either full-time or part-time in some of them.

Also under committee study are sources of funds for journalist traveling fellowships and possible CIA relations with national journalism organizations, or individuals employed by such groups.

Senate aides refuse to say whether CIA has given the committee any names of news organizations or individual journalists. Similar requests from the House intelligence committee were turned down by the agency, according to a House committee staff member.

The prospect that names of cooperating news organizations and CIA-paid reporters may emerge — plus repeated statements by CIA Director William E. Colby that the agency plans to continue employing part-time reporters (called stringers) — has created concern among journalists.

Complicating the picture, both for news organizations and the congressional committees, is the lack of information on exactly what use of the press the CIA has made.

According to House and Senate committee sources, the CIA appears to have had relationships with three types of reporters:

— Stringers, who work abroad part-time for American and foreign news organizations, have been used to gather information as CIA informants. Colby has said the CIA still uses some 30 stringers, but he refuses to reveal which news organizations they work for.

— Full-time staff members of general circulation American news organizations who also worked for CIA. In 1973, when Colby first disclosed this type of relationship to The Washington Star in a background interview, he announced the practice was being halted. He said recently that the last five of these had given up one or the other profession. Of the five, Colby said, three reporters had not informed their American employers of their agency relationship. The others worked for the CIA with the approval of their company management.

— CIA agents overseas who use journalistic employment as a cover for their clandestine activities but do not perform any journalistic work.

The House intelligence committee, in its unpublished report, noted that: "The CIA's cover and commercial staff files show that in 1975, 11 CIA employees used media cover with 15 news field companies — television, radio, newspapers and magazines. Five of these are of major general news impact, nine of no major general news influence and one a proprietary."

A CIA "proprietary" is a company secretly owned and operated by the agency.

The House committee never got the names of those organizations and thus does not know how many are American, and how many foreign.

CIA Director Colby told reporters Tuesday that no CIA personnel are operating abroad under journalistic cover for major American news organizations.

The Senate intelligence committee is looking at news organizations based on information that in the past the CIA has benefited from cover provided by American organizations.

A top news executive, who asked that his name be withheld, said recently that he knew of some organizations that had "let their names be used" by the CIA because they were owned by "superpatriots."

Executives of major U.S. newspapers, radio-television networks, wire services and magazines contacted all denied knowledge of any present cooperation by their organizations with the CIA, though several cautioned that there may have been relationships in the past.

Officials at NBC and CBS said that in the early 1960s they permitted the CIA to view and buy film shown on the air which their cameraman had shot overseas. Spokesmen for both networks said that service was available to anyone.

Editors of The Washington Post, the Washington Star, Baltimore Sun, New York Times, Chicago Sun-Times and Los Angeles Times said they never cooperated with the CIA in providing cover for agents overseas.

The same reply came from presidents of NBC, CBS and ABC news organizations, executives of the nation's two major wire services, the Associated Press and United Press International, as well as three weekly newsmagazines, Time, Newsweek, and U.S. News & World Report.

Most of those contacted agreed with the statement of Christian Science Monitor editor John Hughes: "I'm flatly opposed" to CIA-press relationships, "for the obvious reason that it completely undermines the value of the press. . ."

NBC President Richard C. Wald, who worked overseas for the New York Herald Tribune in the 1950s, said he "understands why serious and principled journalists might have felt at that time that they could serve their country while practicing their profession."

"In hindsight," Wald added, "I think it was improper and anyone who cooperated into the 1960s and 1970s ought to have his head examined."

In the past, CIA has recruited journalists for both formal and informal relationships.

In 1960, I was offered a full-time overseas job with the CIA. At the time I was Washington correspondent for three North Carolina newspapers. I turned the job down but that year did take two trips overseas to international youth conferences. The CIA arranged and paid expenses for both trips.

In 1967, I wrote of this CIA association in The Washington Post.

Other journalists and publications have had various kinds of financial relationships with the CIA in the past.

Several former CIA employees have become well-known full-time journalists after leaving the agency.

Philip Geyelin, since 1967 editorial page editor of The Washington Post, took a leave of absence in 1951 from his reporting job on The Wall Street Journal to work for the CIA. After 11 months in the agency, Geyelin returned to the Journal. Since that time he has had no relationship with the CIA or its officials "except to talk to them in the normal give and take of journalism," he said recently.

Columnist Tom Braden was with the CIA from 1950 to 1954 and helped organize links between the agency and several domestic organizations including the National Student Association. Since 1954, Braden has worked in the news business, first running a California newspaper and since 1968 writing a nationally syndicated column.

The publisher of The New Republic, Robert J. Myers, worked for the CIA in Asia for almost 20 years before resigning in 1966.

Two former Newsweek magazine Washington reporters, George Packard and Bruce van Voorst, worked for the CIA before joining the magazine. Packard is now running for the Republican Senate nomination in Pennsylvania; van Voorst recently joined the staff of Sen. Dick Clark (D-Iowa).

In 1967 it was disclosed that the American Newspaper Guild had accepted nearly $1 million from foundations that handled CIA funds. The money financed a union international program, but Guild officers denied knowing the agency was behind the funding.

The House committee staff has proposed that U.S. intelligence organizations not use American general circulation journals or electronic media or their employees or stringers "for cover or information gathering."

Committee members, however, doubt that such a provision could be written into law but say it could become a regulation.

CIA operating regulations already prohibit CIA use of certain specified groups such as the recipients of Fulbright grants (who spend a year abroad as students or teachers) and members of the Peace Corps.

Colby has said, however, that he did not want to add journalists to the limitations already in effect.

While major American news organizations deny they have any covert financial or cooperative arrangements with CIA, most carry on their regular news-gathering functions using CIA officials and publications as sources — sometimes without attribution.

This non-paid relationship has also come under critical review by the House and Senate intelligence committees.

"Tell me which is more corrupting?", a Senate staff member asked recently. "Paying a stringer overseas for tid-bits or some cozy relationship between a Washington columnist and a CIA official over lunch at Sans Souci?"

CIA officials are often in-

terviewed for stories by Washington reporters, almost always without attribution. The agency has its own public relations man to whom questions are directed.

A CIA publication, the Foreign Broadcast Information Service Reports, which presents transcripts of overseas radio broadcasts, can be purchased by news organizations.

Reporters going overseas often ask for and receive briefings from CIA area specialists. And CIA officials ask for an opportunity to debrief reporters and correspondents who have traveled in areas that interest the agency.

Richard Salant, president of CBS News, said recently that in the early 1960s when his network's correspondents overseas came back to the United States for their annual year-end program, they would "drop down to the State Department for a conversation" that turned into a debriefing. Salant stopped the practice.

The House committee, as part of its inquiry, interviewed aides to former CIA Director Richard M. Helms on how Helms, a former newsman himself, cultivated people in the news business. They said Helms, according to a House aide, had "chummy" relationships with publishers, network executives and reporters.

He "called on their patriotism" to cover certain stories or send reporters to various areas of the world and occasionally got stories killed.

The Senate committee also plans to explore the CIA's nonfinancial relationships with the news media.

WASHINGTON POST
10 FEB 1976

CIA Balks At Listing Reporters

By Walter Pincus
Washington Post Staff Writer

Central Intelligence Agency officials, claiming support from some top American news executives, have refused to give the Senate intelligence committee the names of U.S. news organizations and individual journalists that worked with the agency in the past, according to informed sources.

Agency officials passed the word that names would not be released to the Senate committee late last week.

CIA Director George Bush met last Wednesday in New York with executives of CBS and The New York Times and found support for the CIA position of "burying the past," according to sources within the intelligence community and on Capitol Hill.

The committee was told that one news executive said to Bush, "we protect our (news) sources, you protect yours," one source said.

There were, the committee heard, differing views expressed to Bush during his New York trip, according to another source, "including some who wanted all the names out to cleanse the profession," and others who said the CIA "should protect them."

Bush's New York trip, according to one source, was part of a re-examination by the new CIA director of the agency's present use of American journalists and stringers (part-time reporters, usually paid on a piecework basis) for U.S. publications.

On Wednesday, Bush had an off-the-record luncheon in New York with CBS board chairman William Paley, CBS News president Richard Salant and CBS Evening News managing edititor Walter Cronkite.

That same day Bush had an hour-and-a-half off-the-record meeting over coffee with New York Times publisher Arthur O. Sulzberger, Times editorial page editor John Oakes and Times vice president Sydney Gruson.

The network and newspaper executives believed their remarks, like those of Bush, would not be attributed to them. Nevertheless, by Friday the Senate committee had received word of some support from the Times and CBS for CIA's non-disclosure position.

Sulzberger said yesteraay he has known Bush "a long time" and that their discussion was "about a wide range of different things."

He said the Times is seeking under the Freedom of Information Act to find out "whether or not any Times person is now connected" with the CIA. His talk with Bush focused on the agency's future relations with journalists, Sulzberger said. "The past," he maintained "was not part of our discussion.....We did not get that specific."

The Times on Jan. 31 published a story that described attempts by the CIA in 1953 to recruit one of its own newsmen. In the story, a former Times reporterer said he had been told by a CIA official that former Times publisher Arthur Hays Sulzberger, the father of the present publisher, had "a working arrangement" with the CIA in which some of the newspaper's reporters working abroad had been on the CIA's payroll.

Sulzberger said yesterday he "did not raise" any questions about that allegation with Bush.

CBS News president Salant refused to discuss the luncheon discussion because it was "off the record and I feel bound by that." Cronkite said yesterday that, as a guest, he would abide by the rules and not discuss the session.

Cronkite added that he feels "terribly strongly" that the names of journalists with past CIA connections should be "put on the table for the protection of those not guilty of such behavior."

According to informed sources, Cronkite was the only person who made a strong pitch to Bush that there should be full disclosure of past CIA connections with journalists and news organizations.

Senate committee staff sources say it now will be up to the full committee how far their request for specific names will be pressed.

A White House source said yesterday the agency's policy of non-disclosure will continue to be supported even if the committee exerts strong pressure to get names.

"The interest of the government goes to the integrity of our guarantee of confidentiality of all agents," this presidential aide said.

All sources contacted agreed that the New York news executives uniformly argued that the CIA should eliminate its practice of using stringers and freelancers for U.S. publications. Their combined position, according to intelligence sources, may influence Bush to issue a regulation barring such use in the future.

The House intelligence committee has been discussing such a prohibition against the use of journalists for cover or as agents, and CIA officials expect the Senate committee will recommend a similar course.

"It could be," one intelligence source said, "that we will have to spend more time justifying them than they are worth."

"The agency is very pragmatic," one official said recently. "If they see that problems from Congress and the press outweigh the advantages (of using American journalists) they might shift."

This source pointed out that in 1973 then CIA Director William E. Colby announced he was halting the practice of the CIA hiring full-time reporters from major publications to act also as full-time covert agents.

BALTIMORE SUN
7 Feb. 1976

Arafat links CIA, Israel in 'scheme'

Washington (AP)—Yasser Arafat said yesterday that there has been a conspiracy against the Palestinians, Lebanese and Arabs involving Israel and the United States Central Intelligence Agency.

The Palestinian leader appeared on a broadcast of NBC's Meet the Press which had been taped in Beirut, Lebanon. The transcript was released in Washington.

Mr. Arafat said the civil war in Lebanon is not a battle between Christians and Muslims but between national groups and isolationist groups, although it appears to outsiders to be a religious battle.

"From my point of view it has been done because there is a conspiracy against the Lebanese people and the Palestinian people and the Arab nation. And, according to my information and analysis, the conspiracy had been planned by the help of imperialistic powers and especially by your CIA and the Zionist powers, and especially by . . Israel itself."

Asked for proof of this, he responded:

"I have many proofs, but I think the time is not suitable to unmask what happened here in Lebanon. But definitely, after some years, one of the heads of the CIA will write by himself his memories about what he has done in Lebanon. The same thing—the same that he has done in Chile, Angola and the others, and the moment I find it suitable I will say everything."

LONDON TIMES
6 Feb. 1976

CIA said to have plans for coup in Rome

From Our Own Correspondent
Rome, Feb 5

The United States Council for National Security has contingency plans ready in the event of Communist entry into the Italian Government, according to Mr Victor Marchetti, a former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) agent. He said that the final resort would be a military coup.

Mr Marchetti is quoted in the news magazine *Panorama* as saying that the CIA has a principal role in the formulation of these plans. The right-wing coup would be planned by the Italian counter-intelligence service which he describes as a "key element" in the CIA's plans. The military coup would be followed by the installation of a military junta on the Chilean pattern.

The CIA would make use, he is reported as saying, not only of the Italian counter-intelligence service but also of neo-fascist groups and the Mafia.

NEW YORK TIMES
11 FEB 1976

AN EX-CBS WRITER IS LINKED TO C.I.A.

Former Network Aide Says He Ousted Man in '54 on Learning of Connection

By JOHN M. CREWDSON
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Feb. 10—A staff officer of the Central Intelligence Agency worked in the mid-1950's as a staff writer for CBS News in New York while he was serving as a deep-cover intelligence operative, according to intelligence sources and past and present executives of CBS News.

The officer was identified as Austin Goodrich by Sig Mickelson, who at the time was a CBS vice president in charge of the network's broadcast news division. Mr. Mickelson said that he dismissed Mr. Goodrich in 1954 after learning of his C.I.A. connection.

Other sources said that Mr. Goodrich joined CBS as a part-time correspondent, or "stringer," in 1951, while he was stationed by the C.I.A. in Stockholm, where he also reported for Swedish television as part of his intelligence "cover."

CBS sent him to New York is 1953 to write for its broadcast news program, according to network personnel records. He remained there until he was discharged by Mr. Mickelson the following year, when his role as a career C.I.A. operative became known to network officials.

In Job 16 Months

Mr. Mickelson said that hi recollection was that Mr. Goodrich rned to Stockholm after his 16-month stint as a writer in New York, because he believed the the man was overseas when he was dismissed by CBS in May 1954.

"We got rid of Goodrich fast," said Mr. Mickelson, now an executive of Radio Free Europe here.

Richard Salant, who now heads CBS News in New York, confirmed today that Mr. Goodrich was employed by CBS during the period indicated by Mr. Mickelson, but said that he had no independent corroboration of Mr. Goodrich's agency background.

Reached at his home in suburban Virginia, Mr. Goodrich declined to comment on the assertion by Mr. Mickelson, saying only that he was "now retired from government service."

Other sources said, however, that Mr. Goodrich during his career as a clandestine C.I.A. operative in Scandinavia and elsewhere, had reinforced his cover as a journalist and author by publishing a book about Finland, "Study in Sisu," in 1960.

No one in the New York offices of the book's publisher, Ballantine, could be reached for comment on whether editors there had known of Mr. Goodrich's C.I.A. connection when they accepted the manuscript for publication.

Mr. Salant in a telephone interview, said however, that he and other CBS executives were aware of assertions by Mr. Mickelson and by John Day, a former manager of CBS News, that Frank Kearns, a former correspondent for the network in Africa and Europe, had had an operational connection with the C.I.A. while serving as the CBS stringer in Cairo in the mid-1950's.

Possible News Article

The CBS news chief said that the matter was being looked into by the network with a view toward a possible news article about Mr. Kearns. Kearns.

He said that his office had received accounts of Mr. Kearns's agency relationship from Mr. Mickelson and Mr. Day, a former manager of CBS News who now publishes a small aper in England.

However, Mr. Kearns said today that he had never worked for American intelligence.

Mr. Day could not be reached for comment, but Mr. Mickelson recalled in the telephone interview that he and Mr. Day had heard a "rumor" about Mr. Kearns's agency affiliation while Mr. Kearns was serving as the part-time CBS reporter in Egypt.

CBS, Mr. Mickelson recalled, thought highly of Mr. Kearns's work and was eager to hire him as a full-time staff reporter, but was concerned about his C.I.A. affiliation.

He and Mr. Day, Mr. Michelson said, approached Allen W. Dulles, then the Director of Central Intelligence, at a Washington dinner party in 1957 or 1958 and told him, in effect, that CBS wished to employ the man, but would not if he remained with the agency.

Letter of Resignation

Mr. Mickelson said he then "put it up to Frank" whether to stay with CBS or the C.I.A., and that some time later an agency official approached him with a copy of Mr. Kearns's letter of resignation from the C.I.A.

It was only "after I was absolutely convinced that his resignation was total and complete" that Mr. Kearns was hired as the CBS correspondent in Cairo, Mr. Mickelson said.

According to Mr. Salant, Mr. Kearns joined the CBS staff in September 1958 and resigned in March 1971.

Mr. Kearns, now a professor of journalism at West Virginia University, said in a telephone interview today that the recollections of Mr. Mickelson and Mr. Day were unfounded.

He said at first that "during all the years I was a CBS news staff reporter, I had no connection whatsoever with the C.I.A. or any other intelligence agency."

He then added that he had never worked for American intelligence at any time during his career, including the period he served as the CBS stringer in Cairo before joining the network's staff.

He said that there had never been any acrimony between himself and Mr. Mickelson or Mr. Day, and that he could not account for the certainty with which they stated their recollections.

LONDON TIMES
20 Jan. 1976

Editors deny having spies on their staffs

By Roger Berthoud

With more or less one voice, the editors of Britain's national newspapers yesterday denied that they knowingly employed any foreign correspondent who also served an intelligence agency.

The charge was made in a letter, printed in *The Times* yesterday, from Mr Bernard Nossiter, London correspondent of the *Washington Post*. He alleged that "the lives of foreign correspondents are endangered by editors who permit or encourage their reporters to serve two masters, a newspaper and an intelligence agency".

There was general agreement among the editors to whom I spoke that it would be impossible to vouch for the purity of every single "stringer" (non-staff correspondent) in every capital around the world. In such cases it is not easy to arrange any form of "positive vetting", as Mr Freddie Fisher, editor of the *Financial Times*, pointed out. "But we do go to considerable trouble to satisfy ourselves as far as is possible that such things do not arise", he said.

"I have never known of anyone employed by this newspaper (as a staff correspondent) who has been an agent either for this country or a foreign power."

Mr William Rees-Mogg, editor of *The Times*, commented: "No one on the staff of *The Times* is permitted, let alone encouraged, to serve an intelligence agency, and I have never met any editor of any English newspaper who I believe would have permitted his staff to engage in intelligence work." *The Sunday Times* printed a similar assurance in its leader column

Mr William Deedes, of *The Daily Telegraph*, was the only editor who preferred not to comment: mainly, it seems, out of respect for the finiteness of even an editor's knowledge. Mr Peter Preston, the new editor of *The Guardian*, said: "Obviously we endeavour and expect and hope to employ people working only for *The Guardian*. Where stringers are serving a variety of other masters, we hope they are *bona fide* journalistic enterprises."

There were forthright denials from the deputy editor and foreign editor of the *Daily Express* and *Daily Mail* respectively.

Mr Andrew Knight, editor of *The Economist*, said: "Mr Nossiter cannot be referring to us. Any form of correspondent who was known to have anything to do with an intelligence agency would be out on his neck."

Lurking at the back of suspicious American minds may well be the case of Kim Philby, the double agent who was working in Beirut as the correspondent of *The Observer* and *The Economist* when he vanished to the safety of the Soviet Union.

Mr Donald Tyerman, who was then editor of *The Economist*, recalled yesterday that Philby had been under suspicion as being the "third man" in the Burgess and Maclean case, and had been publicly exculpated (in November, 1955) in the Commons by Mr Macmillan, then Foreign Secretary.

"After that a number of his friends approached *The Economist* and said he wanted a job in the Middle East to carry on his father's business interests. Simultaneously *The Observer* got in touch and said could we make a joint stringer arrangement. Although we had been asked by old friends, *The Observer* had been asked by the Foreign Office. If I had known the Foreign Office had asked, I would no more have employed him than if the CIA or KGB had asked.

"In my experience, apart from wartime, it is not the habit of respectable papers consciously to employ intelligence agents."

Mr Tyerman said that he had, as editor, been asked by the Foreign Office to provide a letter of accreditation as cover for "young so-and-so going off to Latin America," but had always refused.

Mr David Astor, until recently the editor of *The Observer*, recalled that after Philby had been "cleared", the Foreign Office approached him quite openly and said: "This wretched fellow is unemployable. He has been the subject of so much chatter that we cannot use him. He was originally a journalist; could you take him on?"

The Foreign Office gave Mr Astor a specific undertaking, he said, that they would not use Philby as a spy. But, it seems, there was a pro-Philby and an anti-Philby faction in the Foreign Office and intelligence service, and the pros insisted he should remain eligible. "They rerecruited him but did not tell me, which was of course a breach of their undertaking."

They were thoroughly apologetic when he vanished, and implied that there had been internal divisions. "What got us into trouble was that he was a Soviet agent, and that nobody knew. But they did not plant a spy with us. They planted with us a chap they were not using, and then rerecruited him."

Mr Nossiter meanwhile stands by his charges, while regretting that *The Times* did not print his original full 2000-word article on the British intelligence services, but only a few sentences "ripped out of context."

NEW YORK TIMES
12 FEB 1976

C.I.A. to Stop Enlisting Agents From the Press and the Church

By NICHOLAS M. HORROCK
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Feb. 11—The Central Intelligence Agency announced today that it would cease the practice of recruiting agents from among reporters for American news organizations or American clergymen and missionaries.

The action was taken, senior intelligence oficials said, in response to growing criticism of the C.I.A.'s use of news media personnel and the buying of information from American newsmen. There have also been substantial complaints from religious groups over the reports that the C.I.A. once used missionaries for intelligence gathering.

It was the first public action of George Bush, the new Director of Central Intelligence and the first time the agency had publicly barred itself from a particular intelligence gathering method.

In 1967, President Johnson barred the C.I.A. from secretly funding private American voluntary organizations. The agency was prohibited from recruiting agents from members of the Peace Corps by an executive order.

In 1973, William E. Colby, then the Director of Central Intelligence, halted the secret use by the agency of five full-time journalists with major American publications and, as Mr. Colby said this year, they were phased out by 1974.

But Mr. Bush's order goes further. "Effective immediately," a statement issued by the director's office said, the "C.I.A. will not enter into any paid or contractual relationship with any full-time or part-time news correspondent accredited by any U.S. news service newspaper, periodical, radio or television network or station."

A senior intelligence agency official said that "less than 20 persons will be affected by the order." He said the order would also end the practice of sending a C.I.A. employee abroad under the "cover" of being an accredited representative of an American news organizations.

The order, another official said, did not bar the agency from recruiting employees of foreign news organizations.

In taking today's action, Mr. Bush appeared to be directly opposed to the position of his predecessor. Mr. Colby told newsmen shortly before he retired that he believed "part time" or freelance employees of American news organizations were fair game for recruitment by the C.I.A.

The agency order noted that it would also bar recruitment within the clergy, but that, in fact there was no current "secret or paid contractual relationship with any American clergyman or missionary."

It said, however, that the agency would accept information voluntarily offered by members of the news media or the clergy.

"It is the agency policy not to divulge the names of cooperating Americans. In this regard C.I.A. will not make public, now or in the future, the names of any cooperating journalists or churchmen," the statement said.

Mr. Bush's statement said that the agency did not believe that its use of people in news and religion was improper, but that it recognized the freedoms of religion and the pres in the Constitution and that it would ban the recruitment "in order to avoid any appearance of improper use by the agency."

The first strong indication that the C.I.A. had infiltrated the news media came in 1973 when Mr. Colby leaked a news story about ahe gency's use of "stringers" and the five staff reporters. These details were confirmed last month in a report of the House Select Committee on Intelligence.

The House report created an uproar among members of the news media, the major news organizations and press and writing societies. Sigma Delta Chi, the society of professional journalists, and the American Society of Journalists and Authors, which represents many freelance or parttime writers, made formal complaints to President Ford.

C.I.A. STATEMENT

Over the years, the C.I.A. has had relationships with individuals in many walks of American life. These relationships, many of a voluntary and unpaid nature, have reflected the desire of Americ man's to help their country. Such relationships have been conducted by the agency with the clear intent of furthering its foreign intelligence mission and have not been aimed at imfluencing or improperly acting on any American institution.

Genuine concern has recently been expressed about C.I.A. relations with newsmen and churchmen. The agency does not believe there has been any impropriety on its part in the limited use made of persons connected in some way with American media, church and misionary organizations. Nonetheless, C.I.A. recognizes the special status afforded these institutions under our Constitution and in order to avoid any appearance of improper use by the agency, the D.C.I. [Director of Central Intelligence] has decided on a revised policy to govern agency relations with these group:

¶Effective immediately, C.I.A. will not enter into any paid or contractual relationship with any full-time or part-time news correspondent accredited by any U.S. news service, newspaper, periodical, radio or television network or station.

¶As soon as feasible, the agency will bring existing relationships with individuals in these groups into conformity with this new policy.

¶C.I.A. has no secret paid or contractual relationship with any American clergyman or missionary. This practice will continued as a matter of policy.

C.I.A. recognizes that members of these groups may wish to provide information to the C.I.A. on matters of foreign intelligence of interest to the U.S. Government. The C.I.A. will continue to welcome information volunteered by such individuals.

It is agency policy not to divulge the names of cooperating Americans. In this regard C.I.A. will not make public, now or in the future, the names of any cooperating journalists or churcmen.

NEW YORK TIMES
15 Feb. 1976

Selling Secrets

The winding trail of the secret intelligence committee report from its origins in the House of Representatives to the pages of The Village Voice raises at least as many ethical issues for journalists as it poses sleuthing problems for those in the executive branch or in Congress who may be inclined to trace this leak back to its spout.

CBS correspondent Daniel Schorr now admits that he transmitted the report to The Voice through a still unnamed intermediary. The *quid pro quo* was an arrangement under which money passed from The Voice to the Reporters' Committee for Freedom of the Press, a group dedicated to defense of the First Amendment.

In his journalistic capacity Mr. Schorr had every right to seek access to the Pike committee report and to communicate the information in his possession to viewers of CBS News. Where he did responsible journalism a disservice was in making the report available for cash sale. The Reporters' Committee, in turn, did itself and its mission little honor in becoming a willing recipient of the proceeds of such a transaction.

To put it bluntly, while reporters and news organizations have rightly declined to accept the Government's judgment on what documents it is appropriate to publish, it is flatly wrong for reporters to be involved in any commercial traffic in such documents.

The attempt to launder the transaction by devoting the proceeds to high constitutional purposes just does not work. The damage to journalism lies in the willingness to be involved in such commerce in any manner, and the fact that the crusading Voice and the Reporters' Committee—both of which, in other circumstances, would probably be among the first to denounce "checkbook journalism"—receive the benefit deepens rather than eradicates the stain.

NEW YORK TIMES
10 FEB 1976

More 'C.I.A. Agents' Listed By West German Magazine

BONN, Feb. 9 (UPI)—A West German news magazine today published the names of 10 more persons it said were agents of the United States Central Intelligence Agency in Bonn and said it was not concerned about what happened to them.

Information Service, a magazine with a small circulation that describes itself as socialist, rejected warnings from a United States Embassy spokesman that publication could incite "lunatics and fanatics" to attack American diplomats. It said that the safety of the persons whom it named had to be weighed against the safety and independence of entire nations.

"The C.I.A. has proven often enough that it is ready if necessary to crush freedom by bloody intervention," it said.

The magazine gave the names, addresses and telephone numbers of the persons it listed today, including women it said were posing as secretaries and men posing as diplomats. It published a first list of 15 names last week.

THE NEW YORK TIMES, WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 18, 1976

Senators Won't Seek Newsmen's Names at C.I.A.

By JOHN M. CREWDSON
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Feb. 17—The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Operations abandoned today its efforts to obtain the names of American and foreign journalists who have cooperated with the Central Intelligence Agency, saying that their identities were not crucial to the success of its investigation of the Federal Intelligence agencies.

Senator Walter Huddleston, the Kentucky Democrat who heads the panel's Subcommittee on Foreign Intelligence Activities, said that the C.I.A. had agreed instead to provide the senators with "certain files describinb its association with journalists over the years.

He said the committee now possessed evidence suggesting that the agency, apart from using reporters to gather intelligence abroad, had attempted to manipulate or distort news articles reported by foreign journalists, and that he believed the materials to be supplied would show whether that practice had extended to Americans as well.

Impact on Free Press

Senator Huddleston said that George Bush, the Director of Central Intelligence, made clear at a luncheon meeting today with himself and Senator Charles McC. Mathias Jr. the agency's postion that it was "not at liberty to reveal the names" of any individuals who had cooperated with it, including journalists.

The Senator said the committee's concern was to determine what impact such arrangements, which have been halted, had had "on the free press in this country," and that that responsibility could be fulfilled by discovering the sorts of individuals involved, the positions they had held and their relationship to the C.I.A.

That, he said, was "all the information we need" to make an "accurate assessment" of the danger posed by such practices, and he added that "we will not seek the names" because "the name itself is not important to us."

Mr. Huddleton conceded, however, that the committee could probably deduce, from the documents promised to it today, the identities of individual journalists or at least the names of the organizations for which they worked.

He said he did not believe now that that would become necessary, since the comittee had no plans now to call news executives or reporters to testify before it.

But he said that it might be forced to do so "if we find illegal practices or absolute wrongdoing" on the part of any ofthose involved.

Consisting on Practice

Both Senators Huddleston and Mathias, a Maryand Republican, said that their refusal to press Mr. Bush for the names of reporters and organizations concerned was consistent with the Senate committee's past practice of declining to seek from the C.I.A. the identities of its operatives of working undercover.

However, the panel's report on plots by the agency against the lives of foreign leaders, issued last November, included over the C.I.A.5s protests the names of a number of its clandestine officials and operatives.

The agency ended its relationships with correspondents for major domestic news organizations in 1974, and last week Mr. Bush put a halt to its use of stringers, or part-time correspondents, as agents for the collection of intelligence overseas.

As of last year, however, nearly a dozen C.I.A. staff officers working under "deep cover" abroad were posing as journalists for obscure foreign and docestic publications in connection with their work, acording to a report of the House Selet Committee on Intelligence.

William E. Colby, who resigned last month after nearly three years as director of Central Intelligence, has said that the C.I.A. avoided using American journalists who worked as its agents to alter or manipulate the news, but employed foreign reporters for that purpose "all the time."

The New York Times reported yesterday that the Senate committee had been given by the C.I.A. "summaries" of instances in which it had used journalists in its employ for various purposes.

It was understood today that what the committee would now receive are the C.I.A. documents used to prepare the summaries, but with identities and organizations excused.

WASHINGTON STAR
12 FEB 1976

Papal Bug For the CIA Is Alleged

ROME (UPI) — An Italian news magazine says the late Cardinal Angelo Dell'Acqua headed an intelligence network which bugged papal audiences, kept files on hundreds of priests and gave confidential information to the CIA.

L'Espresso, a non-Communist leftwing magazine, gave no sources for its story published yesterday. It said the main figures in the alleged spying network were Cardinal Dell'Acqua, who died in 1972, and Archbishop Igino Cardinale, the Vatican's current nuncio (*ambassabor*) to Belgium.

CARDINALE, an Italian who spent several years in the United States, shrugged off the allegations when he arrived in Rome from Brussels.

"I am no CIA agent, I'm just a person who spent some time in America," he told reporters.

Vatican spokesman Federico Alessandrini called the allegations "ignoble slanders."

"After reading the article, I have an absolute duty to denounce its baseness, which unfortunately seems to be part of a trend that dishonors newspapers and journalists," Alessandrini said.

L'Espresso said agents of Italy's Defense Intelligence Service, acting on instructions from Dell'Acqua, bugged a private conversation in the papal private library in 1967 between Pope Paul VI and Greek Orthodox Patriarch Athenagoras I of Istanbul.

DAILY TELEGRAPH, London
22 January 1976

PAPER NAMES LONDON OPERATIVES

THE publication, by the *Socialist Worker* newspaper yesterday of the names and addresses of CIA agents working in London was described as "mischievous and dangerous" by Mr Nicholas Winterton, Conservative MP for Macclesfield.

He said he would use whatever means he could try to see that the person who was so ready to release the names of the agents was exposed.

"Publication is not in any way helpful to the cause of freedom in the Western world. I would challenge these Left wing papers to publish the names of the Soviet KGB agents in Britain. That will show just how unbiased they are."

The *Socialist Worker* claimed that the CIA chief in London is Mr Cord Meyer, jnr., of Eaton Place, Westminster, and gave the names of four other alleged agents.

The newspaper said it believed printing the names and addresses was essential "if a campaign is to be built up to drive out these hired murderers of big business."

Intervention record

Mr Stan Newens, Labour MP for Harlow, defended the publication of the names. "The whole record of the CIA, wherever they are based, is one of intervention, whether you look at Chile, Iran, or anywhere else.

"Often as the result of their activities many people have died violently."

He said he utterly opposed the murder of CIA agents but publication of their names probably meant a reduction of their activities in Britain.

"I agree also that the names of Soviet KGB agents in Britain should also be published. I do not want any foreign power, whether the United States or the Soviet Union, through its secret intelligence services to try to make British foreign policy. If they have accredited diplomats, that should be enough.

"The activities of the KGB especially in Europe in the past have often led to deaths and assassinations. We need none of that in this country."

Mr Paul Rose, Labour MP for Blackley, a strong campaigner for civil rights, said he found the whole issue about the publication of the names "mildly amusing.

"Everyone involved in this sort of activity knows just who is collecting information and for whom."

NEW YORK TIMES
17 Feb. 1976

C.I.A. SAID TO SPY ON REDS IN FRANCE

Special to The New York Times

PARIS, Feb. 16 — Today's issue of Humanité, the Communist Party newspaper, charged that the United States Central Intelligence Agency had, with the knowledge and assistance of French intelligence aides, been spying on French Communist Party officials.

Humanité, a normally unsensational paper, gave its readers two-thirds of a page of what it said were facts on how the American agency, with French assistance, was spying and harassing French Communist Party officials at work and at home in Paris.

The article strongly suggested that the administration of President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, particularly his Interior Minister, Michel Poniatowski, had explicitly given the American agency freedom to spy on French communists.

Neither the French Government nor the United States Embassy commented on the Humanité charges. When a list of 32 alleged C.I.A. agents purportedly assigned to the American Embassy was published here last month by the newspaper Liberation, the United States Embassy declined comment.

WASHINGTON POST
9 FEB 1976

Hill Hurt By Leaks On CIA

Reform Plans Seen Shifting To White House

By Laurence Stern
and Walter Pincus
Washington Post Staff Writers

Congressional efforts to legislate new charters and draw tighter reins of oversight on the U.S. intelligence community have bogged down disastrously in a show of division and political ineptitude on Capitol Hill.

This is the verdict of administration officials and congressional leaders of the campaign to reform the intelligence agencies.

"The issue has become how to keep secrets rather than how to preserve freedom," Sen. Frank Church (D-Idaho), chairman of the Senate intelligence committee, confessed despondently in a recent interview.

White House officials, meanwhile, now express confidence that President Ford rather than Congress will be the architect of any renovations in the structure of the Central Intelligence Agency, which has been at the center of a year and a half of controversy stemming from press and congressional disclosures of unsavory and sometimes illegal acts.

"We are not going to have change simply for the sake of change — something I wouldn't have said to you six months ago," one White House official observed of the changing political mood.

Another administration official, who has helped to guide CIA officials through the past year's ordeal, summed matters up this way: "What has the past year and a half of investigation wrought? Not much."

This assessment is underlined by the chaotic state of affairs on Capitol Hill over legislative efforts to reorganize Congress for the task of performing a stronger oversight role upon the intelligence community.

All indications point, in fact, to the prospect that whatever oversight system emerges from the current struggle will be weaker than the one already in force, which subjects the CIA to the attentions of six separate committees.

Congressional initiatives of the past few weeks have been directed more toward the punishment of congressional members and staff personnel who leak intelligence secrets than at the original goal of adding legislative restraint to the free-swinging use of the intelligence agencies by presidents.

For example, Sen. Walter Huddleston (D-Ky.), a member of Church's committee, last week called for curbs on the cherished congressional prerogative of free speech and debate, in the overriding interest of secrecy.

"I have at times had the feeling that we are riding a 'runaway horse' — with information galloping forth and no one able to pull in the reins," he said in proposing restrictions such as fines, end of access by members to classified information, and even censure or expulsion.

Church, however, in his unconcealed frustration at the turn of events, said that "if Congress permits itself to be gagged it ought to forfeit its oversight function."

His own committee was unable to agree on a bill to establish a permanent intelligence committee. Even the majority of members who joined Church in one proposal was not in agreement on key points such as whether the new oversight committee would have the right on its own initiative to disclose intelligence information — a right that Church successfully asserted late last year in releasing the report on assassinations.

On the House side the disarray is even deeper in the aftermath of a series of collisions between the feisty chairman of the House intelligence committee, Rep. Otis B. Pike (D-N.Y.), and the administration. This culminated late last month in an overwhelming rebuke by the House to the New York congressman in a vote that temporarily kept secret the contents of the committee's final report.

The present altered state of the intelligence reform process, according to congressional and administration sources, arose primarily from two specific events and the inability of Congress to handle them:

— The assassination last Dec. 23 of the CIA's Athens chief of station, Richard S. Welch, in a terrorist ambush at his home. Former CIA Director William E. Colby acknowledged in a recent interview that Welch's murder was the "single most crucial" event in changing the climate of opinion toward the agency.

The administration's open orchestration of the Welch tragedy tended to implicate all critics of the agency, including the congressional investigating committees. "There was no leak from our committee," Church insists, "only the administration's innuendos, which the press repeated."

The massive unauthorized disclosures of portions of the Pike committee report were described as a "disaster" even by its staff director, A. Searle Field.

Administration spokesmen lost no time decrying the leaks as examples of how Congress could not be trusted with national intelligence secrets.

Despite the year of huffing and puffing by congressional committees, the prospects are that it will be the administration, with a sense of public opinion running its way, which will define the future boundaries of intelligence activity.

This will be done in a national intelligence message by President Ford within the next 10 days, and a series of private recodifications of the charters for each of the principle intelligence agencies.

White House reorganization blueprints already in draft form call for a detailed code of accountability within the Executive Branch and a method of bringing "errors" to the surface, according to

NEW YORK TIMES
8 Feb. 1976

Memo Said to Cast Doubts of Legality Of C.I.A.'s Actions

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Feb. 7—The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence has obtained a copy of a memorandum, drawn up last year for the Director of Central Intelligence, that one committee source described as raising "serious questions" about the constitutionality of covert military and political operations undertaken by the United States between 1947 and the passage of the Foreign Assistance Act in 1974.

The memorandum, a copy of which was obtained by The New York Times, was produced last September by a group of legal researchers under contract to the intelligence community staff, an umbrella group that works for the Director of Central Intelligence in his capacity as coordinator of the Federal intelligence agencies.

The Senate source said that it appeared to lawyers who had obtained the memorandum that it was "important in undercutting the theory" with which the Central Intelligence Agency, since its founding in 1947, has justified initiating covert operations without first seeking the approval of Congress.

The C.I.A. has argued that thet the President's inherent powers to control some aspects of foreign and military affairs, along with the language of the 1947 National Security Act that established the C.I.A., have made Congressional authorization unnecessary.

One senior intelligence official asserted today that the 1975 memorandum had no official status as a policy document within the C.I.A., since it had been approved neither by the agency's general counsel nor its special counsel.

The official added that the 48-page paper had been prepared largely by three law students among those hired to staff the intelligence community staff's legal research project last summer.

Nonetheless, the paper is considered a crucial document by the Senate intelligence committee, which is known to be preparing a study that will argue against the President's inherent power to begin covert operations on his own, because of the paper's acceptance by the intelligence community staff, where one source said it had been widely read and discussed.

One Government lawyer said that the acceptance of the memorandum by the intelligence community staff did not amount to an interna admission by the C.I.A. that its stated policy over the last two decades had been badly founded in law.

But the lawyer and others familiar with the legal questions involved said they believed that the memorandum's expressions of doubt about the inherent-powers argument was "a more accurate reflection of the state of the law" than the C.I.A.'s formal position on the matter.

That position, presented to the House elect Committee on Intelligence ast December by Mitchell Rogovin, the C.I.A.'s special councel, concluded that in addition to the President's in herent constitutional authority to conduct foreign affairs and the wording of the National Security Act, authorization for covert operations could be found in the ratification by Congress over the last 28 years of "the authority of the agency to plan and conduct covert action."

2 Types of Covert Actions

The research paper, which notes at its outset that it was prepared at the request of the intelligence community's coordinating staff on the basis of a recommendation by the C.I.A.'s general counsel, makes a distinction between covert activities designed to gather intelligence and those aimed at influencing through political or military means the internal affairs of another country.

The paper notes that authority in the field of foreign affairs has historically been shared by Congress, whose approval is required for treaties, declara-

tions of war and funds for their conduct, and the President, who under the Constitution negotiates treaties and serves as Commander in Chief of the nation's military forces.

The collection of foreign intelligence necessary to the formulation of foreign policy, it said, is an executive function that can be carried out by the President, through the C.I.A. and other executive agencies, without supporting legislation.

Nor, it continued, is there any doubt about the President's authority to use covert or other means, in his capacity as the supreme military commander, "to meet the threats of war or national emergency."

But the memorandum declares that until the passage of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974, "there was serious doubt that the C.I.A. had authority to engage in covert operations involving the use of political and military force against, or in support of, a foreign government or its leaders."

Such actions, the researchers wrote, amounted to the implementation of foreign policy, a shared function that had not been wholly delegated to the President, or through him to the C.I.A., by Congress in the National Security Act.

The Foreign Assistance Act, which limits the authority of the President to use appropriated funds to finance covert political or military operations in foreign countries, requires him to first report to Congress the importance of such operations to the national security.

"Any question as to whether the President can authorize covert operations," the report stated, "has now been removed" by the passage of the Foreign Assistance Act.

But it added that, although "differences of opinion" on the question have existed among those inside the C.I.A. and others outside it, it was "doubtful" that the agency was intended by Congress before 1974 to have the autonomous power "to implement foreign policy by the use of covert means targeted against foreign elements."

"The theory that the President has unrestricted sovereign power to authorize covert operations as long as they do not violate international law cannot be supported," the study concluded.

C.I.A. Counsel's Argument

In his statement on the question, Mr. Rogovin argued that "long before the C.I.A. was established," Presidents had directed their agents "to perform covert action in foreign countries," and that as a result, when the C.I.A. was set up in 1947, there was no need for the executive branch to assert "any new or theretofore unrecognized executive authority" in that area.

Mr. Rogovin also noted that the 1947 act gave the Director of Central Intelligence the authority to "perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence" as the President "may from time to time direct."

The intelligence community staff's research paper argued however, that to cite the "other functions and duties clause," as it has come to be called, as an example of Congressional approval of covert operations, "would strain the literal meaning of the language used."

It maintained that most of the responsibilities dilegated to the C.I.A. by the 1947 act were "ministerial and do not involve policy making or policy implementation in the field of foreign affairs."

THE WASHINGTON POST Thursday, Jan. 29, 1976

Taking Issue With Daniel Schorr

Daniel Schorr's reply, January 17, to Tom Braden's article is a strange combination of nonsense and a view of at least one reporter's ideas of the responsibility, or lack thereof, for checking a story before running with it.

As to the nonsense: Mr. Schorr says "It was not I who revealed that Alexander Butterfield had all along been a CIA agent, it was Colonel Prouty who stated it on the CBS morning news." Next, Mr. Schorr says "it was not said that Butterfield had been an agent, but the CIA's contact—a distinction that an old CIA hand will surely understand."

First, when a seasoned TV reporter introduces a supposed authority on a network news program and asks him a leading question and gets a foreknown answer, you know the reporter only has the source present for authentication. There may be those who believe that Mortimer Snerd was the voice and Edgar Bergen the dummy—but not many. Mr. Dooley once asked Hennessy: "D'ye think tis the mill that makes the water run?"

As to the characterization of Butterfield's relationship with CIA: I have the transcript of that news broadcast. It would stretch imagination beyond belief to accept Mr. Schorr's statement that Butterfield was labeled only as a CIA contact. Each of Mr. Schorr's questions and Prouty's replies was calculated to produce an image of Butterfield as a CIA agent in the White House.

Finally, Mr. Schorr relates all the efforts to correct the original impression given on CBS morning news. If Mr. Schorr had taken the trouble in advance of the original broadcast to check out Prouty's credentials, he would have found that Prouty was a minor Defense Department officer with no qualifications to speak on CIA operations beyond a very limited sphere. Anyone who has read his book, "The Secret Team," knows that he is given to blowing his own horn and that against increasing his own self-importance, the truth has little value.

The obligation for accuracy is clearly greater in the electronic media because it is nearly impossible for the average listener to know exactly what was said. There is no way easy way to read it over and analyze words.

It seems to me that the point Mr. Braden made regarding Mr. Schorr is a valid one. Mr. Schorr is a serious, responsible journalist. He has a vast audience. One should be able to hope that when a reporter with Mr. Schorr's credentials has broadcast a bad story he would realize it and admit it.

THOMAS F. MCCOY,
CIA officer, retired

Washington

THE WASHINGTON POST Thursday, Feb. 12, 1976

Pike Says Leak Would Help CIA

By Richard L. Lyons
Washington Post Staff Writer

Chairman Otis G. Pike (D-N.Y.) said yesterday he had no idea who leaked parts of the report of his House intelligence committee to The Village Voice, but suggested that the leak would serve the interests of the Central Intelligence Agency.

"I can't conceive of anyone on the committee or its staff who would want it to come out in this manner," Pike told reporters. "A copy was sent to the CIA. It would be to their advantage to leak it to that publication. All the leaks make the committee look bad" from the long-term view of Congress' wish to oversee the intelligence community.

Because it contains classified information, the final report has been locked up until House Speaker Carl Albert (D-Okla.) decides how and whether it should be made available to members of the House and others. Albert said yesterday that he plans to read the report in the next couple of days and that he will not be influenced in his decision by the fact that it has been made public by leak.

Rep. Robert McClory (R-Ill.), senior Republican on the committee, called the leak and publication of the report "very, very unfortunate. It will have a very destructive effect on the intelligence committee will damage our intelligence capability and will interfere with Congress intent to get full information on intelligence operations."

McClory said a major part of the responsibility for this situation must be borne by the committee staff for including classified information in the draft report, and by a majority of the committee for insisting on printing the report despite an agreement with the President not to make public classified information turned over by the executive branch. The House voted by a margin of 2 to 1 to hold up publication of the report.

McClory had strongly opposed publishing the report with the classified material included.

Rep. Robert N. Giaimo (D-Conn.), who along with Pike had favored making public the classified information about CIA secret operations, said:

"All these leaks are hurting and discrediting the committee. I have to assume that those doing it do not have the best interests of the committee at heart. It hurts our effort to gain the right to perform real oversight over these agencies.

"Who gains from this? Those trying to undo or block us. It could be people downtown or even on the committee, I don't know. Remember, the CIA is very adept at covert actions. They've lobbied everywhere against us."

RADIO TV REPORTS, INC.

4435 WISCONSIN AVENUE, N.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20016 244-354

PROGRAM The Today Show STATION WRC TV
NBC Network

DATE February 18, 1976 7:00 AM CITY Washington, D. C.

SUBJECT An Interview with Director Bush

JIM HARTZ: As you have heard in the news, President Ford last night proposed that George Bush, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, be given power to control all American spy agencies. This is a controversial plan of far-reaching importance, and Mr. Bush is in our Washington News Center this morning to discuss it with us. Also there is NBC News correspondent Ford Rowan.

And I would like to put the first question to Mr. Bush. Mr. Bush, it seems that much of the concern about the CIA and other intelligence agencies is their domestic activities. The President has proposed several oversight committees, but all of which would report to him.

Do you not think that there needs to be congressional oversight?

CIA DIRECTOR GEORGE BUSH: Well, I certainly do think that there should be congressional oversight. Part of the President's recommendation to the leaders last night was a joint committee on oversight. Clearly, as Director of the CIA and as Director of Central Intelligence, I will want to report fully to the Congress. My only hope is that instead of reporting to eight committees, we can simplify it, report to fewer, hopefully one, maybe three, and do a more thorough job.

But clearly, this agency, under my direction, will cooperate with any oversight mechanism set up by the Congress. And that is in the President's plan.

FORD ROWAN: Mr. Bush, if I could follow up on that, one of the questions about congressional oversight is the question of whether the congressional committees that have a chance to look at CIA secrets will also have the authority to release those secrets on their own, without getting the President's permission.

Do you think Congress has the authority, should have the authority to release secret material?

DIRECTOR BUSH: No, I don't.

ROWAN: Why not?

DIRECTOR BUSH: Because I think when there's -- I think if there's something wrong with the classification system that protects the nation's secrets, we ought to change the classification system. But as long as we have it, I don't think any branch -- that the legislative branch of government should unilaterally be empowered to release secret documents. I simply don't feel that way.

25 ROWAN: Mr. Bush, right now inside the executive branch

there are fifteen thousand six hundred and forty-four employees of the government who can stamp something secret. At least that's the figure put out by the Pike Committee.

DIRECTOR BUSH: Do you know what that means to me is we ought to work harder to cut that fifteen thousand down. And there is an executive order and a mandate to do that. And I admit that there is overclassification, and I hope I can come to grips in this job before I've been in there too long with that problem.

But, sure, I was in foreign affairs and worked abroad and worked at the United Nations. And I think there is excessive classification. But I still don't think that gives each man of conscience the right to release a piece of classified information if he deems it shouldn't be classified. We cannot run an intelligence business on that kind of basis. And part of it's secret, and I'm going to see that it stays secret.

ROWAN: Barbara I think has a question in New York.

BARBARA WALTERS: Mr. Bush, the Pentagon Papers opened up a great many questions which were never fully answered. The President last night said that if -- the publication of the Pentagon Papers -- that if a member of a congressman's staff leaks secret information, it would be a criminal offense. What if a journalist leaks it and the paper publishes it? Is it, in your opinion, journalistic integrity? Is it okay?

DIRECTOR BUSH: I don't think it's integrity, but I don't what -- I don't think we need a British Official Secrets Act, which would be an inhibiting factor on a free press. But in terms of whether I think it's okay, my own judgment on that is that it's not okay. And I feel strongly about it. I don't see why a journalist should be able to release classified information when anybody -- and somebody else cannot release it.

WALTERS: But should anything be done about it, or is it just something that's going to stay as is?

DIRECTOR BUSH: Well, I think what needs to be done about it is to go along with what the Congress is now suggesting and which the President enthusiastically supports. And that is to have a carefully drawn secrecy legislation, which will put meaningful penalties on for those who accept classified information and then leak it. And I think that's the place to start, rather than trying to go after the journalist. And if that law is successful, the problem can be solved.

ROWAN: Director Bush, I'd like to ask you about another part of the President's reorganization plan which will give you greater authority over the budgets of the military intelligence agencies.

Now how widespread will that authority be?

DIRECTOR BUSH: Well, you get to a very important point here, because, really, the budgetary authority is very wide. For the first time, the Director, who has had the responsibility, now has the authority, albeit in connection with the Deputy Secretary of Defense and Bill Hyland, the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs. So it's a three-man committee that I chair that controls all the resources, the budgets of the intelligence community.

But what you're getting at, I think -- and it hasn't come out yet clearly -- is that the Director will pull back from

the mandate of '71 to involve himself in tactic intelligence, purely tactical. That should be and will now be clearly, more clearly the mandate or the role of the field commanders. So while we control the resource, we're not going to be involved as much even in the line, purely tactical line decisions.

Now it's a gray area, because....

ROWAN: Well, isn't it a gray area?

DIRECTOR BUSH: It is. And it is very hard to sort out. But by direction, for the first time since '71, the Director of Central Intelligence is going to pull back from the day to day operation of tactical intelligence, although he will control the resources. It's a good compromise.

ROWAN: Well, now, the Defense Department fought this because they said what you'll really cut back on in budgetary matters is tactical expenditures. You're going to try to cut back to have national intelligence expenditures.

DIRECTOR BUSH: Well, that I don't think is true, because that would connote a certain unfairness on my part. When I'm acting as the Director of Central Intelligence, I've got to be objective. And I think I can be objective. And I think the Defense concern can be laid to rest by fair play. And that's the way I'm going to approach this job.

ROWAN: I think Jim Hartz has a question in New York.

DIRECTOR BUSH: Yes, Jim.

HARTZ: Yes, I'd like to ask what -- where the FBI's going to fit into all of this. Are you going to have any jurisdiction over that.....

DIRECTOR BUSH: No.

HARTZ: ...over their -- over their intelligence-gathering activities?

DIRECTOR BUSH: No, sir. We're going to be out of the domestic business, for the most part, and they're going to be handling that. There will be some cooperation. I'm having lunch with Director Kelley in just a few days to examine this order and to see -- to be sure there's no overlap.

But, no, we are not -- we're not involved there. And also, the President made clear last night in briefing the congressional leaders that it was not his intent that this oversight responsibility that he's recommending to the Congress that they do -- congressional oversight -- include oversight of the FBI.

ROWAN: Mr. Bush, let me follow up on that question about the FBI by making the point that in the past one of the reasons that the FBI got into trouble with political spying and one of the reasons the CIA got in trouble with spying on Americans was because they followed the President's orders. Now President Ford has come along with a plan which centralizes within the White House to a greater degree more presidential control over these agencies, especially your agency, the CIA.

Doesn't that increase the fear that, in the future, a future President down the line might again try to misuse some of these agencies?

DIRECTOR BUSH: You see, I'd argue with the fact that it centralizes more control. The President has always had

responsibility. What he's done is build in safeguards with his oversight committee, with a more active, clearly defined role for the NSC. He hasn't put more -- given himself more authority. He's always had -- any President has always had, as we know, great power in this area. But what he's done is come up with streamlined machinery, with this mandate to do more through inspectors general, with the oversight part, with a more active role for the NSC that I think builds in safeguards into his own administration to avoid the kind of abuse that concerns the American people.

So part of it is reform and part of it is streamlining.

ROWAN: Mr. Bush, now that you're going to have more authority over the budget, let me ask you a question about a controversy that was renewed by the Pike Committee, and that is their recommendation that the Defense Intelligence Agency just be abolished because it's wasteful and duplicates the efforts of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Do you think you should cut back on military expenditures which are quite high in relation to CIA expenditures?

DIRECTOR BUSH: Well, I'm not going to go into any individual category. But this Committee on Foreign Intelligence, this three-man committee I'm sure will be looking at a wide range of questions.

But within the Defense Department itself, I would certainly recognize that the Secretary of Defense continues to have the major role. Intelligence is just a small part of it. And I think that, you know, as for myself, I'm going to lean heavily on how the people running the Defense Department think they can streamline their own organization.

ROWAN: Well, a quick question....

DIRECTOR BUSH: Yes.

ROWAN: ...just to get a direct answer. Do you think the Defense Intelligence Agency should be abolished?

DIRECTOR BUSH: I have no -- made no conclusions on that one way or another; haven't studied the problem; will be "tasked" (?) with it in the CFI, to some degree.

ROWAN: Thank you very much. We've been talking to Director George Bush of the CIA. It's time now for a station break.

The Washington Star Friday, January 30, 1976

Commentary

Morley Safer (on "60 Minutes"): "The first person to publicize CIA names was Philip Agee, a former CIA agent, now a member of the advisory board of Counterspy Magazine.

Ex-CIA agent David Phillips: "Yes, of course . . . it's certainly safe to say that Agee has been working on a campaign that must be dear to the hearts of foreign intelligence services, disrupting the American service. And there's no question that he's collaborated and been cooperative — been cooperating with them."

Safer: "One draws the conclusion that the possibility exists that Agee could have been working for the KGB the whole time?

Phillips: "That's certainly a conclusion that could be drawn . . . I think that people in this country are sitting back and looking at some things that have happened (in CIA activity) and they don't like them. And we're going through a great agony of introspection. And I think in the long run it's healthy, but it can't last too long or our institutions won't survive."

Safer: "Do you think that the country is in a mood to accept anything good about the CIA right now?

Phillips: "Well, I'm afraid there is a credibility factor that must be conquered. When I found I was going to be living on retirement with five children to send to college, I went to a lecture agent . . . and said, 'What can I expect to make during the coming year?' He said, 'I estimate between seven and ten thousand dollars. However, if you'd be willing to give an anti-CIA lecture, I can promise you between fifty and a hundred thousand dollars . . . .' "

RADIO TV REPORTS, INC.

4435 WISCONSIN AVENUE, N.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20016 244-3540

PROGRAM 60 Minutes

STATION WTOP TV
CBS Network

DATE February 15, 1976 7:00 PM

CITY Washington, D. C.

SUBJECT An Interview with CIA Director Bush

MIKE WALLACE: At no time in the 29 years of its existence has the Central Intelligence Agency come under such close public scrutiny as right now. Dirty tricks, excesses, failures, illegalities -- all have been aired before congressional committees and in the press.

Well, President Ford wants to refurbish the image of the CIA, to restore our confidence in it. Former Director William Colby was sacked. The new man is George Bush.

Mr. Bush has held almost as many public posts as Elliot Richardson: congressman from Texas, Chairman of the Republican National Committee, Ambassador to the U.N., our man in China. He was sworn in as Director of the CIA two weeks ago. This past week in Los Angeles he talked to 60 Minutes.

His first public act as head of the agency was to announce the CIA would remove from its payroll all journalists working for U.S. news-gathering organizations. But he refused to reveal the names of reporters who had worked for the CIA, refused to reveal them either publicly or in confidence to Senator Frank Church's Select Committee on Intelligence.

Frank Church's committee in the Senate wants the names of those journalists. You will not give Frank Church's committee...

DIRECTOR GEORGE BUSH: I won't, sir, no.

WALLACE: You don't trust his committee.

DIRECTOR BUSH: I trust Mr. Church and I trust his committee, but I am dedicated to the protection of sources...

WALLACE: And?

DIRECTOR BUSH: And I'm not going to do it.

WALLACE: You will not name journalists who in the past have worked with...

DIRECTOR BUSH: Absolutely not.

WALLACE: Why?

DIRECTOR BUSH: Because some people can come up dead, for one reason; and secondly, when you have a contract or you have a relationship, I'm not going to get into the business of giving out names of -- whether they're journalists or who ever they are. I'm simply not going to do that.

Now...

WALLACE: Leaks come out of committees.

DIRECTOR BUSH: Yeah.

WALLACE: Leaks don't necessarily come out of senators; they come out of staff.

DIRECTOR BUSH: Okay. Go ahead.

WALLACE: You deplore it?

DIRECTOR BUSH: Yes, sir, I do. I deplore leaks. They come out of CIA sometimes, too, and I deplore them. And my own view is that we need some kind of legislation, very, very carefully drawn, to have penalties on those who, for their own reasons, leak classified information.

WALLACE: Mr. Bush, Otis Pike, chairman of the House committee looking into CIA activities, a committee that took 10,000 pages of testimony, said that his committee's report reveals, quote, atrocious, horrendous, disastrous, nauseating operations.

Now, you say, "Let's not look back; let's look ahead."

DIRECTOR BUSH: They've already looked back.

WALLACE: Well, tell me something -- I'm sure that you've studied these reports -- what does an intelligence agency of the United States have to do that kind of thing for?

DIRECTOR BUSH: I think some of the things that offend you offend me. I'm not sitting here saying some things haven't gone wrong. But the thing that I don't like about the Pike report is it didn't talk about the successes; and some of that's impossible to do, because of the very nature, the clandestine nature of some of our operations.

WALLACE: The day after this interview with George Bush, I put some of his criticisms to Congressman Pike. Said Pike, "I concede the CIA has successes, but their successes, on balance, have been pretty puny compared to their failures," he said. And then Pike cited the failures of the intelligence community, beginning at Pearl Harbor and going all the way to the CIA's failure to predict the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, failure to predict the Yom Kippur War, the coup in Cyprus, the coup in Portugal.

Said Pike, "They always tell us, 'Don't look at our failures,' but what they want to do is classify their failures, keep them secret."

The White House wants to suppress that Pike report, says Otis Pike.

DIRECTOR BUSH: I don't believe that.

WALLACE: Well, he says, "because it would be embarrassing to us as a nation." And then he went on to say that we as a nation are strong enough to face the truth.

DIRECTOR BUSH: Let me speak for the CIA, not the Executive, and there's a difference here. The CIA doesn't want to suppress this report.

WALLACE: You want it out?

DIRECTOR BUSH: The CIA would be glad to have it out, protecting classified information; and so would the majority of the Congress, by 2 to 1; 2-to-1 vote said the same thing -- of the Con-

gress, the people speaking.

Now, the CIA -- if somebody's saying we're trying to cover this report up -- and I'm not suggesting Mr. Pike is, but if he is, he's wrong.

WALLACE: Pike's answer? "That is pure, unadulterated hogwash. The CIA wanted to remove half of our entire report." And then he went on, "My committee, which voted 2 to 1 to publish the report, knew what was in it. The full House, which voted 2 to 1 not to publish, did not know what was in the report."

The committee says, Mr. Bush, that there were so many games played with secrecy and classification that they couldn't get the information that they needed.

If they can't get the information they need, how can a committee oversee the intelligence community?

DIRECTOR BUSH: Well, I don't accept that premise, that the committee didn't get the information it needs. I'm very sorry.

WALLACE: The chairman of that committee, Otis Pike, responded this way: "From the day we were created," he said, "the CIA knew we were operating against a deadline. They always talked cooperation; they always acted to deny information to the committee.

DIRECTOR BUSH: We're living in a tough world. We're not living in one where everybody's operating in an open society like we are.

WALLACE: Perfectly understood, Mr. Bush, but the House report says the following...

DIRECTOR BUSH: Well -- go ahead, go ahead.

WALLACE: All I can do...

DIRECTOR BUSH: Go ahead.

WALLACE: ...is go to the House report.

DIRECTOR BUSH: Okay.

WALLACE: "Today," says the report, "taxpayers and most congressmen don't know and can't find out how much the CIA spends for spy activities. This is in direct conflict with the Constitution, which requires a regular and public accounting for all funds spent by the Federal Government. What is clear is that the Russians" -- this is the House report -- "that the Russians probably have a detailed account of our intelligence spending. In all likelihood, the only people who care to know and who do not know these costs today are the American taxpayers."

DIRECTOR BUSH: This is what the House committee report says.

WALLACE: Right.

DIRECTOR BUSH: The House of Representatives said, by overwhelming majority vote, "We are not going to make the budget matters public."

Let them determine what the reporting should be on this, and this agency will faithfully fulfill our obligation to do what the Congress says.

WALLACE: Has the CIA been in any way, directly or indirectly, connected with the hiring of mercenaries to fight in Angola?

DIRECTOR BUSH: My view is no.

WALLACE: Your view is no.

DIRECTOR BUSH: Yes.

WALLACE: As far as you know.

DIRECTOR BUSH: Uh-huh.

WALLACE: Where is the money coming from for mercenaries?

DIRECTOR BUSH: I'm not sure that I could help you on that. I don't really know. But we are in compliance with -- with -- I'm confident that the CIA is in compliance with the will of the Congress on this.

WALLACE: Mr. Bush, is there no way that CIA money is getting into Angola, one way or another?

DIRECTOR BUSH: I would say that any involvement or non-involvement in Angola has been properly reported to the oversight committees, and one should press the Congress for any further information on that, which I hope they wouldn't give.

WALLACE: In other words...

DIRECTOR BUSH: I'm not saying that there is or isn't any money in it.

WALLACE: Example from the House committee report, so far suppressed: "CIA covert operations are irregularly approved, sloppily implemented, and at times have been forced on a reluctant CIA by the President and his National Security Adviser," Henry Kissinger.

Example: $800,000 to a right-wing Italian general.

Example: Intervention in Chile.

DIRECTOR BUSH: Let's look to the future. I hope that, without passing judgment on those cases, that I can bring some judgment to this operation that will at least guarantee that before an operation is entered into, the various people that are involved in the process will have to sign off on the operation; and if it's something that's deeply and morally offensive to me, they can get somebody else to do it.

WALLACE: We can expect in the fairly near future announcements from the White House concerning reorganizations, restructure, streamlining of the intelligence community?

DIRECTOR BUSH: There has -- it's widely reported that the White House is working on these things, and I would say it ought to be very soon. I would say, from my knowledge of what's going to take place, that there will be very important recommendations on restructure, and I think there will be safeguards that certainly the agency can enthusiastically support, and I know will meet with the satisfac -- with the support of the American people.

Can I tell you a little story?

WALLACE: Please.

DIRECTOR BUSH: When I -- when I came here, one journalist said, "Anybody dumb enough to accept the job is too dumb to do it." He got a great laugh from people, because it's a kind of a funny line; let's face it. But God, I said to myself, "How sad for our country, when we're facing some tough, tough opposition in this world, to take such a cynical view of intelligence in the 1976 time." I -- you know, he got his laugh and I got my little hurt inside from it, but it made me determined that I'm going to approach this job with pride. And they can have all the jokes they want on television about the CIA; it's vital to the national security of the United States.

And I feel so dedicated and strongly about it that I just wanted to wedge that in, apropos of no question you've asked.

WALLACE: How long are you going to stay?

DIRECTOR BUSH: I serve at the pleasure of the President.

WALLACE: I understand that. How long are you...

DIRECTOR BUSH: I'm going to stay as long as the President wants me to stay, Mike. There's no politics in this thing for me. Good heavens, you'd have to be hallucinating to think there was any political mileage in this kind of a job.

NEW YORK TIMES
19 FEB 1976

F.B.I. TO INVESTIGATE REPORT DISCLOSURE

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Feb. 17—The Federal Bureau of Investigation has been ordered by Attorney General Edward H. Levi to assist the Justice Department in its investigation of the unauthorized disclosure of the final report of the House Select Committee on Intelligence.

Justice Department sources said Tuesday that the F.B.I.'s assistance was requested by Mr. Levi in a letter dated Feb 13 and received by the bureau this morning.

The department's criminal division is reviewing Federal statutes to see whether any of them were violated by the disclosure to The New York times, CBS News and The Village Voice, a weekly New York newspaper that published last week verbatim excerpts from the document.

One Justice Department source said that the F.B.I. was trying to determine which documents among those made available to reporters were classified, and whether they could be declassified in the event the department decided to prosecute any of those involved.

THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR Thursday, February 19, 1976

Ford and CIA reform

From now on the President of the United States will be fully answerable for any abuses of American foreign intelligence operations.

This kind of accountability, reflected all the way down the line, is the central need for restoring confidence in these operations.

By making it the core of his intelligence reforms, Mr. Ford has started as he should.

The success of his reorganization of the CIA and other agencies will depend on how faithfully everyone concerned carries out the key points he made at his Tuesday press conference: that designated individuals will be held accountable "for what happens in their particular area of responsibility" and that the President will be accountable for the "process and the decisonmaking."

Here lies a hope for getting rid of the "plausible deniability" which previous presidents are supposed to have been able to claim through being given ambiguous information about covert activities. There should now be no loopholes for overriding public presidential instructions as in the case of preserving poisons Mr. Nixon had ordered to be destroyed. And if the orders are sufficiently tightly drawn, those who commit or condone illegalities would be subject to the prosecution that has been escaped by indviduals in the midst of all the disclosures of wrongdoing in the past.

There remains the question of what recourse the intelligence community has if a president himself puts improper demands on it. Such a circumstance would place a burden on the accountability of Mr. Ford's new intelligence management committee headed by CIA director George Bush — and on that of the three-man monitoring board of outsiders. Mr. Bush encouragingly is on record as saying he would resign in the face of an improper demand and might report to members of Congress a request to do anything illegal.

Neither Mr. Bush nor Mr. Ford, however, is willing to give advance information on covert activities to the kind of joint congressional committee to oversee intelligence which they both favor. Without such information members of Congress fear becoming simply a rubber-stamp for deeds already done.

Clearly, if the principle of accountability is to extend to Congress also — as it should — the legislators cannot be made responsible for overseeing operations about which they are kept in the dark. But the need for information runs into the need for secrecy, and the recent history of leaks suggests the necessity of safeguards.

Mr. Ford proposes legislation to make it a crime for a government employee to disclose "improperly" certain "highly classified information." Any such legislation ought to include safeguards against the improper classification of information as well as improper disclosure of legitimate secrets. After all the abuses of secrecy revealed by the Watergate, Vietnam, and CIA disclosures, it would be a too harshly ironic outcome to make such disclosures even more unlikely in the future.

Once again the key, beyond legislation, is accountability. The public knows that it cannot be told secret details that would benefit an adversary of the United States. But it needs to know that those entrusted with such details are answerable for the use of them.

Certainly this demand should be placed on domestic as well as foreign intelligence officials. Mr. Ford's omission of the FBI from his master plan challenges the Justice Department to ensure accountability in that agency and resistance to improper White House demands on it.

What the country needs to get back to is a conviction that leaders are using secrecy for the good of the country rather than any purposes of their own. Mr. Ford's version of "the buck stops here" could mark the turning point in that direction.

When Show-and-Tell Is a Mortal Game

By Lord Chalfont

LONDON—It was during the war that a Foreign Office official, walking along Whitehall, was accosted by a stranger who asked him which side the War Office was on. "Ours, I hope," he replied courteously, and passed on.

I was reminded, in a somewhat bitter way, of this pleasantly inconsequential story by the recent campaign in which the names and addresses of alleged intelligence agents have been published in books and journals of varying distinction. It is, of course, possible that some of the people now busily engaged in this fashionable pursuit believe that they are doing so from pure and benevolent motives.

There is, however, evidence of a certain moral or political asymmetry in their behavior so far. It seems that they are concerned mainly with the intelligence services of the West. The list of names and addresses appearing in various publications in Paris, London and in the United States are, so it is claimed, those of members of the American Central Intelligence Agency.

These same people, you may notice, have not yet come up with a list of the names and addresses of agents of the Soviet K.G.B. or the Czechoslovak Intelligence Service working in London, Paris or Washington.

This is not because this information is not available. I could, if the editor of The Times [of London] felt able to devote the space to such a project, fill a large proportion of this page with a list which would be at least as accurate as those now being published of the Central Intelligence Agency.

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I could, furthermore, embellish it with such fascinating extras as the names of K.G.B. agents who have been expelled from this country and who are now plying their trade in Bangkok and other sensitive Southeast Asian capitals. I shall not do so because I regard the whole business as stupidly irresponsible; indeed it would be possible to describe it as puerile if it were not, in fact, sometimes tragically dangerous, as it turned out to be in the case of the American recently murdered in Athens.

The fact is that intelligence officers are well aware of the identity of their opposite numbers. Generally speaking, whatever may be suggested by the more sensational kind of novel and television film, they do not go about murdering each other. When names and addresses are made public, however, those identified are vulnerable to every crank or psychopath with the price of a revolver or a stick of gelignite.

It is, of course, arguable that espionage, in its conventional sense, is archaic and irrelevant, even in a world of nation-states.

Those countries who wish to discover the military, economic and political secrets of other countries are now able to do so through the agency of an astonishing range of electronic and other devices ranging from reconnaissance satellites taking high-definition photographs to remotely controlled listening and recording devices of almost unbelievable precision and refinement.

Yet the secret agent still exists, sometimes because he provides the only means of obtaining some specific type of information, and sometimes because he is, as an "agent of influence," able to affect the course of political decision-making in the country to which he is assigned.

All this, of course, will enrage those who believe that the world of the nation-state, with its paraphernalia of armaments, diplomacy and espionage, is old-fashioned and immoral, and that we should be living together as a peaceful world community, irrespective of race, nationality, color or creed. As desirable as such a world may be, it is not the one in which we live; and until we achieve it, we had better learn to make the best of what we have.

What we have, among other things, is an international system in which every power of any size or consequence has a secret intelligence service. To the citizens of this country the most significant and important manifestation of this occurs in the persistent confrontation between the Communist world represented by the Soviet Union and its allies, and the non-Communist world represented by the United States of America and its allies.

In the pursuit of their respective interests these conflicting groups employ clandestine means, including espionage and, by extension, counter-espionage; and even to the most neutral and uncommitted observer it must be obvious that however squalid and repellent the whole business may be, it is illogical to apply double standards to it.

If it is outrageous that the C.I.A. should kill, blackmail and terrorize in the pursuit of its unappetizing trade, then it is equally outrageous that the K.G.B. should do so; and even on this somewhat artificial basis the intrepid scribes of the underground press ought not to direct their attention exclusively at the intelligence services of the West.

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It is, however, as I have suggested, an artificial argument, because very few people on either side *are* neutral. Most people believe in and are, in one degree or another, committed to the survival of their own system.

The political system under which we live in the West is riddled with imperfections. It does, however, embody a degree of individual liberty and a respect for freedom of choice and human dignity which many of us regard as the indispensable basis of a civilized existence.

The Communist system, as it has developed in the Soviet Union and in most of the countries of Eastern Europe, is oppressive, degrading and often shockingly cruel. Furthermore, there is evidence of an undiminished determination on the part of the Soviet Union to export that system to as much of the rest of the world as will accept it.

There are, according to the precepts and tactics of Marxism-Leninism, a number of possible ways in which this can be done, some of them peaceful, employing the instruments of trade, diplomacy and political persuasion.

The instrument of armed force is not ruled out, however, if other methods should prove ineffective and if war should offer a reasonable possibility of success. Now, this is where we all have to decide which side we are on.

If the Soviet Union and its allies in the Warsaw Pact decided to mount an armed attack on the Western alliance, most of us would recognize that the armed forces of NATO, including those of the United States, were engaged in our defense. We would rightly condemn unequivocally anyone who deliberately engaged in actions designed to undermine their effectiveness.

If that attitude makes sense—and I believe it does—then it should apply with equal force in a situation in which international Communism is employing its alternative instruments of expansion, subversion and infiltration.

In this case, our defense is not a military one. It involves a whole complex of diplomatic and political activity, of which espionage and counterintelligence are an integral part. Yet we have seen, in recent months, a coordinated attack on the American Central Intelligence Agency which has materially affected the security of the United States and of the West as a whole.

We are, evidently, prepared to tolerate behavior in the press which, in time of more formal and conventional war, would be regarded as treasonable and therefore punishable. It is, surely, time we recognized clearly this latest example of the use of democratic instruments — in this case the freedom of the press — to undermine the very foundations of our democratic systems.

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If the people now engaged in what they refer to as "spook-spotting" are really outraged by espionage and secret intelligence operations as a manifestation of human behavior, then let us reveal the names and addresses of Communist agents working in the West. They are, as I have already suggested, readily available.

If on the other hand the campaign continues to be directed exclusively at the intelligence organizations of the West, those who are engaged in it must not be surprised if they are themselves regarded as enemy agents. Someone, indeed, might one day start publishing *their* names and addresses —strictly, of course, in the public interest.

Lord Chalfont, the former Alun Gwynne Jones, was a member of the Government under Harold Wilson between 1964-70, in which he was a Minister for Disarmament. He is author of books on defense. This article is reprinted from The Times of London.

February 7, 1976

Detente in check

"The actions of the Warsaw pact are having a major influence in shaping the situation not only in Europe but far beyond Europe." General Haig, Nato commander in Europe, pointing the usual Nato finger of alarm? James Schlesinger, sceptic about detente and dismissed American secretary of defence? Mrs Margaret Thatcher? No, though all have spoken again this past week. It was Andrei Gromyko, foreign minister of the Soviet Union, writing last September in Kommunist, the monthly organ of Mr Brezhnev's communist party. Mr Gromyko added that "the forces of peace and progress" now have a "visibly increased preponderance" and may be in a position "to lay down the direction of international politics".

The main event of the first weeks of 1976 is the fact that it has suddenly become popular in the west to admit that what Mr Gromyko says may actually be true. Since the Soviet intervention in Angola, the minority of voices which have long been arguing that the kernel of truth in detente has been lost under layers of dangerous illusion have started to become a majority.

The core that remains

The kernel of truth in detente consists of two propositions. First, the countries which possess nuclear weapons have a powerful interest in trying to keep their nuclear armouries in some kind of balance, thereby lessening the danger that they will be used; and this points to an attempt to keep their non-nuclear strength in balance too. This is the arms-control part of genuine detente. Second, detente is one possible way in which the democracies can try to make up for their permanent disadvantage in dealing with authoritarian states. This permanent disadvantage is the fact that democracies have a public opinion in a way dictatorships do not; public opinion understandably dislikes war, and having to pay for the armies that might have to fight a war; and it is therefore desirable to limit the extent to which public opinion is asked to face either of those disliked things. This is the argument for going on talking to the Soviet Union in an attempt to settle minor disputes by political compromise, so that when a major issue comes up public resolution will not have been so whittled away in a series of lesser crises that it is incapable of making a stand. This is the crisis-frequency-limiting part of detente, and the part Mr Henry Kissinger, as he contemplates what he sees as the erosion of American will to take on Russia in Angola or anywhere else, thinks is most important.

But, once detente has been properly defined, it becomes clear what it does not include. It does not amount to an authorisation for:

- The sort of agreement which works mainly to the advantage of the Russians, without giving the west some compensating leverage over future Soviet policy. The five-year contract for providing American grain to Russia was one example of this. The relief it gives to the whole incompetent Soviet farming system, and therefore to Mr Brezhnev's political position, is more important than its benefits to American grain growers, Republican voters though many of them are; and when it was suggested that it could be used as a lever to influence Soviet policy on Angola President Ford refused to do so on the—probably correct—ground that it would not produce the desired result.
- The sort of agreement which the Russians like, not because it produces any significant change in the real state of the world, but because it encourages western public opinion to believe that the contest with the Soviet Union is coming to an end. Last August's Helsinki conference would have been a prime example of this, if subsequent events had not shown people how little the Russians believe in the ending of that contest. The chief argument against this bogus "detente" has always been that it could lead to a one-sided western disarmament—either literal military disarmament, or what the French accurately call a *désarmement de l'esprit*.
- Above all, "detente" is not a justification for what may be about to happen in Angola. The American-Russian relationship has so far notably failed to provide a political compromise in Angola which would avoid putting western public opinion on the rack over this admittedly less-than-central issue. The crisis-frequency-limiting part of Mr Kissinger's theory of detente did not work here: the Russians simply used their own theory of detente to try to get away with a straight piece of Soviet-Cuban interventionism.

It is probably no accident that the Angola war, more than any previous event, has helped to prick the bubble of detente. The very remoteness of Angola—which persuaded the American Congress that it did not justify even a small expenditure of American money—is also a striking example of the expanding range of Soviet ambitions. The Angola issue may be less-than-central (though its possible effect on the hopes of peace in the rest of southern Africa means that it is by no means negligible); but it has provided a salutary shock on the wider east-west issue—if not on Angola itself.

The valid core of detente—though it really needs another word—is therefore reduced to three things:

1. The attempt to balance the armed strength of the western alliance and the Warsaw pact should certainly continue. This includes the present Russian-American missile negotiations, and the parallel talks about limiting the size of the armies in central Europe. But it is doubtful whether these are going to succeed, because it is doubtful whether the Russians really want a balance of strength; they may be trying (see the box above) to reinforce that "visibly increased preponderance" Mr Gromyko spoke of.

2. There can obviously be no objection to agreements on specific issues which bring roughly equal benefit to both sides. The Berlin agreement of 1971 probably fell under that heading. So do some trade agreements, when these are designed to remove obstacles to what would otherwise be a mutually beneficial flow of goods, and do not merely divert resources from healthier uses for the sake of some hypothetical future political benefit.

3. It is also necessary for the two superpowers to keep

up the practice of consulting each other when their friends in parts of the world away from the European front line seem to be heading towards a fight that could involve them. The most obvious example is the Middle East; southern Africa could be another before long.

But that is about it. This list does not warrant the word "detente", with its comfortable implication that we can afford to sit back and relax. "Confrontation with brakes" would be a better name, even if (as Mr Brezhnev knew when he plugged "detente") it is not as catchy.

The new relationship has to start from the Soviet Union's repeated public assertion that co-operation with the west does not mean the end of the Soviet attempt to change "the balance of social-political forces" in the world; and from the long history of more esoteric communist teaching that relations with the democracies, if handled with skill, can actually help to speed that change. The Russians will pursue this policy, on present evidence, by means ranging from the provision of money to friendly parties abroad (as in Portugal last year) through the dispatch of client troops where they think they can get away with it (as in Angola) to the intimidation that can be achieved by the mere possession of a visible superiority of armed force.

A struggle prolonged

To public opinion in the democracies, unwilling to contemplate a foe who makes his peace only where and when it suits him, the end of the false hopes attached to detente will not be pleasant news; but it is the reality. It calls for a willingness to use all the forms of countervailing pressures needed to hold Soviet policy in check: economic assistance to the west's friends, where that is appropriate; the supply of arms, when arms are needed and justified. It also requires a willingness to pay for defence budgets designed to match the military problem the democracies face rather than domestic political convenience. And to achieve all that the west needs, in tandem with careful detente, a *réarmement de l'esprit*.

How it's changing



*calculated from International Institute for Strategic Studies and American Arms Control and Disarmament Agency figures † long-range ballistic missiles (inc submarine-launched)

A "visibly increased preponderance" was the phrase Mr Gromyko used about the power behind Soviet foreign policy in his Kommunist article. There is no good single measure of strategic power: numbers of men, tanks, ships and missiles, nuclear throw-weight and megatonnage, even total defence spending, are all only bits of the equation. These graphs do not therefore represent a complete picture of the balance of strength between America and Russia and their respective alliances. But they do show some decisive changes of the past six years.

Apart from total defence spending and the nuclear statistics, there is also a graph for one major indicator of conventional military strength—the number of tanks the two alliances have in central Europe. It is admittedly easier to count quantities of things—tanks or missiles, say—than to measure qualitative differences such as the accuracy of missiles or the mechanical reliability of tanks (in both of which the west is probably still ahead). But these figures bear out the general belief that Soviet power has been growing rapidly in relation to the west's. Even in warheads, the Russian number is about to move sharply up.

DAILY TELEGRAPH, London
30 January 1976

Détente—Moscow's view

PETER BLAKER, MP

puts himself in the position of a senior official in the Kremlin making a report to Mr Brezhnev. It would, he suggests, read something like this

I am happy to tell you, Comrade Brezhnev, that our policy of *détente* is succeeding and we are making progress towards the subjugation of Western Europe. As I have previously pointed out, the main characteristic of bourgeois democracy is its capacity for self-deception.

Thus many people in the West think they can safely relax their guard. They also do not realise that what we mean by *détente* is a time for consolidating our hold over Eastern Europe, and for extending our influence in Western Europe, without war, if possible, but with war, if necessary — and certainly not a time to reduce our forces. It is surprising that this self-deception should be so widespread in view of the clear statements which have been made by senior members of the Soviet régime.

You will recall that Comrade Zarodov received your personal backing when he reaffirmed in August Lenin's view that power could be seized in ways other than through the ballot box, using force if necessary. Comrade Cherepenin in *Pravda* on Oct. 19, 1975, recommended mass strike action for political purposes in Western countries. You yourself said not long ago that Lenin's appeal remains topical today for Communists — "Be ready for any change of circumstance, to use any form of struggle, both peaceful and non-peaceful, legal and illegal."

"Crumbling"

All this appears to be ignored by politicians in the West. What is more, in spite of the adverse publicity which followed our refusal to allow the traitor Sakharov to collect the Nobel Prize, they pay little attention to his view that the West is too ready to "grant unilateral concessions and gifts in the course of *détente*" and that unilateral disarmament is likely to encourage us to step up our military efforts in strategically important parts of the world, such as the Indian Ocean.

What is perhaps even more remarkable is that people in the West ignore the warnings of their own military experts that our forces and our bases are designed

for offensive rather than defensive use. Indeed, not only do they ignore these warnings; they help us out by selling us their grain and their advanced technology.

In any case, while we are increasing our forces they are cutting theirs, and we see a crumbling of the Nato posture in the Mediterranean. This is occurring at a time when it should be obvious to all that the capability of the Americans, on whom the West principally depends, is weakened by internal doubts.

So, Comrade Brezhnev, my advice to you is that there can be no better time to push on with the development of our network of bases: Conakry, Berbera, Aden, Cuba, and now perhaps Angola. If present trends continue it is possible in a few years time we shall have such a preponderance of military and naval strength in Europe and on the sea lanes, and that the West will be psychologically so disarmed, that we may be able, by intimidation and pressure, to impose our will on one or more of the members of the Nato bloc.

Taking particular countries, in Portugal our man Cunhal has responded readily to our orders. His recent setbacks are disappointing, but following the Zarodov line, he has kept the Communist party in the Government while working for its defeat. Weapons have been systematically distributed to our sympathisers and, given the country's economic state and the chaos in the administration, we may be confident that there will be further opportunities for attempting to seize power.

In Italy we have an equally profound strategic interest. The Communist party is now being regarded seriously as a possible party of government. The West has welcomed Comrade Berlinguer's declaration that if his party came to power, Italy would not withdraw from Nato. Yet, Nato may well be persuaded to leave Italy. The party in Italy may differ from ours in many respects, but they are fundamentally related and openly claim to be a Marxist-Leninist party taking its lead from our country.

In Yugoslavia, our preparations for bringing that country back into the Soviet camp after the death of Tito continue. However, Tito himself and his lackeys have recently launched a campaign to discredit our agents, claiming that what is at stake is not ideology but independence. It is to be feared that this campaign will have some success. However, the Nato countries appear totally unprepared psychologically to meet any threat of military pressure against Yugoslavia and it should be possible, after Tito, to create pretexts for intervention.

"Incredible"

I turn now, Comrade Brezhnev, to Britain. Here I believe we have excellent prospects for a breakthrough. I have reported to you in the past on the alleged comprehensive review of defence which the Government carried out a year or more ago and the likely effect of that review on the flanks of the Nato bloc.

I reported subsequently on the cuts of £100 million or more which the Government made, despite having just completed that review.

I must tell you that there are reports in the Press in Britain that the Government are planning further cuts in defence and I have reason to believe, from our usual sources and on past performance, that these reports have some substance.

It may seem incredible to you, Comrade Brezhnev, that although the British Government have conducted a comprehensive, fundamental review — the most fundamental, they claim, that has been conducted for a generation in the field of defence — there is no other field of Government spending in which they have conducted any review of such a fundamental kind.

Most politicians in Britain—and on the continent of Western Europe—fail to understand that our whole strategy, the build-up of our naval fleet, the acquisition of bases in Africa and Asia, the boosting of our troop level in Central Europe, are aimed at Western Europe. Western Europe is the target because, when we have control of it, our military and industrial strength will be greater than that of the rest of the world put together.

I come now, Comrade Brezhnev, to my recommendations. First, we should go slow on negotiations in the M B F R because there is no point in continuing them in Britain's present mood. We should wait and see if Britain continues to disarm without reductions by us. Secondly, we should concentrate our efforts to weaken the military strength and the willpower of the West on Britain.

"Weakling"

I say this for four reasons. First because Britain still has a good deal of prestige in the Western capitals. This may seem surprising to you, Comrade Brezhnev, but I suppose there are historical reasons for it, in spite of Britain's present condition. So her example is likely to be followed. Second, because Britain is the weakest country economically in the E E C, for which our workers in Britain must take a great deal of credit. Third, because, those in the ruling party in Britain who sympathise with our point of view are in a strong position, indeed they have never been stronger.

The fourth reason relates to the character of the Prime Minister. He is a weak person in whom it is difficult to see any principles. He is a repair man who sees his job as holding the party machine together. So there is a good chance that the pressure of the Marxists in his party and the apathy of many others will have the result we wish.

★

Would that report to Mr Brezhnev be far wrong? And might not he reply that since Mrs Thatcher seems to understand what the Russians are up to, they should press ahead on these lines before she has a chance to become a power?

Los Angeles Times Wed., Feb. 11, 1976

The Bugs in Detente

There was only one thing surprising about the new Soviet radiation-monitoring of the American Embassy in Moscow, and that was the State Department's effort to keep it quiet.

The public record is full of revelations of ingenious Soviet and American efforts to penetrate the security of each other's diplomatic missions. The snooping has not been limited to foes, but has included friends as well.

So why all the secrecy on the latest discovery?

Robert Toth, our Moscow correspondent, reported the general belief that the State Department sought to suppress the information lest it reenforce skepticism and misgivings about detente in the United States.

The secrecy can hardly have been associated with special security considerations. The Russians knew that the Americans knew what they were up to, for we are told that Secretary of State Kissinger protested the radiation-bugging when he was last in Moscow.

If the secrecy was imposed out of concern for the American reaction, the decision must stand as yet another bit of bad judgment on the part of the policymakers.

It is akin to the kind of thinking that has discouraged candor on the degree of Soviet compliance with strategic arms agreements.

Kissinger has criticized Congress for denying him the discretion he thinks he needs to implement foreign policy. But behavior like this does not encourage public trust.

DAILY TELEGRAPH, London
29 January 1976

TURN OF DEFENCE TIDE

AN END TO "DETENTE" in its present form—which has meant Western disarmament and abdication but unceasing military and political expansion by Russia—was as good as proclaimed by Mr RUMSFELD, the new American Defence Secretary, in his statement to Congress. He announced that, in order to meet "a dangerous shift of the military balance in Russia's favour," America was launching a 10-year arms expansion and development programme. This would involve an increase in real terms in America's military expenditure for the first time since 1968.

Mr RUMSFELD's statement amounted to what may well be the most devastating indictment of Soviet world-wide militarist imperialism since the war. The figures he gave of Russian military expansion during the years of the Western run-down were all the more alarming in view of the relentless and purposeful determination with which it must have been extracted from Russia's inefficient economy at the cost of depressed living standards. Despite the Russian challenge in the Middle East, the Mediterranean, the Persian Gulf and Africa, he said, "the most likely field for armed conflict remained the Central European plain."

It is tragic that the free world, if it is not to live under a darkening cloud of fear, must gird itself for greater defence consciousness. Nor evidently is there any other way of seeking realistically to achieve a reduction by negotiations. America, Government and people, now see this. France is also increasing its military expenditure. Mr RUMSFELD's statement is additionally heartening because he repeatedly warns Russia not to think that she could get away with an attack on Europe without involving America. He is backing this up with an appropriate weapons programme. This is all the more important because of Russia's obvious tactics, in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, to retain freedom to develop weapons for attacking Europe while working towards a mutual abstinence on the part of Russia and America concerning attacks on each other.

Sunday, February 8, 1976 The Washington Star

Our noble stance: A bully thumping little kids with foreign-aid club

By Theodore M. Hesburgh

SOUTH BEND, Ind. — Ambassador Daniel P. Moynihan's departure from the United Nations gives an opportunity to re-examine a basic issue: Should the United States determine its foreign policies on the basis of whether they are right and just, rather than merely politically expedient?

The administration's decision — which apparently originated with Ambassador Moynihan — to use all United States aid, including development assistance, to punish or reward poor countries that vote against us or support us in the United Nations, seems to have been triggered by the United Nations vote linking Zionism with racism, a silly and stupid resolution that deserves little more than to be condemned and summarily ignored.

In any event, the new policy is a major setback for United States foreign relations. Indeed, it is both immoral and counterproductive: Immoral because it subordinates the survival and well-being of millions of suffering human beings to winning votes on transistory political issues, counterproductive because it may well achieve the opposite effect.

The Rev. Mr. Hesburgh is chairman of the board of directors of the Overseas Development Council and president of the University of Notre Dame. He is former chairman of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights.

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Simply put, development aid cannot be used both to buy another country's support and to finance its economic and social development. To buy support, aid would have to be turned on and off as reward or punishment.

But development requires a reliable flow of aid over a period of years to support long-term changes. Once aid is cut off, technicians are brought home, research work of many years is terminated, construction projects are closed down, and university-to-university programs must be severed. All momentum is lost, and even if the aid is later renewed, the effort must begin again almost from scratch.

Those who argue that we have a right to demand support for our objectives in return for economic assistance miss the whole point of development aid. It is not something we do for other governments. Rather, it is, or ought to be, an investment we and they make together to solve certain human problems that our children and those in poor countries will otherwise inherit.

It is a small investment that an appropriate regard for posterity and the well-being of humanity demands that we make.

If the administration wants a political slush fund, our current programs of security assistance provide just such a tool. For my part, I will have no further interest in supporting bilateral development aid if it is to be used for political manipulation rather than for the improvement of the human condition in the poorest countries on earth.

Ironically, the new policy is not simply immoral: It won't work. Anyone who has lived or traveled extensively in the developing world knows how really unlikely it is in this moment of rising nationalism that aid can be used to achieve short-run political ends. Indeed, the public unveiling of this policy has made it good politics for a developing-country leader to oppose any United States position in international forums to prove his country's independence from "U.S. neo-imperialism."

How will we apply this new policy? Will we punish countries like Iran, Brazil, Egypt, Pakistan or Nigeria — all of whom voted for the Zionism resolution? The news from Washington implies the opposite. Their raw materials (especially oil) and political influence are too important to us.

Rather, it will be the Guyanas and Tanzanias of the world that suffer our wrath, because they can't fight back. Our country will be the neighborhood bully, picking only on those small kids who can't defend themselves. What a tragic Bicentennial stance for a country that began as a small powerless nation daring to declare itself independent from the abuse of power!

In recent years Congress has more and more strongly favored humanitarian and developmental uses for our foreign aid, resisting the traditional executive-branch propensity to use aid for political purposes. Last year, Congress even legislated limitations and specifications for allocating our foreign assistance among countries by reserving the greater proportion of aid for countries and peoples most in need. The new State Department policy violates that standard.

Citizens of conscience should reaffirm our commitment to the universal, inalienable rights to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness — and make it good politics for Congress and the executive branch to represent these great American ideals.

WASHINGTON POST
18 FEB 1976

Red Tape Hinders Drug Crackdown

By Jack Anderson and Les Whitten

The State Department is so entangled in red tape that it has hampered the effort to stop drug smuggling.

For years, prodigious amounts of heroin, cocaine and marijuana have poured into the United States from Asia, Latin America and the Middle East. Each year, more than a billion dollars worth of "brown" heroin is smuggled across the border from Mexico alone.

To stem the tide, the United States has spent millions of dollars and assigned thousands of people. Yet project after project has been caught in the bureaucratic tangle at Foggy Bottom. Here are just a few examples:

—At one time, a United Nations team persuaded reluctant Thailand officials to allow an aerial survey of their poppy fields. The State Department, incredibly, turned the idea down. Rep. Lester Wolff (D-N.Y.), one of the leading narcotics experts in Congress, pressured the bureaucrats to change their minds. But by this time, the Thais had changed theirs. The matter is still being negotiated.

—Under the code name Operation Cocina, Colombia last June began cracking down on cocaine traffickers. The Colombians asked the United States for some special communications equipment. Two U.S. narcotics officials, whose sole responsibility was to audit such requests, decided they wanted a "feasibility study." Special personnel from Washington were flown down to conduct the study, which dragged on for more than a month. Two months later, the bureaucrats solemnly reached a decision: the Colombians needed equipment but not the kind they had requested. Operation Cocina will end shortly, but the right equipment only recently arrived.

—After much haggling, the government of Mexico agreed to eradicate 20,000 poppy fields. At the time, the Mexicans used sticks to beat the heads off poppy plants. But they agreed that herbicides would be more effective. Thereupon, the State Department delivered a primitive system employing buckets to pour herbicides out of helicopters. Of course, the Mexicans really needed more sophisticated spray equipment, which was finally provided after Rep. Wolff intervened.

—The Mexican government has also agreed to conduct an aerial survey of their country to locate poppy fields. Using prop-driven aircraft provided by the United States, the Mexicans can survey only 60 square miles a day. With a small jet, they could survey 600 square miles daily. Yet the State Department refused to provide a jet, and suggested instead the Mexicans lease one.

Nevertheless, there are signs that officials on both sides of the Rio Grande are finally getting together to stop the illicit drug traffic.

Last month, Wolff and a colleague, Rep. Benjamin Gilman (R-N.Y.), met privately with the leaders of four countries and hammered out some "breakthrough" agreements.

In Mexico City, for example, they called upon President Luis Echeverria. They worked out an accord which has been summarized in a private letter from Echeverria to President Ford, transmitted by classified State Department wire.

"I put forward to the U.S. legislators the idea of creating twin national commissions," wrote Echeverria, "one in each of our countries, which would undertake a study of all aspects of this (narcotics) question and propose solutions . . . For my part, I am proceeding to establish the Mexican commission."

WASHINGTON STAR
16 FEB 1976

U.S. Submarines, 'Hostile Vessels' Collided 9 Times

United Press International

The House Intelligence Committee's final report says U.S. nuclear submarines in Soviet waters have collided with nine "hostile vessels" in the last 10 years.

That's only part of a hair-raising story.

Of the collisions reported without details by the committee, five are known to have involved Soviet nuclear submarines — with both craft submerged and carrying either nuclear missiles or nuclear torpedoes.

None resulted in any sinking of U.S. submarines or serious injury to American crews, and the most reliable word available is that "presumably" no Russian sub was sunk.

This also leads to speculation on a number of sinkings of American and Soviet submarines for which no completely satisfactory reasons have been given.

Leaked segments of the House report — still classified because it contains material the White House did not want released — said of the collision incidents:

> "A highly technical U.S. Navy submarine reconnaissance program, often operating within unfriendly waters, has experienced at least nine collisions with hostile vessels in the last 10 years, over 110 possible detections, and at least three press exposures. Most of the submarines carry nuclear weapons."

The report did not say so but it referred to a top-secret U.S. Navy operation which, at least until last year, was called "Holystone" and was run from an operations center known as the "Spook Shack" at Norfolk, Va., submarine headquarters of the Atlantic Fleet command.

"The program clearly produces useful information on our adversaries' training exercises, weapons, testing, and general naval capabilities," the report said.

"It is also clear that the program is inherently risky. . . .

"The committee is, therefore, troubled by the completely pro forma nature of the mission risk assessment as it is presently accomplished."

The report gave no details of the nine collisions or the "110 possible detections" of American submarines by the Soviets.

But reports, some sketchy, surfaced in past years on these known collisions:

• Unidentified U.S. nuclear submarine and Soviet submarine "in the early 1960s . . . low speed impact."

• U.S. nuclear submarine Gato in collision in November 1969 with a Soviet nuclear missile submarine at the entrance to the White Sea.

At one point, the American sub was only a mile off Soviet territory because of a navigational error, according to one report.

Gato was monitoring Soviet submarine traffic in and out of the White Sea and picked up one northbound Red Fleet sub and began "tailgating" it with the Russian vessel's propellers acting as a protective shield against detection.

The Soviet sub turned, the American crew miscalculated and Gato was hit amidships, fortunately in the heavily armored section around the nuclear reactor.

Gato prepared for action with nuclear torpedoes but the Soviet crew was so confused about what had been encountered that the Americans were able to steal away.

•A collision between an American and Soviet sub in March, 1971; details lacking.

• U.S. nuclear sub Pintado, May 1974, in head-on collision with Soviet nuclear-powered submersible off the Soviet Far East port of Petropavlosk on the Kamchatka Peninsula. Damage seen and photographed when it pulled into Guam for repairs.

• Nov. 3, 1974, U.S. nuclear submarine Madison, carrying 16 new Poseidon multi-warhead atomic missiles, hit or hit by Soviet sub in the North Sea off Britain.

Some 800 to 900 submarines are in service or mothballed in the world's navies, and they congregate like mating whales around the most traveled sea lanes and straits and harbors.

WASHINGTON POST
8 FEB 1976



Troubles Are Also Ours

By Charles William Maynes

IT WAS AN extraordinary statement even for Daniel Patrick Moynihan, who has repeatedly shown an ability to enlarge on reality. Questioned about the United States' position in the United Nations 2 months before his resignation as U.S. ambassador, Moynihan replied that a majority of U.N. members are out to "kill" the United States. Imagine an earlier U.S. representative answering the same question: "It is to be noted that as a result of changes in the composition of the United Nations since 1960, which opened the era of decolonization, increasingly a majority of U.N. members states are pursuing their perceived national interests in the world body in a manner which is in conflict with our perceived national interests and these trends have made the U.N. a somewhat less useful over-all tool for United States foreign policy."

Whether one prefers one's judgments with Irish embroidery or Foreign Service fog, the reality which most American observers see at the U.N. is precisely the United States in opposition. Suddenly the rest of the world, or at least its leaders, have gone bad. Why is not clear but, following Moynihan's lead, many of us search for the answer in a sudden ideological shift in views of foreign leaders, perhaps fostered by inadequate university training. Yet it may be time to look at some deeper factors.

While it is undeniable that the vast increase in the number of U.N. members has helped to dilute U.S. influence in the organization and that anti-Americanism is rampant in the developing world, these developments do not adequately explain either our own weakness in New York or the U.N.'s general dilemma. The United States' isolation and the U.N.'s current difficulties are the result of powerful domestic and international currents of change which profoundly affect the way that nations look on the U.N. and on international organizations in general.

The most fundamental change involves America's international position: In recent years, the United States has ceased to be a global power seeking global solutions in a formal institutional framework and has become simply the most important among important international powers.

A second major change, almost psychological in nature, is the worldwide waning of the postwar belief in progressive change through government intervention.

WE CAN BEGIN with the changes in the United States' role in the world. To understand these, it is necessary to probe the reasons behind earlier strong U.S. support for the concept of a world orgainization after both rld wars. Usually, accounts on this subject dwell on American idealism, either praised as farsighted or condemned as naive. But even in 1918 a fundamental reason for American interest in a global institution was American security interests, already perceived by some policymakers as global.

These policymakers were interested not only in enhancing American safety but also American influence; and in an organization with global membership, only a nation with global interests can aspire to dominant leadership. They believed in 1918 and knew in 1945 that the United States was the only healthy and dominant global power. They reasoned that only America could conceivably aspire to enduring leadership in the new world body.

Against this background, the U.N. from the beginning was in a very real sense an American organization. It was American not simply in the most obvious sense—that the United States dominated the world body politically and financially for two decades and used its power for Cold War reasons. It was also an American organization intellectually.

For more than two decades, the United States was practically the only significant member state that not only tried to "use" the U.N. but also to "build" it. There spewed forth from Washington, administration after administration, a stream of proposals and plans, many of which for tactical reasons had to be surfaced by others, that helped to develop the central core of intellectual capital necessary to make the world organization vital and more than marginally relevant to world politics.

One of the U.N.'s major achievements was the U.N. Emergency Force which kept the peace in the Middle East from 1956 to 1967. Henry Cabot Lodge points out that the original resolution was drafted in the State Department—he thinks by Joseph J. Sisco, now under secretary of state. Lodge, then U.N. ambassador, passed the resolution to Lester B. Pearson of Canada, who went on to win a Nobel Peace Prize for his work in putting the plan into action.

This uniquely American approach occurred almost in spite of the personal preferences of many top United States policymakers. No one disliked the U.N. more than Dean Acheson; yet in the Korean crisis he saw great advantages in using the U.N. and through the Uniting for Peace Resolution enhanced the power of the world body. Almost against their own instincts, U.S. policymakers, pursuing a global policy, found advantages in using a global institution.

Today, the United States continues to have wider interests in more regions of the world than any other major power. Nevertheless, when President Nixon announced his vision of a five-power world, when he jettisoned the Bretton Woods monetary system, when he showed little interest in such "global" issues as North-South relations, when his powerful treasury secretary proclaimed no standard higher than narrow national interest, the United States in effect announced that its interests were no longer global. It followed inevitably that the United States would downgrade considerably its attention to developments in Africa, southern Asia and Latin America—developments which dominate the U.N. With the United States reducing the range of its foreign policy interests considerably, the cost of speaking out at the U.N. began to fall.

This change in the U.S. attitude and interests has been especially traumatic for the U.N. because its consequences are compounded by the extreme hostility of many countries in the Third World toward the United States (a hostility which will surely survive Moynihan's departure). Although any dispassionate analysis would acknowledge that this hostility is at least in part explained by 15 years of poorly conceived policies toward the Third World, an element of postured confrontation has developed which now threatens not simply the relevance but the very existence of the U.N.

The other dimension to the U.N.'s dilemma has been the drying up of the postwar spirit of optimism among

key elites. One major asset for the U.N. in its past three decades of growth was a faith shared almost everywhere in the ability of government institutions—both at home and abroad—to carry out and economic reform effectively and at minimal human cost.

Such pessimism about the ability of domestic institutions to perform effectively is bound to influence popular and elite perceptions regarding the performance of international institutions. It is no accident that at roughly the same time the U.S. government abandoned the domestic "war on poverty" and failed to meet its aid and trade obligations to the Thrid World under the Second Development Decade.

Similarly, there is some relationship between the conclusion that liberalism has lost its creative force in shaping domestic programs and the conclusion that attempting change through multinational and institutional approaches motivated by a sense of internationalism is probably misguided. Indeed, the greatest difficulty the U.N. may face in the current Third World campaign for a "New International Economic Order" is that this drive moves against the general trend toward retrenchment and conservatism.

We forget too easily that, particularly during the period between the two world wars, people generally perceived government as incapable of effecting meaningful social and economic reform. But by 1945 the belief began to spread that if nations could organize efficiently for total war, certainly they could prepare themselves effectively for a better peace.

One consequence of this renewed faith in government capability was a spectacular increase, historically unprecedented, in the scope and extent of government activities, abroad as well as at home. The growth of the U.N. system took place in this context of the postwar expansion of all governmental and intergovernmental institutitions. The U.N. budget for specialized agencies may have grown at a rate of 11 per cent a year from 1951 to 1970, for example, but U.S. budget expenditures grew at a rate of 18 per cent during this same period.

Today there are numerous signs that, at least in the developed countries, this golden age of bureaucracy is coming to an end, both domestically and internationally. In the United States, where the Democrats have traditionally been identified as more favorable to the expansion of government services, the four most promising new Democratic governors have stunned both their supporters and opponents by immediately initiating a process of budget cuts. In the words of one: "The days of wine and roses are over."

Austerity, not progress, is now the watchword not only in the United States but in most other developed states as well. The essential goal of government, which used to be the achievement of new social gains for the future, has devolved into a more negative objective of protecting social gains from the past.

ALTHOUGH the U.N. seems to be entering a difficult period, we should be careful not to assume that his will also be true for multilateral diplomacy as a whole. Many U.N. supporters contend that because it is imperative that nations cooperate with others, all states must for that reason work with one another witain the U.N. framework. Yet this does not at all follow, as Secretary General Kurt Waldheim was forced to concede in a 1975 statement to a group of experts working on a restructuring of the U.N.:

"A realistic assessment of the actual pattern of inter-state relations reveals that many, if not most, of those relations continue to be handled bilaterally, that a relatively small volume of inter-state activity is channeled through international organizations. Even in the case of problems recognized as global, there is a tendency to rely on restricted forums and groups of so-called 'interested' countries, without reference to the more generally accepted codes of behavior or coordination with activities carried out within the United Nations system."

Of course, these "interested" states are interested not in the sense that they are more competent than others but in the perverse sense that they are out to promote their own interests with little regard to the interests of others. Both the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries and the International Energy Agency are examples.

Nevertheless, Waldheim's observation suggests a central insight about international organizations that most U.N. supporters overlook—that, as one expert has written, governments will not entrust a project to which they attach importance to a body that seems to be out of control. This explains why OPEC producers, as much as the industrial consumers, prefer to establish new institutions outside the U.N. framework to conduct their negotiations, or why disarmament talks take place in special forums created by and controlled by the Soviet Union and the United States.

As we move into an era where nations have less money and time to spend on institutions that are too large to work, these examples of "interested states" working together will multiply, not always with desirable consequences for the globe as a whole.

UNDER SUCH conditions, what role in the international system is appropriate for the U.N.? There remain several, though all place the U.N. at the margin of policy rather than the center.

First, we should not undervalue the continuing usefulness of the United Nations simply as a debating society. It is easy to denigrate this function, but the world needs a forum which can issue warning signals that current international policy is engendering too much hostility (as on economic issues) or permitting to little progress (as on disarmament questions) or simply going too far (as on the Zionism resolution). There is a second advantage to any debating forum. Anyone who has worked in a government bureaucracy knows well the catalytic effect on policy that the existence of a public forum can have. Often it provides the only excuse for reviewing current policy.

Fihally, in terms of U.S. interests, we ought to recognize that the U.N. enjoys one advantage as a debating society that few other international organizations or conferences can offer. Through its charter the U.N. accords the U.S. a privileged position on the Security Council where its lone opposing voice can often delegitimize consensus for international action in the political and security field.

Second, there is the traditional U.N. role of standard-setting in areas where adequate international consensus exists, such as telecommunications, health and international trade. Regrettably, there are still too few such areas these days. Their number may slowly increase.

Third, the U.N. system in certain areas can perform an important monitoring role, helping to make new developments in the international system more visible, and thus more amenable to reform. The recent U.N. effort to study the multinational corporations falls into this area. So do its early-warning systems on such issues as crop failures and epidemics. The opportunities here should not be exaggerated. Member states are well aware that knowledge is power and they are not able to give too much of either to an international secretariat, which in recent years has capitulated too quickly to member states' protests or demands.

Fourth, in certain areas, the U.N. is a vital action agency. Peacekeeping is one area. The work of the U.N. Development Program, now the world's largest channel for international technical cooperation, is another. But however important these activities are and in limited circumstances they can be vital -- there may be a ceiling on future expansion. The

contrast between U.N. peacekeeping in the Middle East and U.N. paralysis in Angola suggests that the balance of local and outside forces must be in a very narrow range before the U.N. can move. As for further increasing U.N. development activity, the first step is an improvement in over-all relations between industrialized countries and developing countries. Only then will programs like UNDP receive the support they merit. Governments these days are in a nasty mood and want to know what they get for what they give. The scale, therefore, is temporarily weighted in favor of bilateralism or regionalism.

AS WE MOVE further into the era of multilateral diplomacy, there is a final U.N. function which could exceed in importance the others. This is to serve as an organization which can *legitimize* those multilateral activities that have a global significance.

The model for future multilateral activity is likely to be OPEC or the International Energy Agency or the new Paris forum of limited membership for negotiating over energy and raw materials, the so-called Conference on International Economic Cooperation (CIEC). These are all organizations based on the principle of exclusion rather than universality; yet the feature they all share is that each, though it must be small to be effective, nevertheless carries out activities of interest to a much larger group of states. How can the larger group make its views known? How can they have some influence over their fate? That these are vital questions is clear from the intense pressure to increase the carefully negotiated size of CIEC, now set at 27. CIEC, which some argue may become the "prime forum" for North-South dialogue, is vulnerable to such pressure because its membership is self-appointed and lacks the legitimacy which an organ like the U.N. might bestow.

The talks between the oil producers and the oil consumers may prove a test case. It is widely conceded that the General Assembly is not an appropriate forum in developed-developing world relations would have to represent other states which, for reasons of numbers, could not all be present.

This proposal bears some resemblance to the most important recommendation of the May, 1975, report of the Group of Experts on the Structure of the United Nations System. The 25 experts from all regions and political groupings urged the creation of "small negotiating groups to deal with key economic issues identified by the (Economic and Social) Council as requiring further negotiations." During the year or two such groups would be given to work out a settlement, the General Assembly would take their efforts into account in addressing these issues.

It would be a mistake to underestimate the difficulties in trying to evolve such a responsibility for the U.N. Any suggestion that the U.N. might promote international cooperation through its legitimizing function immediately brings forth the challenge that the U.N. in its legitimizing function can also promote international conflict: Look at the U.N. efforts to bestow legitimacy on the Palestine Liberation Organization. Whenever the U.N.'s legitimizing role is used to sanction a process and set reasonable goals for the negotiating parties, it will move closer to the center of policy. Whenever this role is used to predetermine the final results of a negotiating process, the U.N. will move to the margin of policy, useful primarily as a mirror of forces operating in other arenas.

For the sake of the U.N. and better global policy, its supporters must hope that it will be able to use its legitimizing role in a responsible manner. At this point, however, all one can say is that the likelihood of this happening is still uncertain and for that reason so is the future of the organization.

But no American can express pleasure in this. For the weakness of the organization reflects our own. The U.N.'s current difficulties, though also caused by the policies of others, will not end until the United States can redefine its role in the world in a positive fashion and until our people and their leaders can restore some balance to our national spirit.

Maynes is secretary of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

The Economist

January 17, 1976

In western fists

It is not a policy for dealing with the problem of Italy's Communists to wish they would go away, and to act as if they had. The new government Italy is now trying to cobble together (see page 42) is quite possibly the last that will not include the Communists; by May next year, unless something dramatic happens to change Italians' apparent voting intentions, an election will probably have given the Communist party enough seats in parliament to claim its place in the cabinet. The French and Spanish Communists have learnt the lesson of Signor Berlinguer's success: swear you believe in the alternation of power, abjure the dictatorship of the proletariat, and half Europe's liberals will accept you as newly baptised converts to the democratic communion. To this Mr Henry Kissinger has no response except to say that the United States will do nothing to help western Europe's Communists come to power, which is reasonable enough, and then to fall back on a programme of pinpricks ranging from using the CIA to provide American money for Italy's non-communists (but it is not money they need) to the refusal of American visas for senior Italian Communists. The European community does not even have a policy as coherent as that.

The first item on the American-EEC political agenda for 1976 should be an attempt to work out a common approach to the imminent challenge of Italy's Communists. The first step to that is to decide what the consequences of their entry into government would be.

Spillover and erosion

The undesirable effects have now begun to be tallied up. First, although the Italian Communists' claim to be converted to democracy is admittedly more credible than most, their election would have a spillover effect on the prospects of other west European comrades whose credentials are less impressive. Signor Berlinguer has the best claim to be believed when he says he is a democrat because (a) he has been saying it a long time, (b) he has gone looking for trouble with the Russians by saying it and (c) his very large party contains a lot of people who anywhere else would be unmistakably social democrats. None of these things is true of the French Communists (M. Marchais formally renounced the dictatorship of the proletariat only last week); but a victory for Signor Berlinguer would help M. Marchais's chances of winning a popular-front majority, in alliance with the Socialists, in the French parliamentary election of 1978. It would also improve the Spanish Communists' prospects of being made legal, and then picking up votes in Spain's volatile electorate, even though their commitment to the democratic rules is still relatively obscure.

Second, a success for the Communists in Italy and France would affect the defence of western Europe. Even if these parties agreed to keep their countries in the Atlantic alliance, it is inconceivable that they would not try to cut their defence budgets and limit their co-operation with the United States. That would probably encourage the defence-cutters in other European Nato countries ("Why should our defence budget be bigger than theirs?"). It would also encourage the faction in the American Congress which says there is no point in sending so many American troops to defend a western Europe unwilling to defend itself.

Third, though this is more debatable, the entry into office of the Italian Communists might affect the world-wide position of the Roman Catholic church. Even since Pope John took over the Vatican in 1958, the Catholic church has been trying to make up its mind whether the communists are its fundamental adversaries or just another in the long line of ex-enemies with whom it has come to an expedient accommodation. The latest evidence (see page 42) suggests that Pope Paul may be swinging back to a no-truck-with-communists line, at least in Italy itself. But the arrival of the Communist party in government would certainly affect the papal calculation; and the papal calculation, for all the loosening of discipline in the church, still affects the decisions of Catholic leaders outside Italy.

Against these three grounds for concern, there is one weak and one better argument for saying that the acceptance of communists in government could be a positive advantage to the west.

The weak argument is that the Italian and Spanish parties, and to some extent even the French one, have now shown that they are willing to say and do things Russia does not want. This growing independence from Moscow, it is argued, could lead to yet another rift in the communist world, in addition to the great breakaways by Jugoslavia in 1948 and by China in 1959–60; and the Russians would not like that at all. True. But the value of this to the west is strictly limited. The independence of China, and of Marshal Tito's Jugoslavia, has been a major embarrassment to the Soviet Union, but in most international arguments Jugoslavia and China have not exactly been on the western side. It is far from clear that the Russians would see the problems a new sub-division of the communist world would cause them as outweighing the advantage of having even some pretty independent-minded communists in the governments of two or three major west European states. And anyway, from the west's own point of view, the most important thing is not how independent of Moscow these parties are willing to be. It is whether they are prepared to be not just non-Russian communists but practisers of western-type democracy as well. How many Jugoslavias—to take the most liberal existing communist state—could western Europe contain, and still be western Europe?

You believe them or you don't

The better argument is that in fact the west European communists might do a lot better than Jugoslavia's: with suitable encouragement, they could cross the dividing line that separates them from being left-wing social democrats. That would indeed be the prize of the century. Unfortunately, there is no solid way of testing their claim to be converts to democracy.

There is no test in past European history. The Communists took part in French and Italian governments after 1945, and left them when required to do so; but with western Europe then unmistakably under the eye of

American power they would have been mad not to. Since then the Communists in Finland and Iceland have twice been respectably in, and dutifully out, of their local governments. But how many west European hopes can dance on the point of two small Nordic needles? Nor is it much use to ask whether Signor Berlinguer and M. Marchais and the rest have their tongues in their cheeks when they say they will abide by the rules. Quite possibly they do not; they may earnestly mean to respect the majority's will, obey the result of elections, and confine their aims to what voters will endorse.

Their trouble is that, even if they mean all that, this conversion to democratic principles is a very recent flower growing out of a deep substratum of rocklike convictions to the contrary. A century of communist political theory—and, indeed, the hierarchical structure of communist parties—are based on a very different proposition: that politics is a science, that only communists really understand its laws, and that they therefore have a special responsibility for bringing the future to birth. Even on the best assumption about Signor Berlinguer's sincerity, he has yet to explain how his new ideas are to be reconciled with the historical impetus of the movement he leads.

Very likely that question will be answered only by what happens if and when communists get into office. And whether they get into office is going to be decided largely by events in each particular country. There are limits to what CIA money, or the threat of other external intervention, can do to affect the issue nowadays. But the United States and the European community are not entirely powerless. Their economic links with a country on the brink of taking its communists into government—or a country that has already taken them in—are one means of trying to make sure those communists stay on the democratic side of the dividing line. There may be other instruments. To use them, the western democracies have first to decide what their policy towards the problem is. It should be their start-of-1976 priority.

NEW YORK TIMES
11 FEB 1976

Rough Road in Italy

On its face, the Government that Prime Minister Moro is about to present in Italy—a minority Christian Democratic regime dependent for survival in Parliament on abstentions of Socialists and Republicans—is among the weakest of the 38 administrations the country has had since the fall of Fascism. Yet, it must cope promptly with Italy's worst political crisis of conscience and one of its worst economic slumps of the postwar period.

Mr. Moro's prospects would be grim enough if he had to concern himself only with 11 percent inflation, unemployment that now afflicts 7 percent of the work force and a lira that has been effectively devalued by 11 percent in the five weeks since the fall of his previous Government. But the Prime Minister must also contend with bitter divisions among Italy's democratic forces and inside his own party that have become even deeper during the maneuvering and negotiating about a new administration.

He takes office with two former Prime Ministers and influential party figures, Amintore Fanfani and Giulio Andreotti, strongly opposed to his strategy of forming a one-party Government. Senator Fanfani preferred early elections, despite the risk these would entail of additional gains by the powerful Communist Party.

In addition to these obstacles, Mr. Moro will be handicapped by recent allegations of C.I.A. subsidies to prominent Christian Democrats and charges of payoffs by the Lockheed Corporation to Luigi Gui, Interior Minister in the caretaker Government, while he was Minister of Defense in 1970. These accusations have given the Communists a propaganda windfall.

It has been customary with the resolution of each of Italy's political crises in recent years to wonder if the new Government might be the last one capable of excluding the Communists. With all of the problems on Mr. Moro's plate, the speculation is bound to be even more widespread and persistent this time.

Near East

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR Thursday, February 19, 1976

After Sinai—peace or new hostility?

Israel watches for Egypt's future course

By Jason Morris
Special to
The Christian Science Monitor
Tel Aviv, Israel

Israeli-Egyptian relations enter a new phase next Sunday when military implementation of the U.S-sponsored Sinai pact will be complete.

Policymakers here expect Egypt to redefine its attitude toward Israel once the sectors earmarked for evacuation are fully occupied by UN and Egyptian forces.

"It will be interesting to see how President Sadat and his government talk and act then," a senior Israeli official said, suggesting that the Egyptians may have been keeping a low political profile for the duration of the six-month-long withdrawal process.

Until now, the Israeli consensus has been based on a belief that Mr. Sadat is interested in economic reconstruction and development, not in renewal of the Middle East conflict.

Reopening of the Suez Canal, smooth passage through it of cargo bound to or from Israel, and rebuilding and repopulation of the canal zone cities have been cited as evidence of Egypt's lack of interest in military showdowns.

The fact that 500,000 Egyptian reservists have been demobilized since the interim agreement was signed last Sept. 1 has been hailed as further proof of peaceful intent.

However, some Israeli skeptics, including professional military men, point out that Egypt still has 650,000 soldiers under arms and that the reservists can be integrated in relatively little time into standing units.

The unkonwn factor in the new disengagement equation is whether Egypt simply bought three years in which to overhaul and westernize its armed forces in preparation for the next Middle East war or whether it has embarked on the first stage ot accommodation with Israel.

Cairo's future course may be partly influenced by the outcome of President Sadat's forthcoming trip to Saudi Arabia where he will confer with King Khalid, presumably on the extent to which the Saudis are willing to continue financing the Egyptian economy.

Another indicator will be Egypt's evaluation of the United States as an international superpower — a quality undermined in many eyes abroad by U.S. refusal to challenge the Cuban interverntion in Angola's civil war and to back the pro-Western Angolan factions against the Soviet-backed Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA).

According to Israeli analysts, the Soviets have not reconciled themselves to Egypt's transfer to the U.S. camp and the outcome of the Angola conflict could augur a Soviet try at a comeback in Cairo.

Meanwhile, Israeli, UN, and Egyptian soldiers are proceeding with the intricate process of redeployment in western Sinai.

Israeli observers report seeing several Egyptian helicopters over the canal's eastern bank and stepped up activity in the narrow Egyptian limited-arms zone.

A new Egyptian early-warning station will start operating Sunday at Hill 720 in the Giddi Pass, and Israel will continue using its vast Um Hashiba electronic monitoring post three miles to the west.

The 200-man "Sinai Field Mission," composed of American peace observers, will be in position to check on both monitoring stations and to operate a chain of listening devices and sensors as well as three stations of its own.



By Joan Forbes, staff artist

Africa

WASHINGTON POST
14 FEB 1976

Rowland Evans and Robert Novak

A Somber Message From Africa

In sending a special emissary here to plead to an ostrich-like U.S. Congress for help, Zaire's President Mobutu has warned that the now certain Soviet victory in Angola could escalate into far worse defeat for the Western world elsewhere in Southern Africa.

That somber message, carried to a score of key senators and representatives by Mobutu's foreign minister, Nguza, has had some impact. But it is conjectural whether Congress, in its election-year isolationist mood bred out of Vietnam, is now prepared to vote help for Zaire, Zambia, and other nations of Southern Africa after its flat veto of President Ford's plan to aid Angola.

If Congress keeps its head in the sand, the fault will not lie in the clear warnings of either President Ford or Nguza, who spent 10 days roving Capitol Hill. Zaire's Belgium-educated foreign minister, who is highly regarded in Western Europe, carried this message: U.S. failure to compete with brazen Soviet foreign intervention would threaten not only his own country and neighboring Zambia; it would endanger Africa's entire southern salient down to the Cape of Good Hope.

The reason is Angola's unique strategic position, which gives it immense economic leverage over landlocked Zambia and nearly landlocked Zaire. If Moscow retains its present power in Angola, both Zaire and Zambia could be economically decimated.

Zaire (the former Belgian Congo) is the largest fertile country in Africa, equal in size to the United States east of the Mississippi. It is also one of the world's richest sources of copper, manganese and other valuable minerals.

The critical geographical fact is Zaire's dependence on rail transport across Angola to the Atlantic Ocean. "That is our lifeline," Nguza told us here this week. "Close it and our people in Shaba (formerly Katanga, the copper-rich part of Zaire) will be ruined."

Moscow has coveted the riches of the old Belgian Congo for decades. Antoine Gizenga, a key pro-Soviet figure on the losing side of the Congolese civil war a decade ago, is now in Angola for possible trouble-making in his old homeland. Also in Angola are some 5,000 anti-Mobutu troops from the old civil war—military pawns for use back in Zaire.

What frightens Zaire, Zambia and other non-aligned nations of Southern Africa even more than massive Soviet military aid to Angola is the contrasting U.S. refusal to help. As Nguza told us and warned congressmen: "The Africans, I am sorry to say, are losing their confidence in the United States. Whenever there is any trouble, the U.S. says, 'No more Vietnams.' That is hard for us to understand."

That confirmed what Europeans, far better informed on once-colonial Africa than are Americans, have been privately warning: The mere existence of Soviet-backed Angola, coupled with the congressional refusal to compete, could automatically generate pro-Communist movements, without pressures from the Kremlin.

Nguza and other non-Communist Africans are counting on a visit by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger to Southern Africa to help show that the United States does not intend to withdraw from superpower competition on the continent.

But the real question lies in Congress. Can Congress, as some tenuous signs now indicate, finally rid itself of the costly illusion that every U.S. involvement is a candidate for "another Vietnam"?

Unless the answer is yes, the political outlook in Southern Africa is dangerous. North of Zaire is the People's Republic of the Congo (the former French Congo), controlled by an anti-Western regime. To the east along the Indian Ocean lies Mozambique, like Angola a former Portuguese colony whose government has intimate ties to Moscow. If the assumption is correct that Moscow will indeed be able to consolidate and hold its political influence over pro-Soviet Angola, Zaire and Zambia are extremely vulnerable—landlocked countries squeezed between Angola and Mozambique.

That was the message of President Mobutu's emissary here. Whether Congress understands it will not be known until it takes up the President's military and economic aid program for Zaire. It amounts to a piddling $42 million, but the congressional attitude toward it could foretell the fate of Southern Africa.

Field Enterprises

THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, Monday, February 9, 1976

The Troubles of Angola

By Arthur Schlesinger Jr.

Angola, a country to which Americans paid absolutely no heed for the first 199 years of our national existence, is suddenly revealed in our 200th year as a key to national survival. "The Senate decision to cut off additional funds for Angola," our President has solemnly told us, "... will profoundly affect the security of our country... will have the gravest consequences for the long-term position of the United States."

Once Americans locate Angola on the map, they may well wonder why, if this small African country is so vital to our security, no one ever mentioned it before. The administration's point is not apparently that the United States has a direct interest in Angola. This Secretary Kissinger disclaims. Nor can it be that the Soviet Union has been giving arms and money to one side; after all, we have been giving arms and money to the other side. The critical point surely—though the administration has not made it with much clarity—is the introduction by the Soviet Union of a Cuban expeditionary force in order to decide the outcome of an African civil war.

Extracontinental military intervention is what alarms neighboring African states like Zambia and Zaire. President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia, one of Africa's more progressive leaders, perceives "a plundering tiger with its deadly cubs" loose in Angola and warns his own country to be "prepared for the worst." President Mobutu of Zaire agrees. While half the members of the Organization of African Unity recognize the Soviet-anointed Popular Liberation Movement (MPLA) as the government of Angola, the other half insist that the two opposing factions have equal claims and call for a tripartite solution with an end to foreign military intervention. There is plainly a real issue here. Should not the international community do something to discourage the importation by a Eurasian power of Latin American soldiers into an African civil war? If the Soviet Union succeeds by this device in Angola, will it not be tempted to send other satellite forces to other parts of the continent?

Sen. Clark's Efforts

Senator Dick Clark of Iowa, who has done a heroic job in springing Angola from the vaults of executive secrecy, has called for "a full-scale effort to persuade the Soviet Union to join us in ending all outside intervention in Angola." Secretary Kissinger would evidently endorse the objective. The need to induce a measure of Soviet restraint becomes all the more important as evidence accumulates that Moscow is in an unwontedly activist mood these days. The only problem is how we are to attain this splendid goal. Here Clark and Kissinger diverge. Kissinger thinks it necessary to restrain Soviet adventurism by reacting within Africa itself. Clark doubts both that Soviet adventurism can have a lasting success in Africa and that American countermeasures in Africa can be effective.

The Kissinger course hardly begins from a position of strength. The Nixon Af-

rican policy was a disaster. The Kennedy administration, convinced that colonial rule could not last in Africa, had initiated programs of quiet assistance to African liberation groups especially in Angola and Mozambique. Nixon, in his anxiety to please the Portuguese dictatorship, terminated these programs. He thereby cut off the United States from any serious relationship with the groups likely to take over after the Portuguese departed. His general solicitude for white Africa alienated the OAU. In consequence, the American government was inexcusably unprepared to do anything when the Portuguese pulled out. If we had cultivated the OAU, we might have helped the 50% of African countries opposed to Soviet-Cuban military intervention become a majority. But our African policy, such as it was, was rather anti-OAU, which is why countries like Nigeria resent our sudden interest now.

Unable to work through the OAU, we might still have lined up non-African countries to try and attain the Clark-Kissinger objective. Britain, France, Belgium and Portugal have larger interests in Angola and environs than we have. China has its own ambitions in Africa and is reportedly pressing the United States to do something about Angola. But, no, we had to do it all by ourselves, with whispered encouragement from the sidelines. "Go in there and fight," said the manager to the battered pug in the old cartoon. "They can't hurt us."

Board of Contributors

The Angolans have not thrown out the Portuguese in order to be ruled by the Russians.

Or, to put it more accurately, the Executive Branch of the American government had to do it all by itself. After the introduction of the Cuban troops, the administration should have done at once what the Secretary of State said last week it thinks it might do now: it should have set forth candidly the reasons that might lead Congress to vote overt American assistance to the two factions the Cubans are fighting. Instead the administration showed how little it had attended the lessons of Vietnam and Watergate. Still convinced it could escape the disciplines of the Constitution, it tried to commit the United States to Angola in secret. "There can by only one explanation," Harry Rositzke, himself a retired CIA officer, has written. "...The President and the Secretary of State were concerned that the Congress would not agree with their Angolan policy and would not supply the required funds. Secret funds provided the easy way out."

As the secret operation began to leak, the administration defended it not by careful definition of the issues in Angola but by extravagant background noises. Thus Ambassador Moynihan said ominously that, if the MPLA succeeded, the Communists would be "next to Brazil." This prospect evidently upset the right-wing dictatorship in Brazil much less than it upset our UN ambassador, for Brazil was one of the first governments in the Western Hemisphere to recognize the MPLA as the government of Angola.

Then President Ford, reverting to his mood when the Thieu regime fell last year, started once again to blackguard his own country before the world. If we do not do such-and-such with regard to Angola, he said in effect, no adversary will ever fear us, no ally ever trust us. Mr. Ford still does not understand that hyperbole is a wasting asset. Someone should read him the story about the boy who cried wolf. It was only last May that he said, if Congress did not vote $722 million in military aid to General Thieu, the world would regard the United States as a feeble and perfidious nation. Congress didn't, and the world doesn't. Talk in this fake-apocalyptic vein turns everybody off.

Mr. Ford's apparent contention is that if the United States declines to act in a place where its interests are not immediately engaged, it will not act in a place of direct and vital American interest. For an American President to proclaim this to friend and foe is hardly a patriotic deed. It is also nonsense. It is as if to say that, since the Soviet Union did not fight over Cuba in 1962, the United States could have intervened with impunity in Eastern Europe. No one in the United States drew that conclusion from the Soviet withdrawal in 1962. I strongly doubt that any one in the Soviet Union is concluding today that our withdrawal from Vietnam or the Senate's action on Angola gives Moscow a blank check for foreign adventures.

Senator Clark's counter-argument is twofold. He fears that American aid would only increase Soviet aid and begin a process of escalation. Since we have no compliant Cubans to send in and the administration has excluded the commitment of American troops, the future of Angola would be totally beyond our control. We may well raise graver doubts about our "credibility," to use that odious word, by giving inadequate aid to a side that goes on to lose than by giving no aid at all. And a foreign policy whose "credibility" requires us to react to every Soviet move everywhere in the world surrenders the initiative to our adversary.

Moreover, Clark and his allies contend, the MPLA is a nationalist rather than a disciplined Communist movement. The Angolans have not thrown out the Portuguese in order to be ruled by the Russians. In the end the Soviet Union would be no more successful in controlling a client government in Luanda than the United States was in controlling a client government in Saigon. "The history of Soviet intervention in Africa," Clark observes, "is one of almost total failure." If the Russians want to have their own Vietnam in Africa, why should we deny them that pleasure?

The Soviet Viewpoint

How then would Clark gain his objective? He seems to think that we might make ground in Moscow by invoking general principles of detente. But detente in Soviet eyes means a series of specific and limited agreements. It does not mean a broad agreement to guarantee the status quo. Indeed, from the Soviet viewpoint the status quo is the world revolution, and those who block revolution are the disturbers of the status quo. If the Soviet Union will not cease and desist, Clark then says, the United States should stop its own intervention anyway and let Russia bear the opprobrium, expense and frustration of being the extra-continental ogre interfering in internal African affairs.

These are not bad arguments in a situation where no choices are satisfactory. Two things might be added. If the Soviet Union does not pull out the Cuban troops in the near future, the United States, it seems to me, must re-examine the policy of selling Russia the wheat and computers it so desperately needs. On the other hand, it is not impossible that Moscow wants to avoid escalation. The Izvestia statement on January 29 implying the possibility of a political solution may be a relieved Soviet response to the Senate's decision to cut off additional funds for Angola and to the unquestionable American determination, outside the administration, not to make a world issue of Angola. Let us explore this possibility at once.

Whatever we do, let our government explain calmly and precisely to Congress what it conceives the American stake in Angola to be; let Congress debate the matter soberly; and let no drastic steps be taken without congressional consent. As Averell Harriman so wisely said, "No foreign policy will stick unless the American people are behind it. And unless Congress understands it the American people aren't going to understand it."

Mr. Schlesinger is Albert Schweitzer Professor of the Humanities at the City University of New York and winner of Pulitzer Prizes in history and biography. He is also a member of the Journal's Board of Contributors, five distinguished professors who contribute periodic articles reflecting a broad range of views.

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Failure in Angola

How Side Backed by U.S. Crumbled

By David B. Ottaway
Washington Post Foreign Service

News Analysis

KINSHASA—At a rusted red gate on the dark, tree-shaded Avenue Plateau in midtown Kinshasa, a guard dressed in camouflage jungle dress and beret opens a small peephole and looks out. Satisfied with the identity card, he unsmilingly opens the door and allows the visitor to step through into the crumbling world of the National Front for the Liberation of Angola.

Downcast African and Portuguese refugees wander about the big compound, mixing with war veterans hobbling along on crutches or heavily bandaged. Babies cry. Officials scurry from building to building. Soldiers talk in hushed voices about the latest news from the battlefront.

The compound is crowded with trucks, water and gasoline tankers, buses with Angolan license plates, jeeps and Land Rovers in various stages of disrepair.

This is the Kinshasa headquarters—and last retreat—of the Western-backed National Front—a mass of bewildered refugees, soldiers, wounded veterans and officials all wondering what went wrong and what will happen to them now.

For the past two months, the news from northern Angola has been of one disaster after another—Caxito, Ambriz, Ambrizete, Camabatel, Carmona and Negage and now Santo Antonio do Zaire and Sao Salvador, towns that were once strongpoints in the National Front domain that only last

November stretched from the Zairian border to within 35 miles of Luanda, the Angolan capital.

All these towns have since fallen in rapid succession to the National Front's rival, Soviet- and Cuban-backed Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola. The National Front has been completely wiped off the Angolan political map, probably forever.

The rise and fall of the National Front, the Angolan faction the United States chose to back, was spectacular.

Less than two years ago, this nationalist group could rightfully boast of being the strongest of the three rival factions that had been fighting to oust the Portuguese from Angola since 1961.

When Lisbon was rocked by a military coup in April 1974, the National Front had by far the largest army (6,000 to 8,000), the greatest degree of natural cohesion (almost entirely Bakongo people and affiliated tribes) and an undisputed, iron-fisted, strong-willed leader in Holden Roberto.

By contrast, the Popular Movement was a mess—rent by internal ideological divisions and an unresolved struggle for power among half a dozen men while its guerrilla war inside Angola had practically come to a standstill. Even the Soviet Union had given up on it.

The National Front also had important foreign allies, beginning with neighboring Zaire, which provided training camps, military instructors, arms, logistical and diplomatic support and a 1,600-mile border from which to launch guerrilla attacks against the Portuguese.

In addition, it could boast of important friends in both the East and the West. China had sent 119 military instructors to train the guerrillas and provided tons of arms. The United States, through the Central Intelligence Agency, had given small amounts of money off and on almost since the National Front's inception.

Indeed, Holden Roberto had the distinction of being not only "Uncle Sam's man in Angola" but also Peking's.

Again by contrast, the Popular Movement had no friendly neighboring country from which to operate except the Congo, which only made possible attacks into the isolated enclave of Cabinda. Its main foreign backers were half a dozen radical African states far from Angola, plus distant Cuba.

What then happened to the National Front? Why did the largest and most cohesive Angolan faction end up the least effective? Why did it fail to emerge as the dominant party when it had so many initial advantages over the rival Popular Movement?

To hear National Front officials here tell it, none of the fault was theirs. The Soviet Union showered the Popular Movement with sophisticated weapons like the 122-mm, and "Stalin Organ" rockets, tanks, Migs and armored cars. The Cubans threw practically their entire Angolan force of 10,000 to 12,000 soldiers behind the Popular Movement's northern offensive into National Front territory beginning in December.

The National Front, on the other hand, got few modern weapons to match the Popular Movement's arsenal, and much of the heavy weaponry it did have was in the hands of Zairians, Portuguese and other foreigners.

Then there was the treacherous Western press, strangely enough led by the Americans, which participated in a deliberate campaign to discredit the National Front through scandalous and unfounded stories of CIA funding even of its president and of white mercenaries supposedly running its army. "There was a plot to liquidate us and you American journalists were part of it," said one bitter front official here.

But this self-serving account of the National Front's failure does not explain why it was already losing ground rapidly to the Popular Movement by the end of last summer—before more than a few hundred Cubans were in Angola and before the Soviet Union began pouring in heavy arms.

According to most Western journalists, diplomatic observers, Portuguese military officers and other assorted observers of the National Front, the key problems lay much closer to home. There were weaknesses in the leadership, structure and motivation of its organization, in its narrow ethnic base and in its faulty alliances with other Angolan political leaders.

To begin with, Holden Roberto practically had to be kicked out of Kinshasa last spring by Zairian President Sese Seko Mobutu before he would return to Angola to lead his own followers. Even then, it was not to be a triumphal entry into the capital as the leaders of the other two groups had made months before his belated return.

Instead, Roberto stayed within the safe confines of the front's northern domain and went to the battle front at Caxito, 35 miles north of Luanda, to play the role of commander-in-chief of his troops.

The reason for his behavior, according to his lieutenants, was that Roberto feared assassination if he set foot inside Luanda or outside his own turf. But the result was a major loss of face in the eyes of many Angolans, even among his supporters.

A shy introvert who seemed always to be hiding his true personality behind his ever-present dark glasses, the 53-year old Bakongo tribal chief from San Salvador (the old Bankongo capital) proved a disaster as a military commander.

Essentially, he offered tribal-style leadership to a would-be conventional army, and the two never meshed. He distrusted his Portuguese advisers—even his chief of staff, Col. Santos E. Castro—and feared the formation of a strong general staff organization that might threaten him.

He was unable to impart motivation or ideological fervor to his troops, and his army remained sluggish, lacking in indoctrination and unprofessional except for a few elite commando units. To the bitter end, the 122-mm rocket, a noisy but relatively ineffectual weapon, sowed utter panic in the ranks of his troops who never became accustomed to conventional warfare.

Contrary to what many Western press reports alleged, Roberto never wanted anything to do with white mercenaries and so never allowed more than about 150 Portuguese, many of them Angolan-born or bred, into his northern army. Some observers felt it was a question of distrust, others that it was racism of his part.

Whatever the reason, Roberto had no corps of hardened white mercenaries to spearhead his columns, as did his ally, the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola UNITA, in southern Angola. This considerably weakened the offensive capability of his northern army, according to Portuguese and other Western military observers.

When Roberto did decide to take on several hundred white Europeans in January, it was too little and too late to salvage his crumbling army. His mercenary policy was a fiasco.

Roberto's undoing can be traced back to August, when the last of his beaten troops were pushed out of Luanda, leaving the capital entirely in the hands of the Popular Movement. At that point Zairian President Mobutu is said to have concluded that Roberto would never become the leader of Angola and to have begun swinging his military aid to the UNITA army in the south.

Whether the CIA led the way or simply followed Zaire in this switch is not clear, but after August both Zaire and the agency were clearly disillusioned with the National Front and eager to bolster UNITA, until then badly neglected.

Without a doubt, the worst military judgment Roberto made in his short career as commander-in-chief came on Nov. 10, the eve of Angola's independence. He tried to send a single column of several thousand troops down the road from Caxito to seize Quifangondo, where Luanda's water supplies are located, only 12 miles from the outskirts of the capital.

Disregarding the advice of his Portuguese military advisers, according to a Portuguese journalist who was present, Roberto did not even attempt any diversionary tactics or flanking moves, and his compact, single column was torn apart in hail of 122mm. rockets. His troops retreated in disarray with heavy casualties.

The defeat marked the beginning of the end of the National Front in the north.

Thereafter the initiative was taken over by the Popular Movement's army, which began encircling front forces in Caxito and cutting its supply lines to the north.

There were other problems, too. One of the worst of these was Daniel Chipenda, a maverick guerrilla leader who split off from the Popular Movement after losing a leadership struggle in the summer of 1974. Chipenda joined the National Front with about 2,000 to 3,000 soldiers last spring.

Chipenda made use of his close ties with the South Africans, Portuguese rightists and mercenary circles to put together his own independent army in southern Angola in the name of the National Front.

When the National Front finally formed an alliance last fall with southern-based UNITA, it was Chipenda who carried the burden of trying to make it work on the ground in joint military maneuvers and deployment of troops.

But the "Chipenda Army" proved to be anything but an asset. It spent more time looting, robbing banks, raping and fighting UNITA forces than it did battling the Popular Movement.

Finally, in January, after a Christmas Eve shootout in Huambo, all hell broke lose between Chipenda's unruly forces and UNITA local

commanders, who decided to drive the National Front out of southern Angola. Chipenda fled to Kinshasa, where he continued his wheeling and dealing with white mercenaries.

Another serious failing of the National Front was its handling of the Western press. Front officials often showed an amazing ignorance of how to deal with journalists and were terribly awkward in explaining their cause.

One front official was fond of telling this correspondent how the Angolan struggle was basically a "racial war" against the mulattos allegedly in control of the Popular Movement. (There are in fact many Angolans of mixed African and Portuguese blood in high positions inside the movement.)

"The true (black) sons of Angola must rule the country," the official kept saying. "These mulattos must be driven out of the capital."

As for its "ideology," the National Front made much of its anticommunism, but this theme rang false and opportunistic. After all, had not Roberto befriended Peking? Had not both the Chinese and the North Koreans helped to train the front's army? And had not the front deliberately portrayed itself as pro-Chinese in its guerrilla strategy?

The front's mishandling of press relations seemed sometimes astounding. At the African summit on Angola in Addis Ababa last month, the front was the one Angolan faction that held no press conference to defend its cause, despite Roberto's presence there.

Later, in January, the front sent a high level delegation to Washington in an unprecedented open attempt to lobby for aid with Congress. But at the same time, when it desperately needed press coverage to prove it still existed, front leaders here refused to make any effort to take correspondents of The Washington Post and The New York Times into northern Angola.

In the end, the front proved as inept in the propaganda war as on the battlefield, where the Popular Movement won an amazing number of victories by default.

In the final weeks, the front army often did not even bother to fight and sometimes simply abandoned towns 24 hours or more before the popular Movement actually arrived.

The National Front army was apparently not alone to blame for the unseemly rout of its forces from the north, according to Western journalists and Portuguese refugee accounts.

The Zairian army, which was supposed to have provided artillery and armored vehicle support, also fled and in many cases fled first, leaving the front's army without any defense against the Popular Movement's rocket fire and tanks.

Refugees and several correspondents present during the evacuation from Camabatela, Negage and Uige say the behavior of the Zairian soldiers was far more reprehensible than the National Front army's.

Zairian officers, they say, looted houses for furniture and rounded up cattle to take back to sell on the meat-short Kinshasa market. "I never saw one of them shoot off a shot except to kill cows, said a French journalist who asked not to be identified.

According to Portuguese refugee accounts, Zairian troops in one case staged mock raid on a village posing as Popular Movement soldiers to frighten the inhabitants away so they could loot their homes.

When planes loaded with supplies landed at Negage airfield, itself totally stripped of all valuable equipment by Zairian army personnel, there were struggles between the Zairians and National Front soldiers to see who would get the fuel and arms that were aboard. "I don't think the Zairians have many friends among front soldiers," said the French journalist.

While front officials will never say so publicly, several here commented in private that they doubt that all of the arms supposedly sent by the United States and other Western powers reached them. They believe, without having any definite proof, that some of their arms were quietly stolen, or bought, as they passed through various European and Zairian army intermediaries.

But these same officials say they are also convinced that Zairian President Mobutu was unaware of what was going on and would never have permitted it.

Whatever the truth about what happened to its arms, it is certain that the National Front got little help from the Zairian army when it faced its toughest hours of the war.

It is unlikely that the 1,200 to 1,500 Zairian soldiers, with their light Panhard armored cars and only a few heavy artillery pieces, could have done more than delay the Popular Movement's advance if they had dug in and fought alongside the front army. But without their help, the front's position was hopeless.

The real tragic figure of the National Front saga remains Holden Roberto himself. In attempting to run a one-man show, he failed to build the front into an organizaton extending beyond himself or its army into much more than a mass of soldiers bound to him personally, like tribesmen to their chief.

Having spent practically all his life in Zaire dreaming of his return to Angola, Roberto seems doomed to live in eternal exile, a defeated tribal chief overcome by events and developments he did not fully understand and failed to cope with.

East Asia

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1 3 FEB 1976

Victor Zorza

Kremlin Forgery, Chinese Lesson

The Kremlin is circulating a forged political "testament" in which Chou En-lai, the Chinese prime minister who died last month, is shown to have called on the nation to follow policies favored by Moscow.

Chou's will, says Tass, the official Soviet news agency, was distributed by his wife to members of the Chinese party leadership after his death. The text does not refer directly to the Sino-Soviet dispute, but it warns China's leaders against joining an alliance with the "capitalist" countries—which is something that Moscow has been warning them about for a long time. It also shows Chou as downgrading agriculture and emphasizing heavy industry—which is in direct opposition to Mao's teaching, but in line with the policy always urged on China by the Kremlin.

The document shows a number of similarities with other such forgeries, which are usually planted on foreign newspapers and are then given worldwide publicity through the Soviet propaganda network. The KGB's Department "D" (for "disinformation") has nothing to learn from the CIA's department of dirty tricks, which has in the past distributed similarly crude political forgeries.

This may be just a propaganda operation, but it is also possible that the Kremlin is playing a deeper game. What the Kremlin may be saying to Peking is that if any Chinese leaders are inclined to follow the policies Moscow now ascribed to Chou, they would find willing helpers in the Soviet Union. Another timely hint has been dropped by the Kremlin's top China watcher, Mikhail Kapitsa, in the only interview he has ever given to Western newspapers. Moscow evidently decided that this was the best way to pass the message to Peking. Kapitsa, the head of the Soviet Foreign Ministry's Far East Department, told the Rome L'Espresso that "we are counting on the new leaders" who will emerge after Chou and Mao. "With them," he said, "we will be able to negotiate."

He indicated that it may be some time before this happens, but if anyone in Peking is now looking for signals from Moscow, the Kremlin's message will have got through. That there are such people, and that the restoration of links with Moscow is an issue in the current succession struggle, has been repeatedly shown by Peking's denunciation of those who would "sell out" to the Soviet Union. That Kapitsa is more knowledgeable about the Peking leadership situation than Western analysts, who believe that any serious Sino-Soviet rapprochement is out of the question, is also shown by his prediction about the succession to Chou.

Unlike Western government analysts who believed that Chou En-lai had made sure before his death that he would be succeeded as Prime Minister by Teng Hsaio-ping, who would continue his own moderate policies, Kapitsa argued that Teng was merely a transitional figure. Teng's role, he believed, was merely to ease the way into power for the radical faction around Mao. The radicals have not quite won yet, but the appointment of Hua Kuo-feng, the security minister, as acting prime minister has obviously put Teng Hsaio-ping's nose out of joint.

How did it happen? Some of the old China hands who provide intelligence analyses for Washington policy-makers have been questioned quite sharply about their failure to read correctly the signs in the Chinese press which pointed to attempts to unseat Teng Hsiao-ping. The questions are not just part of the internal bureaucratic backbiting, but they reflect a real concern about the quality of the intelligence on the Communist world now being provided for higher officials.

Why, officials ask, are government analysts wrong so often? When one columnist, Joseph Kraft, drew attention recently to security minister Hua as a rising star, U.S. officials asked the analysts whether this meant that Hua might be in line for the succession. They were firmly told that Hua was far too unimportant to qualify, and that, anyway, Teng Hsiao-ping was too securely entrenched to be dislodged. Another columnist who shall be nameless, has evidence which pointed to Teng's growing vulnerability. But official analysts repeatedly wrote stern rebuttals of any such interpretation.

Questions about the quality of analysis are now being raised by some Washington officials who are becoming concerned about the possibility of a Sino-Soviet rapprochement. Once again government analysts tend to dispute, by and large, the considerable body of evidence suggesting that things have been moving toward a rapprochement for some time past. The analysts' objections to any such interpretations have previously been accepted without much question by officials at policy-making levels. These officials' own wishful thinking about the irreversible nature of the Sino-Soviet split has worked to reinforce the analysts' attachment to conclusions to which they had become committed by constant repetition.

But the "surprise" and "shock" which so many experts have freely admitted on hearing the news from Peking about Teng Hsiao-ping has raised some serious questions about their expertise. Perhaps it may do something to improve the quality of analysis on one of the most important foreign policy questions of the time. No one now denies that the outbreak of the Sino-Soviet dispute—which also remained undetected by most government experts for a long time, and was even hotly denied by them at first—was a truly historic event. Any movement toward reconciliation would he hardly less important.

Why, officials ask, have Communist area intelligence analysts failed so often? They point not only to China, but also to the Soviet Union and the failure to predict the fall of Khrushchev and the invasion of Czechoslovakia, to name only the most obvious cases. They wonder whether analysts whose reputations have long been protected by official secrecy and anonymity ought perhaps to be given a salutary shock. They ask whether some of their work should perhaps be opened to outside inspection, in order to learn from their mistakes—and to publicize past errors for the sake of future improvements.

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1 5 FEB 1976

Tightening the Reins in South Korea

SEOUL—Locked in the depths of winter, this capital is a dismally gray and frozen city. The political climate for those who would oppose the will of South Korea's strongman is similarly bleak. In a methodical consolidation of his personal power over the country's 35 million people, President Park Chung Hee has legislated, intimidated and finessed all opposition into effective silence.

Christian activists and students traditionally in the vanguard of demonstrations for the restoration of full democracy and human rights are disorganized and inactive. Some opposition politicians still speak out, but press censorship prevents their words from reaching the public.

The key to Park's success in

gagging his once vociferous critics is the ever-present threat of a North Korean invasion and the president's adroit exploitation of South Korean fears. "Democratic forces in this country have no support," the leading opposition figure, Kim Dae Jung, complains. "We are hemmed in from the left by the Communists and from the right by a military dictatorship supported by the United States."

Draconian emergency laws proclaimed by Park last May after the fall of Vietnam prohibit all but the feeblest opposition. In the most recent trial, 18 students received sentences of up to 6 years for demonstrating at Seoul's Myongdong Cathedral.

The leading political prisoner is Kim Chi Ha, the country's foremost poet. Once sentenced to death, he is now serving a 15-year sentence in solitary confinement. The cells around him have been emptied and Kim is allowed no visitors and no reading or writing materials.

The chances of a North Korean attack, American officials believe, are now no greater than they were before the fall of Saigon, but Park has not rescinded the emergency laws or the general mobilization orders. Instead, he appears to be moving doggedly toward "Korean style democracy," the idea being to advance to economic and military strength without the weakening influence of open political life.

The depoliticization process accelerated dramatically in December when Park requested the resignation of Prime Minister Kim Jong Pil and his cabinet. Kim is a brilliant organizer with strong political support of his own. At least potentially, he is a rival for the presidency.

The new premier, Chol Kyu Hah, is a veteran non-political bureaucrat. He told an interviewer, "Frankly speaking, I've no knack for politics. I'm supposed to execute faithfully the policies directed by the president."

LAST YEAR there were three members of the opposition New Democratic Party with the political support to offer some challenge to Park's presidency. One of them is dead and the other two are facing possible imprisonment.

Kim Dae Jung, 49, polled 49 per cent of the vote when he ran against Park in 1971. Although Gulf Oil has since admitted making a $4 million contribution to Park's campaign, it was Kim who underwent a 3-year trial for alleged violations of the election laws dating back to 1967.

In August, 1973, Kim was kidnapped from a Tokyo hotel and abducted to Seoul by members of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency. He was convicted in December, sentenced to a year's imprisonment and is free on appeal under round-the-clock surveillance.

Kim Young Sam, president of the New Democratic Party, annoyed many supporters by agreeing, at a secret meeting with Park early in 1975, to cooperate with the government. The concession did him little good. After Kim called for restoration of the constitution and freedom for political prisoners, he was indicted under the emergency measures. A committee of 10 lawyers will defend him, but his activities meanwhile are restricted and his financial backers are thinking about their own safety.

Chang Chun Ha, soldier, politician and writer, was a living legend in South Korea. Imprisoned more than 10 times under Syngman Rhee and Park, he embodied the spirit of resistance for many Koreans. Last Aug. 17, he was reported killed in a mountain climbing fall.

Some of the circumstances were suspicious and rumors that his death was not an accident are widespread among the Seoul intelligentsia.

"We believe he was killed by the KCIA," an old friend said. "Perhaps subordinates were exceeding their orders."

There is no hard proof but fear and paranoia about the KCIA are such that the murder theory is taking hold. "It was," a foreign observer mused, "an extraordinary coincidence, extraordinary."

Observers say the KCIA, once widely accused of torture, now operates with subtlety. Its well-targeted operations reportedly cause enough fear to obviate the need for torture, which provokes emotional protest at home and abroad.

"They are trying to get the sadists over there (the KCIA) under control," one diplomat said. "You don't need a rubber hose," another Westerner explained, "when you have Emergency Measure 9. It works beautifully."

An opposition organizer was grudgingly respectful. "It's very thorough. They know our theories, philosophies and tactics."

On university campuses, knowledgeable observers believe, Park's regime uses the Student Defense Corps to create an atmosphere for informers. It is a pervasive government presence. Membership is compulsory. No other student organization may exist without the participation of a corps officer.

Student arrests go unreported, but there are said to be about a hundred students under detention at any one time. The pattern is to pick up suspect students and release them after a frightening day or two University graduates are required to produce their police records at job interviews. If an arrest for demonstrating is listed, the applicant is not likely to get the job. Professors are encouraged to keep watch over their students.

NO ONE KNOWS how deeply the KCIA has penetrated into adult society. But suspicion breeds distrust among fellow-workeers and neighbors. Bugging of telephones is a common practice, and a visitor will hear categorical assertions that the KCIA has informers and agents in churches, factories, bar associations and the opposition parties.

The countryside is under strong control by the interlocking and sometimes competitive KCIA, the national police, the paramilitary reserve forces, army intelligence and the presidential protection service. The "new village" development program puts government supporters in charge of each of the country's 35,000 villages. Observers also believe the Civil Defense Corps, which compulsorily enrolls every able-bodied man, is primarily a mechanism for indoctrination and motivation.

The leading figures in the political and unofficial opposition are biding their time. The hopelessness of resistance while the emergency statutes are on the books leaves them no alternative. Kim Dae Jung and Kim Young Sam both point to prevailing social inequities and predict that the Korean people will eventually cast Park out. Another politician tells his KCIA shadow every day, "The people will rise up against you."

Kim Dae Jung argues that Park has exaggerated the threat from the North and that by limiting freedoms, "he is pursuing a dangerous course" which might ultimately betray the country to Kim Il Sung.

"What is real strength?" Kim Dae Jung said. "President Park has strong power and guns and money, but he is poor in his people's support." But most observers in Seoul think Kim Dae Jung is engaging in wishful thinking. Park has never looked more firmly in the saddle.

—JOHN SAAR

Latin America

WASHINGTON POST
12 FEB 1976

Hobart Rowen

The World Bank in Chile

The World Bank the other day approved a $33 million copper development loan for Chile, thus endorsing the curious U.S. penchant for propping up dictatorial and oppressive governments.

My Washington Star colleague, Mary McGrory, reported that an effort by a group of eight American citizens to talk World Bank President Robert S. McNamara out of the commitment was to no avail.

McNamara told the group that the loan was being made on "purely economic grounds," and that to refuse it would be a "political" act forbidden by the bank charter. But how, then, does one explain the bank's cold shoulder to the Marxist Allende government?

The fact about this latest effort to stabilize the present authoritarian regime in Chile is that there is considerable nose-holding in the bank over it.

Many nations, it is true, fear a precedent leading to politicization of the bank. "If this loan were to be barred on political grounds," says a high U.S. official, "then you could challenge a dozen World Bank loans on human rights issues."

However, in the Chilean loan case, countries with about 35 per cent of the bank's voting power abstained, and 4 per cent (representing the Nordic countries) voted against the loan. And the basic reason for most of this near 40 per cent opposition relates to serious doubts about the credit-worthiness of the Chilean military junta.

The most recent Chilean economic statistics published by the International Monetary Fund show an inflation rate so steep that it runs off the charts. On a base of 1970 equal to 100, the consumer price index ran up to 874 at the approximate time of the Allende assassination, Sept. 11, 1973.

In 1974, under the junta, the index number skyrocketed to 5,797, and in October 1975 hit an unbelievable 38,101. That's an increase of 38,000 per cent since 1970.

This correspondent can report that when the discussion of the loan came up at the bank's board of directors' meeting, McNamara had to admit that the present Chilean government is not in good shape.

But he argued that the bank could take the risk, in view of the much more extensive commitments made to Chile by the United States and other lenders. He then went on to deplore the opposition to the loan, which he said would demonstrate a division in the board "harmful" to the bank.

That there is political opposition to the Chilean junta—which the British have labeled "uncivilized"—can hardly be denied. One regrets only that the United States, which did all it could to bring down the Allende regime, does not acknowledge officially the brutalities of the current junta.

But McNamara chose to ignore the concerns of a number of Western European countries. They pointed out that the current Chilean government had not improved its balance of payments situation. Exports are falling and imports are rising. Chile has been forced, therefore, to ask other lenders to reschedule its debt payments.

Putting those considerations together, the opposing countries suggested McNamara should wonder whether Chile might not soon be forced to ask for a delay in repayment of existing World Bank loans.

McNamara's backers scoff at what they call a rationalization by the political opposition.

But even the supporters of the loan privately admit that if the Chilean junta were not so blatantly vicious, the bank might be more generous. The $33 million, they stress, is just a drop in the bucket.

This very assessment, however, proves that political considerations already intrude. If the main worry is that an effort to protect human rights in Chile would force the bank to protect human rights elsewhere, is that so bad? That shocks the banking instinct: It would transform the World Bank into a different institution. Well, if so, so be it.

NEW YORK TIMES, THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 19, 1976

Chile Files 'Vigorous' Protest Over U.N. Report on Torture

Special to The New York Times

GENEVA, Feb. 18—The Chilean Government has filed a "most formal and vigorous protest" over a United Nations report that accused it of having "institutionalized" torture.

The report, prepared by a special five-man expert group of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, is being discussed by the 32-nation body at its current session here. Because the group was denied admission to Chile, its report, completed here on Jan. 30, was based on documents and on witnesses who testified before it.

The Chilean protest, contained in a 30-page document, said that the report contained "unconfirmed assertions, obvious contradictions and flagrant exaggerations" and that its analysis of the Chilean situation was "neither objective nor serious."

Responding to charges that the "denial of human rights and inhuman, cruel and degrading treatment" had become a "pattern of governmental policies in Chile," the Government of Gen. Augusto Pinochet denounced the report as based "almost exclusively on the statements of witnesses, sworn enemies" of the Chilean Government.

Lack of Proof Charged

"No proof is offered of the truth of their assertions," the Chilean document declared.

The Chilean Goveernment protested that the group's completed report was "basically the same" as the interim report it had prepared for the debate on Chile at the last session of the United Nations General Assembly.

The protest said that the report did not take into account the statements made by Chile at the Assembly and the information supplied by the Government on the gradual restoration of the rights and procedures that had been suspended when President Salvador Allende Gossens was overthrown in September 1973.

Rejecting as unfounded the report's conclusion that torture continued to exist on a large scale in Chile, the Government said the gropu's investigation had been "biased and irresponsible."

The Chilean document denounced as a "product of her imagination" the testimony given the experts by Dr. Sheila Cassidy, a 38-year-old British surgeon, who said she had been tortured with electric shocks while in custody. Dr. Cassidy was released at the end of December and expelled from Chile. Her testimony was cited at length in the report.

The Chilean document said it could not be reasonably believed that if she had been tortured the Government knowingly ran the risk of freeing her just in tim efor her to testify before the group.

The Government also sought to refute the testimony of Bishop Helmut Frenz, the German-born head of the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Chile. Bishop Frenz, who was expelled from Chile last June, has testified that General Pinochet had said before him that if the regime's opponents were not tortured "they will not sing."

The Chilean document charged that the Bishop's activies in Chile were "more political than pastoral," it said he had shown in various public statement a "predilection for, and leaning toward, the Socialist system."

When introducing the Chilean document today before the Human Rights Commission the Chilean representative, Sergio Diez, said that the government's aim was to establish a "true democracy" and not a "paper democracy."